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Introduction 1
As do most private individuals, States and the entities they control, conclude contracts 
on a daily basis. One could expect that the bargains made with a private operator are 
extensively documented. This applies in particular for long term contracts involving 
massive amount of capital and touching upon key resources of the State. Experience 
indeed shows that such contracts tend to be meticulously drafted and include detailed 
provisions covering many questions.2 Against this background, it could be asked why 
it is relevant to focus on the law applicable to such agreements. The importance of 
determining the law applicable to 'state contracts' 3 follows from the peculiar features 
of a contractual relation with a State, and most notably the additional risk this creates. 
As in the domestic context, the State is not a contractual partner like any other. It 
comes into the contractual relationship with its exorbitant powers and sometimes bad 
manners. This explains why, in contrast with private agreements, where such clauses 
are too often neglected, provisions on applicable law and settlement of disputes are 
often  considered  the  “most  sensitive  legal  issues”  in  the  framework  of  contracts 
concluded  by  States.4 In  the  sovereign  bond  market  for  example,  it  appears  that 
international  investors  pay  due  attention  to  the  law which  governs  bond issues  – 
staying  away  from debt  securities  of  emerging  market  sovereign  issuers  that  are 
governed by the law of the issuing state fearing that “the sovereign might someday be 
tempted  to  change  its  own  law  in  a  way  that  would  impair  the  value  or  the 
enforceability of those securities”.5
The question of the legal regime governing contracts  concluded by States or state 
entities with private  partners  is,  however,  made complex due to  several  elements. 
First,  contracts concluded by States are quite often kept confidential  – if not their 
existence, at least the detailed provisions thereof.6 This makes the examination more 
difficult  as  one  must  rely  mainly  on  documentation  disclosed  during  disputes. 
1 A large part of the research for this contribution has been carried out at the Max Planck Institute for  
Comparative and International Law (Hamburg), whose helpful staff deserves much credit for its 
kind assistance.
2 Often the provisions of such contracts are directly dictated or at least, by statutory provisions – see  
e.g. the various provisions in the Petroleum Act of Turkmenistan (March 7, 1997) – articles 16 ff 
dictate  the  various  elements  which  must  be  included  in  the  licence  agreements  granted  by 
Turkmenistan authorities. They could also find their source in model contracts, such as the IBA 
Model Mining Development Agreement, a preliminary version of which was released in 2011 to 
serve “as a negotiation template for investor-state agreements in the mining sector in developing 
countries”.
3 In this contribution, this phrase is used without reference to specific doctrinal constructions as to the 
content  and  legal  regime  of  contracts  concluded  by  States.  Rather  it  simply  encapsulates  all  
contracts concluded by a government or a government agency.
4 R. Dolzer & Ch. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) at p. 74.
5 As noted by L. C. Buchheit and M. Gulati, 'Restructuring a Nation's Debt', 29(5) Intl. Fin. L. Rev. 
46, 48 (2010).  Messrs  Buchheit  and Gulati  also note that  by contrast,  local  law-governed debt 
securities  issued by  industrialised  countries  are  welcomed by  the  international  capital  markets, 
probably because investors believe that “industrialised countries are less likely than some of their 
emerging market brethren to risk eroding future investor confidence by opportunistically changing 
their own law in order to reduce government debt service burdens”.
6 Contracts  concluded in the oil  sector  are,  however,  a  notable  exception  as  they  are  frequently 
published – see e.g. the collection Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts (Barrows Company, 
New York).
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Uncertainty remains therefore on the true extent of practice.
Second, there is a wide diversity of agreements which a State could conclude with 
private  partners.7 If  one  leaves  aside  the  contracts  which  have  no  cross-border 
aspects,8 a rapid overview learns that there is indeed a large variety of contract which 
may be signed by a State, as States and their offshoots often engage in international 
contractual bargains : beyond the agreements for very large projects such as energy 
exploration and production agreements and the agreements relating to utilities and 
infrastructures  (such  as  the  'build,  operate  and  own',  'build,  operate  and  transfer' 
schemes and other contracts  linked to project finance ventures  9),  States may also 
conclude  loan  agreements  -  or  attempt  to  finance  their  budget  shortfalls  through 
issuance of state bonds -, contracts for supplies and services, rental agreements and 
contracts of employment. A State could further conclude a contract for a long or a 
short term. The contract could heavily concerns the public interests of the state – such 
as  when  a  State  grants  a  foreign  company  the  right  to  explore  important  natural 
resources such as oil and gas – or barely touch upon such interests – which will be the 
case when a State hires a local administrative assistant to work in an embassy opened 
in another country. It may finally be that the contract is signed directly by the State or 
one of its sub-entities 10 or is concluded by a state-owned company. It could even be 
signed by a consortium of States.11 Given this variety, it must be recognized that “no 
general pattern applicable to all situations has emerged in practice”.12
Finally, the question has long been obscured by a lively debate on the nature and 
essence of contracts concluded by States.13 This debate cannot properly be understood 
7 As observed by I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (OUP, 7th ed. 2008) at p.546.
8 Without  attempting  to  define  when  a  contract  becomes  international.  In  the  famous  Texaco 
Overseas arbitration,  Prof.  Dupuy  adopted  a  simple  definition  of  the  international  nature  of  a 
contract, holding that an international contract is that “whose elements are not all located in the 
same territory” - Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., California Asiatic Oil co. v. Government of the  
Libyan Arab Republic, 17 ILM 11, § 22 (1978).
9 Project finance is used among others for the financing of the development or exploitation of a right,  
natural resource or other asset. Under this scheme, the government grants a concession agreement  
or license to the project company which is at the center of the project.
10 Which could take the form of a contract concluded between several local entities, such as cities or 
regions. See generally M. Audit, Les conventions transnationales entre personnes publiques (LGDJ, 
2002).
11 This was the case for the agreement which led to the famous rulings of the Swiss Supreme Court in  
the Westland case : the court was requested to determine whether the Republic of Egypt was party 
to an arbitration agreement included in a contract signed by an organization enjoying separate legal  
personality,  which has  been set  up by treaty by several  States  (among which Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia).  The arbitral  tribunal reached through what  they considered to  be a legally  transparent  
organization to take jurisdiction over Egypt and the other State which had created the organization 
by treaty (ICC Award, Case No. 3879). The award was later annulled by the Swiss Supreme Court 
(Westland Helicopters v. Egypt, AOI & Arab British Helicopter Co.,  XVI Yearb. Com. Arb.  174 
(1991).
12 R. Dolzer & Ch. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) at p. 72.
13 The ultimate form of questioning of the legal  nature of state contracts probably relate to loans  
extended to States. As is well known, Drago argued in 1907 that such loans were not legally binding 
contracts, the relationship between the State and the creditor being not one based on contract but on  
sovereignty (L. M. Drago, 'Les emprunts d'Etat et leurs rapports avec la politique internationale', 
Revue générale de droit international public 251 ff. (1907)). For a thorough discussion of this issue, 
see G. van Hecke, Problèmes juridiques des emprunts internationaux (Brill, 2nd ed., 1964), pp. 17-
25. In a more recent past, some States have attempted to portray the contracts as 'administrative 
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without  taking into account  the historical  climate which presided to  this  doctrinal 
discussion.  Those were the days where contracts  concluded by States  were still  a 
rarity  –  or  at  least,  thought  to  be  not  so  frequent.14 When  such  contracts  were 
concluded, they largely concerned very important projects, vital for the interests of the 
States concerned and, most importantly, these contracts were from time to time called 
in question by States 15 – with some contracting States going as as far as unilaterally 
repudiating the agreement, an attack which the system of diplomatic protection could 
on its own not sustain.
This explains why scholars attempted to build a legal framework protecting private 
contracting parties.16 17 In doing so, they borrowed from both public international law 
and French administrative law.18 The theory sometimes involved the creation of  a 
distinction between the law applicable to the contract and another set of rules, which 
would provide a legal grounding for the contract.19 This Kelsenian legal grounding - 
'ordre juridique de base' or 'Grundlegung' – which would precede the applicable law 
contracts, which would entitle the State to modify unilaterally the content of the agreement. In BP v.  
Libya, the claimant submitted a legal opinion stating that concession contracts should under Libyan  
law be considered to belong to the category of administrative contracts, which the government has 
the right to change unilaterally (British Petroleum Exploration Company Ltd. (BP) v. Government  
of  the  Libyan  Arab  Republic,  53  ILR  297,  324  (1979).  Judge  Lagergren  dismissed  this  view 
cursorily (53 ILR 297, 327).
14 In  reality,  States  have  always  engaged  in  cross-border  contractual  relationships,  as  may  be 
evidenced from case law. See e.g. the decision of the French Supreme Court of January 22, 1849, 
Spanish Government v Lambeje and Pujol (D, 1849, 1, at p. 5) – which concerned the sale to the 
Kingdom of Spain of shoes by two businessmen established in Bayonne.
15 The most well-known attempts by States to modify the terms of contracts they have concluded,  
concerned long term agreements in the oil industry. History shows, however, that States have also 
attempted to modify or otherwise set aside provisions of loan agreements they have concluded. See 
the various cases summarized by  R. H. Ryan,  'Defaults and Remedies',  in Sovereign Lending : 
Managing Legal Risks (M. Gruson & R. Reisner (eds.), Euromoney, 1984), 157, 158-160 – and in 
particular the ruling in  United States v National City Bank of New York  90 F. Supp. 448 (SDNY 
1950)).
16 It has been pointed out that the attempts to build a specific framework protecting contracting parties 
bound  with  a  States,  emanated  from  academics  from  capital-exporting  countries  –  see  M. 
Sornarajah The International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2nd ed. 2004) at pp. 403-404. It is 
true that scholars from (formerly) less developed nations often have taken argument with the grand 
scheme of 'internationalized state contracts'.
17 A first attempt to disconnect contracts concluded by States from the application of municipal law, 
was to argue that such contracts were governed by certain legal standards which existed outside 
municipal law and were not strictly part of international law. See on this autonomous approach to 
State contracts and the writings of Lord McNair and Verdross, the thoughtful explanations of  I.  
Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty : State Contracts and International Arbitration (Hart, 2011), 48-
50.
18 See mainly P. Weil, 'Problèmes relatifs aux contrats passés entre un Etat et un particulier', Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy, vol. 128, 98 ff., in particular 159 (1970).
19 See e.g. Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 1, 11-12, § 26 (1978) – where the arbitrator explains that “it seems  
desirable to establish a distinction between the 'law which governs the contract and the legal order  
from which the binding nature of the contract stems'” (quoting Prof. van Hecke's Report to the 
Institute). According to the arbitrator, the latter was to be found in “international law itself”.
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to the contract,20 was sometimes found in “general principles”  21 but most often in 
international law.22 At its most extreme, the doctrine involved a claim that contracts 
concluded between States and foreign companies should be assimilated to treaties.23
These attempts, which resulted in the use of specially created terminology such as 
'investment contracts' or 'economic development agreements', were backed by some 
milestone arbitral  awards  24 which culminated with the  Texaco award rendered by 
Professor  René-Jean  Dupuy,25 in  which  the  arbitrator  held  that  an  oil  concession 
agreement between a company established in the United States and the government of 
Libya, had been 'internationalized', i.e. that it was directly governed by international 
law.26 The arbitrator rested its case on two main elements : first the reference in the 
contract  itself  to  principles  of  international  law  27 and  second,  the  nature  of  the 
20 See the critical discussion by P. Mayer, 'Le mythe de l'ordre juridique de base ou Grundlegung', in 
Le droit des relations économiques internationales – études offertes à Berthold Goldman, (Litec, 
1982) 217 ff. and A. Kassis, Le nouveau droit européen des contrats internationaux (LGDJ 1993) 
231-243.
21 This is the approach adopted by Verdross and Rengeling, as summarized by I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, 
'The  Theory  of  Quasi-International  and  Partly  International  Agreements',  Revue  belge  de  droit 
international at p. 569-570 (1975).
22 See most notably, K.-H. Böckstiegel, Der Staat als Vertragspartner ausländischer Privatunternhemen 
(Athenäum, 1971), at p. 185 (who referred to the 'völkervertragsrechtliche Natur' of such contracts) 
and more recently, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law (Kluwer, 1999, 3rd ed.), at p. 
43-44.
23 See for this claim,  e.g.  A. Verdross, 'Quasi-International Agreements and International Economic 
Transactions', Yearb. World Affairs 230 (1964).
24 One  may  distinguish  in  this  respect  early  awards  which  essentially  accepted  that  a  contract 
concluded with a State, could be disconnected from the law of that State, without attempting to 
build  this  disconnection  within  a  general  theoretical  framework  (see  e.g.  Lena  Goldfields  
Arbitration 36 Corn. L. Q. 31 (1950);  Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheik of Abu Dhabi  18 ILR 
144 (1951); Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co. 27 ILR 117 (1963); Sapphire International  
Petroleum Ltd v. National Iranian Oil Co. 35 ILR 136 (1967)) from later cases where parties relied 
on the process of internationalisation as such (see most famously the three arbitration which arose 
out  of  the  nationalisation  by  Libya  of  oil  concessions  :  British  Petroleum  (Libya)  Ltd.  v.  
Government  of  the  Libyan Arab Republic  53 ILR 297 (1979);  Libyan American  Oil  Company  
(Liamco)  v.  Government  of  the  Libyan  Arab  Republic 62  ILR  140  (1982);  Texaco  Overseas 
Petroleum Co., California Asiatic Oil co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 ILM 1 
(1978); see also  American Independent Oil Company Inc (Aminoil) v Government of the State of  
Kuwait 21 ILM 976 (1982). The interpretation and exact consequences of these various rulings, has  
been long a matter of controversy. It has been argued that some scholars have derived from these  
awards principles and rules which cannot firmly be grounded in what the arbitrators decided. See 
e.g. the criticism by Sornarajah of the reading by Mann of various awards (M. Sornarajah, 'The 
Myth of International Contract Law', 15 J. World Trade Law 187 at p. 201-206 (1981).
25 Texaco Overseas  Petroleum Co.,  California Asiatic  Oil  co.  v.  Government  of  the  Libyan Arab  
Republic, 17 ILM 1 (1978). This award has been commented on numerous occasions. See recently 
J.  Cantegreil,  'The  Audacity  of  the  Texaco/Calasiatic Award  :  René-Jean  Dupuy  and  the 
Internationalization of Foreign Investment Law', EJIL 441-458 (2011(2)).
26 The arbitrator first held that the law governing the arbitration was international law, relying mainly 
on the fact that applying the law of a sovereign State would constitute a violation of the sovereign 
immunity of Libya (Texaco (fn. 8) 17 ILM 1, 8-9 at §§ 11-16 (1978)).
27 The choice of law clause (clause 28) read as follows : “This concession shall be governed by and  
interpreted in accordance with the principles  of  the law of Libya common to the principles  of  
international law and in the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the 
general  principles  of  law,  including  such  of  those  principles  as  may  have  been  applied  by 
international tribunals”. As has been noted, it is peculiar to refer to this choice of law, as the theory 
of internationalization of State contracts rests on the assumption that such a contract is by itself  
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agreement, which the arbitrator deemed to be an 'economic development agreement' 
which by nature was subject to international law.28 The application of international 
law did not exclude that the contract could also be governed by national law, if parties 
had expressly indicated their choice for such a law.29 The application of national law 
did not, however, prevent the application of international law.30 
It  seems that this attempt is today largely abandoned,31 even if  the discussion still 
lingers in some quarters.32 This may be explained first by the fact that conflicts, which 
were very vivid in the 1960's and the 1970's in the field of international investment 
agreements, following a wave of renegotiation and nationalization of natural resources 
operations, particularly in the oil industry, have apparently been subdued.33 If there is 
subject to international law, without any need to consider what parties have agreed.
28 Mr Dupuy also relied on the fact that the concession agreement included an arbitration agreement, 
noting that “the inclusion of an arbitration clause leads to a reference to the rules of international  
law” (  Texaco  (fn. 8)  17 ILM 1, 16 at § 44 (1978)). The arbitrator also noted that “even if one 
considers  that  the  choice  of  international  arbitration  proceedings  cannot  by  itself  lead  to  the 
exclusive application of international law, it is one of the elements which makes it possible to detect  
a certain internationalization of the contract” (idem).
29 See e.g. in  Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 1, 18, § 49-50 (1978) – where the arbitrator held, “in order to 
clarify the scope of the internationalization of the contracts” that national law could be raised to the  
level of the international legal order, if parties have expressly incorporated national law into their 
contract.
30 In the Texaco award, Prof. Dupuy noted that “the reference made by the contracts under dispute to 
the principles of Libyan law does not nullify the effect of internationalization of the contracts which 
has  already  resulted  from  their  nature  as  economic  development  agreements  and  recourse  to 
international arbitration for the settlement of disputes” (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 1, 18, § 49 (1978)).
31 See the radical critique by Berlin (D. Berlin, 'Contrats d'Etat', in Rép. International Dalloz (Dalloz, 
1998),  pp.  3-7).  Berlin  concludes  that  “toutes  les  constructions théoriques  permettant  de  faire  
entrer les contrats d'Etat dans la sphère du droit international, en l'absence de convention en la  
matière, non seulement se heurtent à des problèmes eux aussi théoriques, et non des moindres, mais  
ont disparu presque totalement dans la pratique arbitrale” (p. 6, § 26).
32 Some  commentators  indeed  are  still  convinced  that  there  is  a  need  to  develop  a  specific 
'international law of contracts' which would apply to selected State contracts. See e.g. the works of 
Prof. Charles Leben (Ch. Leben, 'La théorie du contrat d'état et l'évolution du droit international des 
investissements',  Collected Courses of the Hague Academy, vol. 302, pp. 197-386 (2003) – Prof. 
Leben has recognized, however, that this theory is only adopted by “few scholars” (at p. 264, § 
123). On the new dimension added by Leben to the theory of internationalization, in particular in 
comparison with the earlier works of Weil, see I. Alvik (fn. 17), 53-54. See in the recent literature 
e.g. D.-E.  Lakehal,  'Quelques réflexions sur  les  contrats  pétroliers  algériens  à  la  lumière  de la 
théorie des contrats d'état en droit international', in  Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit. Mélanges  
offerts à Jean Salmon (Bruylant, 2007), 507-517 – the author makes reference to a so-called “theory 
of State contracts under international law”, one feature of which would be that such contracts may 
be governed  completely  or  partially  by international  law (at  p.  509).  See  also  P. de Vareilles-
Sommières and  A.  Fekini,  'Les  nouveaux  contrats  d’exploration  et  de  partage  de  production 
pétrolière en Libye', JDI 2008, pp. 3-30 and 2009 pp. 97-136 – analyzing the contracts concluded 
by the Libyan National Oil Company, these authors first undertake to find out whether parties to 
these agreements have intended to “internationalize” their contracts (§§ 13-23). After concluding 
that  there are not  enough elements to  indicate such an intention, the authors  go on to analyze 
whether parties had the intention to submit their contracts to the lex mercatoria (§§ 24-29).
33 As Bernardini as indicated, “... the issue of the law applicable to State contracts is no longer viewed  
in terms of confrontation between a defenceless investor and a State whose incomplete system of  
law and permanent sovereign power justified the fears of a State intervention to the detriment of the  
investor's rights”: P. Bernardini, 'The Law Applied by International Arbitrators to State Contracts, in 
Law of International Business and Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century – Liber Amicorum Karl-
Heinz Böckstiegel (R. Briner et al. (eds.), Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 2001), 51, 66.
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still much antagonism between States and private parties, these conflicts are fought 
using other weapons – the nuclear weapon of outright nationalization, such as those 
which were carried out by the USSR,34 Cuba, Libya and Mexico, has been replaced by 
fencing foils, such as modifications to the tax regime of long term operations. At the 
same time, the sometimes acrimonious opposition between lawyers and scholars along 
the lines of a divided world, with proponents and adversaries of the 'new economic 
order', has also become less visible.35
The change of climate does not explain the demise of the theory of 'state contracts'. 
This fall may also be explained by the theoretical flaws of the doctrine.36 One of the 
major difficulties was that the theory only aimed at some of the contracts concluded 
by a State and a foreign company. The contracts aimed were long term agreements, 
mainly for investment purposes.37 This left the bulk of contracts concluded by States – 
and mainly all contracts concluded for a shorter duration, such as e.g. the sale of boots 
to an army – in need of a proper legal regime. More importantly, it was also difficult 
to  identify  with  precision  which  contracts  benefited  from  the  specific 
'internationalization' regime – as the features outlined by the authors left some room 
for interpretation.38 More fundamentally, one could wonder why the specific regime 
34 See e.g. V.V. Veeder, 'The Lena Goldfields Arbitration. The Historical Roots of Three Ideas', 28 Intl. 
Comp. L. Q. 747-792 (1998).
35 The opposition could be very sharp and the language used by some scholars very radical. In its 
paper on 'The Myth of International Contract Law', Sornarajah wrote that the doctrinal construction 
whereby State contracts could be subject to international law “represents an instance of norms of 
international  law  created  during  colonial  times  to  further  the  interests  of  European  powers 
continuing to survive and justify the perpetuation of a situation of dominance by the erstwhile 
colonial powers” (M. Sornarajah (fn. 24) at p. 188).
36 Which were exposed early on. See e.g. Fr. Rigaux, 'Des dieux et des héros', Revue critique de droit 
international privé 435-459 (1978); J. Verhoeven, 'Droit international des contrats et droit des gens', 
Revue belge de droit international, 203-203 (1978-79). Some of the criticism voiced against the 
doctrinal  construction  was  brutal.  Verhoeven  referred  in  this  respect  to  the  “spéculations  
doctrinales  dont  la  subtilité  n'a  souvent  d'égal  que  la  gratuité  et  dont  l'originalité  abstraite  a  
compensé l'inapplicabilité concrète” (J. Verhoeven, 'Contrats entre Etats et ressortissants d'autres 
Etats', in Le contrat économique international. Stabilité et évolution (Bruylant/Pedone, 1975), at p. 
115).
37 Sometimes  called  'Economic  Development  Agreements',  see  D.  Vagts,  Transnational  Legal 
Problems (Foundation Press, 1986) at pp. 445-488. Weil explained that “Il n'est point besoin de 
préciser que ce ne sont pas tous les contrats d'Etat que l'on devra ainsi considérer comme relevant 
de l'ordre juridique international, mais seulement ceux d'entre eux qui s'intègrent effectivement, par 
des liens objectifs d'ordre juridique ou politico-économique, aux relations entre Etats, c'est-à-dire 
essentiellement – mais non exclusivement – les accords de développement économique ou contrats 
d'investissement” (P. Weil, 'Droit international et contrats d'Etat', in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter :  
le droit international, unité et diversité (Pedone, 1981), 549, at p. 580).
38 One  of  the  most  sophisticated  attempt  to  defining  the  category  of  'economic  development  
agreements'  may  be  found  in  the  Texaco  Overseas award.  Professor  Dupuy  held  that  several 
elements did characterize such agreements : first that “their subject matter is particularly broad :  
they  are  not  concerned  only  with  an  isolated  purchase  or  performance,  but  tend  to  bring  to 
developing countries investments and technical assistance, particularly in the field of research and 
exploitation of mineral resources, or in the construction of factories on a turnkey basis” (Texaco (fn. 
8)  17 ILM 1, 16 at § 45(c) (1978)). Professor Dupuy also noted that these agreements “assume a 
real  importance  in  the  development  of  the  country  where  they  are  performed  …  The  party 
contracting with the  State was thus associated  with the  realization of  the  economic  and  social 
progress of the host country” (idem). Two other features were mentioned as being characteristic of 
such contracts ; their long duration, which “implies close cooperation between the State and the 
contracting party” (17 ILM 1, 16-17, § 45(c) (1978)) and the fact that such contracts attempt to 
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was reserved to those contracts. Certainly, the mere fact of creating a new category of 
contracts known under a particular phrase – 'economic development agreements'  – 
was not sufficient to determine with precision the agreements concerned.39 This is 
certainly  so  given  the  remarkably  complex  distinctions  sometimes  made  between 
various types of agreements, some of which were deemed not worthy enough of the 
internationalization process.40
Another flaw lied in the fact that the proponents of the theory of 'internationalization' 
of State contracts sometimes rested their case on objective factors, such as the fact 
that the contract had been concluded by a State or state entity or that it concerned 
large economic interests deemed vital for the local economy, while in other instances, 
the theory called upon the intention of the parties bound by the contract.41
A final shortcoming lied in the attempt to consider private companies as subject of 
international  law.42 Although  it  is  not  challenged  that  private  individuals  and 
companies  could  derive  rights  from  international  law,  the  byzantine  doctrinal 
construction whereby a State concluding a contract with a foreign company, would 
implicitly recognize the latter as subjects of international law, even if only for certain 
purposes,43 has been generally (and sometimes) vigorously disavowed.44
further an “equilibrium between the goal of the general interest sought by such relation and the 
profitability which is necessary for the pursuit of the task entrusted to the private enterprise” (17  
ILM 1, 17, § 45 (1978)).
39 As Mann put it, “nothing is gained by what is no more than a terminological feature” : F. A. Mann, 
'The  Theoretical  Approach  Towards  the  Law Governing  Contracts  Between  States  and  Private 
Persons',  Revue  belge  de  droit  international 562  at  p.  563  (1975).  Brownlie  explained  that 
agreements involving resource exploitation are sometimes describes as 'concession agreements', but 
noted there was no firm reason for regarding 'concession agreements' as a term or art or, assuming 
they form a defined category, as being significantly different from other state contracts (I. Brownlie 
(fn. 7) at p. 546).
40 Leben for example has argued that when an investment agreement includes a stabilization clause, it 
automatically  becomes  a  'State  contract',  governed  by  international  law,  whereas  there  is  no 
internationalization when the agreement includes a provision requiring that parties renegotiate the 
agreement in case of fundamental changes (fn. 32, at pp. 269, § 134). On the distinction between 
contracts concluded by States in their capacity as 'domestic' legal persons and in their capacity as  
'international' legal persons, which constitute, according to Leben, the dividing line between 'State 
contracts' and other contracts concluded by a government, see Ch. Leben, 'L'évolution de la notion 
de contrat d'état', 48 Revue de l'arbitrage 629-646, 634-636 (2003).
41 On the different streams within the school which suggested the creation of a specific legal regime 
for State contracts, see Berlin (fn. 31), pp. 3-7, §§ 6-26.
42 Prof. Seidl-Hohenveldern wrote, “why should a State be prevented from recognizing its partner to 
such a contract as a subject of international law?” (I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (fn. 21) at p. 570). In 
other instances, the 'internationalization' proceeded without considering that the private party was 
indeed  a  subject  of  international  law (see  e.g.  the  Texaco  Overseas award  :  professor  Dupuy 
refrained  from  holding  that  the  company  was  in  all  respects  a  subject  of  international  law. 
According to Dupuy, “the internationalization of certain contracts entered into between a State and 
a private person does not tend to confer upon a private person competences comparable to those of 
a State but only certain capacities which enable him to act internationally in order to invoke the  
rights which result to him from an international contract” (Texaco (fn. 8) 17 ILM 1, 17 § 48 (1978)).
43 According to Seidl-Hohenverldern, “what recognition there is, is granted to the investor only as far  
as the execution of the agreement is concerned. The investor thus becomes merely a partial subject 
of international law” (I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (fn. 22), at p. 44-45).
44 See in particular, W. Wengler, 'Les accords entre Etats et entreprises étrangères sont-ils des traités de 
droit international?', Revue générale de droit international public 313-345 (1972).
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Finally,  there  is  an  overarching  reason  which  may  explain  why  the  attempts  at 
'internationalizing' states contracts have faltered : the advent over the last decades of a 
much better legal framework for the protection of foreign investment. Thanks in part 
to the rapidly developing web of bilateral  and multilateral  treaties protecting such 
investments, and also to the quasi automatic access to arbitration as a means to resolve 
disputes arising out of such investments, the need to elaborate a specific legal regime 
for contracts concluded by States has become far less acute.45
What is now the starting point of the legal regime for contracts concluded by States if 
such  grand  vision  has  been  abandoned?  Although  there  is  no  consensus  in  legal 
doctrine,46 there  seems  to  be  a  movement  in  favor  of  a  more  measured  legal 
framework  for  contracts  concluded  by  a  State.  The  starting  point  is  that  these 
contracts are governed, if not precisely by the very same conflict of laws provisions 
applicable to international commercial agreements, then at least by a method closely 
similar to the normal choice of law process.47
In its  1979 Resolution,  the International Law Institute has stated that it  wished to 
clarify “the rules of private international law relating to” agreements between States 
and foreign private persons.48 This seems to indicate that the starting point is not so 
much some new theory designed to extend the reach of international law to contracts 
concluded by States,  but  the  application  of  classical  rules  of  private  international 
law.49 The existence in a great deal of contracts concluded by governments, of choice 
45 Prof.  Leben,  one  of  the  main  proponents  of  the  'international  law  of  State  contracts',  has 
acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that the rapid evolution of investment arbitration has made “les  
contrats d'Etat obsolètes” ((fn. 32), at p. 373, § 344).
46 The debate has, indeed, not yet been settled. So it is that state contracts should, according to some, 
be governed not by international law or domestic law, but rather by 'transnational law'. This position 
has  been  advocated  by  J.-F.  Lalive,  'Contrats  entre  Etats  ou  entreprises  étatiques  et  personnes 
privées. Développements récents' Collected Courses of the Hague Academy, vol. 181 (1983-III), 9-
284, at pp. 184-185 and pp. 234-235 and more recently by M. Kamto, 'La notion de contrat d'état : 
une contribution au débat', Revue de l'arbitrage 719-751, in particular 741-751 (2003). In a more 
recent twist of the debate, the discussion on the internationalization of State contracts has been  
linked with the very classic conflict between the monist and the dualist approaches to international 
law, see  e.g.  A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, 'State Contracts in Contemporary International Law : Monist 
versus Dualist Controversies', 12(2) EJIL 309 (2001) and the additional development by I. Alvik (fn. 
17), 58-85.
47 As Mann put it, “For the purpose of ascertaining the legal system applicable to a State contract, we  
do not, as a matter of principle, follow routes which are different from those prevailing in the case  
of contracts between private persons. We search for the legal system which the parties expressly or  
impliedly selected or, ... for the proper law” (F. A. Mann, (fn. 39) 562 at p. 563). Mann did not only 
write  substantially  about  State  contracts  and  their  legal  regime.  He  was  also  involved  as  a 
practitioner in some of the most important cases involving State contracts (see L. A. Collins, 'F.A. 
Mann (1907-1991)', in Jurists Uprooted. German-speaking Emigrés Lawyers in Twentieth-century 
Britain,  (K.  Beatson and R.  Zimmerman (eds.),  OUP, 2004),  (381) 390-391,  outlining the role 
played by Mann in the dispute between BP and Libya).
The very definition of the problem as a conflict of law issue and the application of the conflict of  
laws methodology, may, however, be seen as an assumption which could be questioned (as shown 
recently by I. Alvik (fn. 17), 54-58.
48 Second Recital.
49 Verhoeven has noted that one should first clarify which rules of private international law apply.  
Those rules could indeed differ substantially. When a dispute is submitted to arbitration, this gives 
rise to an additional difficulty, as arbitral tribunals are not bound by specific private international  
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of law clauses suggest that State practice is established in the sense that such contracts 
are  not  necessarily  governed by law of the State  concerned and that  the question 
which law governs such contract must be raised.50
Private  international  law has,  in  other  words,  somewhat  tamed the wild theory of 
international contracts.51 Or, as Brownlie put it, “the rules of public international law 
accept the normal operation of rules of private international law”.52
This does not mean that international law has lost all its relevance to define the regime 
of  contracts  concluded by States.  If  international  law is  still  be relevant  for  such 
contracts, this will, however, result not so much from the nature of the contract and its 
belonging to  a specific  category,  but rather  from the choice by parties  –  in other 
words, application of international law ex contractu and no longer ex lege. A choice 
by  the  parties  of  public  international  law  does  not,  as  was  assumed,53 place  the 
contract  on the international plane.  It  remains,  however,  relevant to determine the 
regime applicable to such contracts. In other words, much will turn on the intention of 
parties  and  not  on  the  qualification  of  a  contract  as  an  'economic  development 
agreement'.
As  a  consequence,  attention  will  also  shift  from the  determination  of  which  law 
applies  to  such contracts,  to  other  techniques  aimed at  granting  protection  to  the 
private  party  and avoid  undue encroachment  by  a  system of  municipal  law.  This 
includes techniques that help avoid, or at least manage, some of the political risks 
inherent in such contracts, such as stabilization mechanisms and dispute resolution 
methods.
It is against this background that public international contracts may be analyzed. The 
attention will first focus on the determination of the law applicable to such contracts 
(section 1). Thereafter the focus will be on the various stabilization mechanisms used 
in  practice (section 2).  This  will  include both direct  stabilization mechanisms and 
dispute resolution provisions, as these two elements are central to the legal regime of 
public international contracts. An attempt will be made to present both the general 
law rules. (J. Verhoeven, (fn. 36), at pp. 130-133). In the BP v. Libya award, Judge Lagergren noted 
that the ad hoc arbitral tribunal “initially has no lex fori which, in the form of conflicts of law rules 
or otherwise, provides it with the framework of an established legal system” (British Petroleum 
Exploration Company Ltd.  (BP) v.  Government of  the Libyan Arab Republic ,  53 ILR 297, 326 
(1979).  Judge  Lagergren  further  held  that  it  would  be  erroneous  to  accept  that  the  lex  arbitri 
necessarily governs the applicable conflicts of law rules and concluded that the arbitral tribunal “is 
at  liberty  to  choose  the  conflict  of  law  rules  that  it  deems  applicable,  having  regard  to  all  
circumstances of the case” (53 ILR 297, 326).
Although this method is not free of criticism, the following observations are made on the basis of a  
blend of private international law systems in use in various jurisdictions.
50 In this sense,  G. A. Bermann, 'Contracts between States and Foreign Nationals : a Reassessment', 
International contracts  (H. Smit  (ed.),  Matthew Bender 1981), 184-185. See also the survey of 
practice by  K.-H. Böckstiegel,  Arbitration and State Enterprises : A Survey on the National and 
International State of Law and Practice (Kluwer, 1984), 26 ff.
51 Note that according to Prof. Schreuer, Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, which aims to determine 
the law applicable  to  investment  dispute,  is  akin to  a  rule  of  private  international  law (C. H.  
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : a Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at p. 555).
52 I. Brownlie (fn. 7) at p. 549.
53 And is still assumed by some scholars, see Ch. Leben (fn. 32), at p. 265, § 123.
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principles  and the  current  practice  of  States  –  even though it  is  difficult  to  draw 
general lessons as contracts concluded by states, which come in various formats and 
shapes, are not easily accessible.
* * *
Section 1. The Law Applicable to Contracts Concluded by States
In order to determine which law applies to contracts concluded by States and state 
entities, it is necessary to start from a review of the relevant principles (§ 1). This will 
involve looking mainly at the freedom which parties have to select which law applies 
to  their  agreement.  It  will  then  be  possible  to  examine  how these  principles  are 
applied in practice (§ 2).
§ 1. The Principle : Freedom of Choice and its Progeny
1.1 The Principle
A good  starting  point  for  the  determination  of  the  law  applicable  to  contracts 
concluded  by  States  is  the  resolution  adopted  in  1979  by  the  International  Law 
Institute  with respect  to these contracts.  Article 1 of this  Resolution provides that 
contracts between a state and a foreign company “shall be subjected to the rules of 
law chosen by the parties or, failing such a choice, to the rules of law with which the 
contract has the closest link”. This is in accordance with the conflict of laws rules of 
most countries.54
Hence, the intent of parties is governing. It must be noted, however, that in sharp 
contrast with the very firm practice in international commercial arbitration, arbitral 
tribunals deciding upon disputes in relation with contracts concluded by States, have 
refrained from considering the principle of party autonomy as a unimpeachable rule. 
This  applies  in  particular  for  the  Iran-US  Claims  Tribunal,  which  has  on  many 
occasions decided to depart from the law chosen by parties to govern their contract.55 
54 Art. 3 Rome I Regulation; Art. 7 1994 Mexico Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable 
to International Contracts. See also Art. 42 of the ICSID Convention, which, although it covers  
much more than contracts  concluded by States,  confirms the principle of party autonomy. One 
should presumably first determine whether these rules apply to all contracts or only to cross-border 
contracts.  The  latter  option  requires  a  definition  of  the  international  nature  of  contractual 
arrangements. It is submitted that in the vast majority of cases, one will easily distinguish cross-
border contracts from purely domestic ones, so that one may dispense from crafting a definition of 
cross-border agreements.
55 See  for  one  of  the  earliest  instances,  CMI  International,  Inc.  v  Ministry  of  Roads  and  
Transportation, at al., award No 99-242-2 (27 Dec. 1983), 4 Iran-US C.T.R. 263 – the tribunal held 
that the contract was governed by the law of Idaho, which had been chosen by parties. It declined, 
however,  to apply that  law for  one particular question, that  of  the possible deduction from the 
damages,  of the profits made by the seller when reselling the items. The Tribunal placed great 
emphasis on the freedom granted by Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration and noted that  
“it is difficult to conceive of a choice of law provision that would give the Tribunal greater freedom  
in determine case by case the law relevant to the issues before it” (at p. 267). See also Economy 
Forms Corp. v. The Governement of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al ., Award No. 55-165-1 (14 
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Arbitral tribunals deciding on investment disputes have likewise treated the choice of 
law made by parties as an important starting point, which did not, however prevent 
them from looking for other guiding principles to settle the dispute.56 In most cases, 
the arbitral tribunal has found the inspiration in the principles of international law.57
1.2 A choice of law – but which law?
At first sight, it may be thought that if parties to a contract have a possibility to make 
a choice, their choice must necessarily be expressed in favor of the law of one State. 
This  is  what  is  suggested  by  the  famous  dictum  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice  in  the  Serbian loans case,  where  the  Court  stated  that  every 
contract must have a basis in a national legal order.58
It has, however, since long been recognized that this formula, if it ever had absolute 
value in eyes of the Permanent Court,59 could no longer hold today.60
Further, a choice for local law has long been seen as insufficient to protect the private 
party contracting with a State. As Nygh explained, to agree that the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the State concerned, is to give it in effect the unilateral power 
to amend or abrogate its terms.61 Such a choice leaves this party in the hands of the 
State which could decide to alter its legislation or regulations so as to deprive the 
June 1983),  3 Iran-US CTR 42 (after  deciding that  the contract  was governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the Tribunal referred to 'equity' to reduce the damages it awarded to the private  
contractor). In other instances, however, the Tribunal has dutifully applied the law chosen by parties 
(see e.g.  Gould Marketing Inc. v. Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 
136/49/50  (29  June  1984),  6  Iran-US C.T.R.  272.  In  general,  J.R.  Crook,  'Applicable  Law In 
International  Commercial  Arbitration: The Iran-US-Claims Tribunal  Experience',  83 AJIL 1989, 
278, 286-299.
56 Schreuer notes that  even when parties have made a choice for  the law of one country,  ICSID  
tribunals  have  considered  that  “there  is  at  least  some  place  for  international  law  even  in  the  
presence of an agreement on the choice of law which does not incorporate it” (C. H. Schreuer, (fn. 
51) at pp. 586-590 – with reference to the Letco v. Liberia award).
57 See the various awards discussed by Ch. Leben (fn. 32) at pp. 282-288, §§ 160-171. As Spiermann 
noted, “The principle of party autonomy is generally considered to be the bedrock of international  
commercial  arbitration,  yet  in  investment  arbitration it  often  yields  to  the principle  pacta sunt  
servanda” (O. Spiermann, 'Applicable Law', in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law (P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino and Ch. Schreuer (eds.), OUP 2008), at pp. 99-100.
58 Case concerning the payment of various Serbian Loans Issued in France , PCIJ [1929] Series A No 
20/21, at p. 41 : in order to consider the subsidiary argument of the Serbian government, to the  
effect  that  the  obligations  entered  into  were  governed  by  French  law  (which  would  have  as  
consequence to render the gold clause null and void as far as payments are to be effected in France), 
the Court  held that  “[a]ny contract  which is  not  a  contract  between States  in their  capacity as  
subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some country”
59 Something which may be doubted given the other observations made by the Court in the very same 
ruling. The Court indeed noted that “the rules may be common to several States and may even be 
established  by  international  conventions  or  customs  and,  in  this  latter  case,  may  possess  the 
character of true international law” (at p. 41).
60 In its celebrated Texaco Overseas award, Mr Dupuy noted that “because it is a long time since the 
Permanent Court of International Justice delivered its judgment in the cases relating to the Serbian 
and Brazilian Loans, juridical analysis has been much refined in this field [...]” (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 
ILM 12, § 29 (1978)).
61 P. Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Clarendon Press, 1998), at p. 192.
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private party from the benefit of the contract. Such unilateral change has occurred in 
the past, as may be inferred from a large body of arbitral awards dealing with the 
consequences of nationalization and other attempts by States to modify the contractual 
regime of investments. 
Hence contract drafters and negotiators have attempted to find another solution, which 
would  offer  a  better  protection  to  the  private  contract  party.  The  classic  tools  of 
private international law did not seem to offer a viable alternative. States were indeed 
understandably  reluctant  -  save  in  particular  circumstances,  such  as  in  financial 
transactions, see infra -  to submit the contracts they conclude to the law of another 
sovereign, as this could be seen if not as a waiver of their sovereignty, at least as an 
admission  that  their  law  does  not  provide  an  adequate  legal  framework.  Further, 
including a choice for the courts of another state, did not offer a sufficient protection 
to the private contracting party. Indeed, the courts of this State would take the law of 
the contract as it stands and take into account changes made to the law by legislation 
of the host government.62 Finally, the idea to consider the contract as a self-contained 
legal system not attached to or governed by any existing national or international law, 
has not gained much support. Besides the many theoretical problems the idea of a 
'contrat sans loi' would entail, it must recognized that in most instances, the contract 
will not provide guidance on all possible issues. In case of dispute, the tribunal will 
therefore be compelled to identify another set of rules in order to find an answer. The 
idea that the contract will be the applicable law, has in effect proved illusory.63
If one focuses on investment contracts, several alternative solutions were designed in 
order to insulate the contract from changes brought by the sovereign. One of the main 
tools – and probably the most controversial  – which appeared, was to introduce a 
provision freezing the law chosen. This type of provision will be explored at length, 
together with other so-called 'stabilization' techniques, in a further section.
If one sticks to the choice of law proper, another mechanism deserves close attention. 
A contract could indeed be submitted to another set of rules than national law. For 
large, long-term contracts concluded with a State, it has indeed become common to 
subject the contract to something else than local law. So it is that in the oil industry, 
many contracts include a sophisticated choice of law provision : the starting point of 
this provision is that the contract is governed by the law of the State. However, this 
choice is qualified with an additional reference to international law.64 In a few cases, 
the reference to the domestic law of the State party is even omitted, the contract being 
directly subject to international law or general principles.65 In all cases, the aim of the 
contracting parties is to offer some additional protection to the private party against 
62 Buchheit and Gutali have noted in relation with sovereign bond issues that if a sovereign issuer  
modifies its own law in order to impair the value or the enforceability of securities it has issued  
under its own law, “Such changes in local law would normally be respected by US and English  
courts if the debt instruments are expressly, or otherwise found to be, governed by that local law” 
(L. C. Buchheit and M. Gulati, (fn. 5) at p. 48).
63 See recently the discussion by A. Diehl The Core Standard of International Investment Protection. 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (Wolters Kluwer, 2012) at pp. 263-264.
64 There  are  several  options to  draft  the  reference  to  international  law,  which  will  be  considered 
hereinafter.
65 Leben notes that “Il est rare … que les parties choisissent comment droit applicable le seul droit  
international” (Ch. Leben (fn. 32), at p. 278, § 153).
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undue modifications of the legal regime by the State party. The end result is to bring 
in international law to a relationship based primarily on a contract. The reasoning is, 
however,  very  different  from  the  one  followed  by  the  proponents  of  the 
'internationalization'  of  so-called  'State  contracts',  since  this  internationalization 
intervenes not so much ex natura, because of the nature of the contracts,66 but rather 
on  the  basis  of  the  intent  of  parties.  Whatever  the  theoretical  implications  of  a 
complex choice of law, the existence of two layers of rules chosen by parties raises 
questions as to the validity and the enforceability of such choice.
1.3 Validity and enforceability of complex choice of law provisions
Many  contracts  concluded  by  States  and  state  agencies  include  a  simple, 
straightforward choice for the law of the State party – or, exceptionally, for the law of 
another State. Such choice of law provisions, which may also be found in commercial 
or civil contracts concluded between private parties, do not raise specific difficulties. 
In some fields,  such as the oil  industry,  where contracts  are concluded for a long 
period and involve substantial investment on the part of the private party, practice has 
developed to submit the contract to a dual layered choice of law provision including a 
reference to international law next to the choice for the law of the State party.67 This 
raises several questions which will be examined in this section.
The first question one is that of the validity of such a complex choice. This is a vexed 
question in the realm of commercial contracts. As is well known, an intense debate 
raged in relation to Rome Convention on whether a choice for something else than 
national law was allowed.68 It was commonly accepted that the Rome Convention did 
not sanction a choice or application of a non-national system of law, such as the lex  
mercatoria, general  principles  of  law,69 or  international  law.70 During  the  process 
which led to the revision of the Convention, it was suggested to allow a choice for 
another  system than  the  law of  a  State.71 The  question  has  been settled  with  the 
66 See the award  by Prof.  Dupuy in the  Texaco case  :  the  contract  is  removed from a particular 
domestic legal system and “comes within the ambit of a particular and new branch of international  
law : the international law of contracts” (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 1, 13, § 32 (1978)).
67 Begie has suggested to refer to this as the 'compound choice of law clause' (T. Begie, Applicable 
Law in International Investment Disputes (Eleven International Publishing, 2005) at p. 19).
68 The issue was linked to the debate on the lex mercatoria and its role in international contracts. See 
in general, P. Nygh (fn. 61) at pp. 172-198.)
69 Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, 13 th ed.) at p. 1223, § 32-079. It 
was  also  accepted  that  if  parties  to  a  contract  chose  to  submit  their  contract  to  the  rules  of  
international law, this could be taken to be an incorporation of the rules of international law, the  
contract being governed by the law applicable in the absence of a choice (Article 4 of the Rome  
Convention). It was, however, unclear, how this incorporation could work since the principles of 
international law are not easily incorporated in a contract (see for more details the explanations of  
A. Kassis, Le nouveau droit européen des contrats internationaux (LGDJ, 1993), 402-403, § 380).
70 Ch. Reithmann and D. Martiny (ed.), Internationales Vertragsrecht, (Otto Schmidt, 6th ed., 2004) at 
pp. 88-89, § 75.
71 The  original  proposal  for  the  Rome  I  Regulation  made  it  possible  for  parties  to  choose  “the  
principles  and  rules  of  the  substantive  law  of  contract  recognised  internationally  or  in  the 
Community” (Art. 3(2) original Proposal for a Regulation (Com (2005) 650 final, at p. 6). This led 
to a rich discussion, with W.-H. Roth, 'Zur Wählbarkeit nichtstaatlichen Rechts', in Festschrift für  
Erik Jayme, (Sellier, 2004), pp. 757-772 (in favor of such a choice); J. Kondring, 'Nichtstaatliches 
Recht  als  Vertragsstatut  vor  Staatlichen  Gerichten  –  oder  :  Privatkodifikationen  in  der 
WAUTELET – INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRACTS – APPLICABLE LAW 14/58
adoption of the Rome I Regulation, which clearly confirms that a choice can only be 
made for municipal law.72
The Rome I Regulation is, however, only binding for courts of EU Member States. It 
further only applies to 'civil and commercial' matters.73
Outside the realm of the Rome I Regulation, there is less difficulty to express a choice 
for something else than municipal law. Although the validity of a direct choice for 
international law has long been the subject of controversy,74 modern practice seems to 
have  accepted  the  principle.75 This  is  the  case for  the  Inter-American  Convention 
signed in Mexico in 1994, whose provisions appear to make it  possible to choose 
another  law than that  of a  State.76 In  other  jurisdictions,  the possibility  of  such a 
choice has been expressly confirmed.77 The 1979 Athens Resolution of the Institute 
has also confirmed the validity of a choice for “the principles common to [several 
Abseistsfalle?', IPRax 241-245 (2007). It was not entirely clear whether the language suggested by 
the Commission would have allowed a direct reference by the parties to the rules of international  
law.
72 Recital 13 of the Preamble, however, allows parties to incorporate “by reference into their contract a 
non-State body of law or an international convention”.  On this compromise reached between the 
Council and the European Parliament, see  R. Plender and  M. Wilderspin, The European Private 
International Law of Obligations (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed.) at pp. 137-138, § 6-012. Therefore, if 
parties e.g. made a choice for international law, this reference to international law would probably 
only lead to the 'incorporation' of the rules of international law in the contract - see e.g. F. Ferrari, 
Comment Art. 27 EGBGB in Internationales Vertragsrecht (Beck, 2007), at p. 12, para. 19. In other 
words, such a choice would not prevent the application of the mandatory provisions of the national 
law which would be applicable to the contract absent a choice of law by the parties.
73 A question arises whether the Rome Convention could be said to apply to contracts concluded by 
States. Unlike the Rome II Regulation, the Rome I Regulation does not indicate that it does not 
apply to matters linked to States. Art. (1)(1) of the Rome II Regulation provides that it does not 
apply to”the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure  
imperii)”.
74 Especially in the 1970's. Compare the opinion of Verhoeven (J. Verhoeven, (fn. 36) at p. 140 - “De 
lege lata, il ne paraît guère possible de défendre de manière générale un assujetissement du 'State  
contract'  au  droit  des  gens”  -  et  F.  A.  Mann ('The  Proper  Law  of  Contracts  Concluded  by 
International Persons' reproduced in:  Studies in International Law, (Clarendon Press 1973), 201, 
222-238.
75 See  e.g. H. Dang, 'The Applicability of International Law as Governing Law of State Contracts',  
17(1) Australian Intl. L. J. 133-158 (2010).
76 This results from a combined reading of Articles 1, 7 and 9. See in general F. K. Juenger, 'The Inter-
American Convention on the  Law Applicable  to  International  Contracts  :  some Highlights  and 
Comparisons', 42 AJCL 381, 392 (1994) – Prof. Juenger wrote that “the parties are free to stipulat to 
the general principes of international commercial law”.
77 This is e.g. the case in Louisiana and Oregon where parties may choose something else than state  
law. See  S. C. Symeonides,  'Contracts subject to non-State norms'  54 AJCL 209 (2006) and  R. 
Michaels, 'The Re-Statement of Non-State Law : the State, Choice of Law and the Challenge from 
Global Legal Pluralism' 51 Wayne L Rev. 215 (2005). In Quebec, the question is still open, with  
different  opinions  on  the  question  :  compare  the  opinions  of  J.  Talpis,  'Retour  vers  le  futur  : 
application en droit québecois des principes d'Unidroit au lieu d'une loi nationale' R.J.T. 584, pp. 
617-618 (2002) (choice for Unidroit principles of for arbitration) and G. Goldstein and E. Greffier, 
Droit international privé (Blais, 1998) at pp. 484 ff. (no room for such choice). For the position 
under  United  States  law,  see  G.  Rühl, 'Party  Autonomy  in  the  Private  International  Law  of 
Contracts.  Transatlantic  Convergence  and  Economic  Efficiency',  in  Conflict  of  Laws  in  a  
Globalized World (E. Gottschalk, R. Michaels, G. Rühl, & J. von Hein (eds.), Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 153-183, at pp. 164-167.
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domestic]  systems,  or  the  general  principles  of  law,  or  the  principles  applied  in 
international  economic  relations,  or  international  law,  or  a  combination  of  these 
sources of law”.78
Arbitration practice is also firmly established in this sense.79 Reference may be made 
to the famous arbitrations conducted in the aftermath of the Libyan nationalization of 
the oil industry in the 1970's.80 The concession agreements included a choice of law 
clause which referred to “the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of 
international  law  and  in  the  absence  of  such  common  principles  then  by  and  in 
accordance with the general principles of law, including such of those principles as 
may have been applied by international tribunals”. As is well known, these contracts 
led to several major arbitration proceedings.81 Although the arbitral tribunals did not 
share the same reasoning and did not reach the same conclusions,82 the validity of the 
choice of law was not called into question. In Liamco, the sole arbitrator held that the 
legal  validity  of  the  choice  of  law clause,  which  was  supported  by  the  “general 
principles governing the conflict of laws in private international law”, “has always 
been accepted by international jurists”.83
In  modern  scholarship,  the  possibility  of  selecting  international  law  as  the  law 
78 Art.2  1979  Athens  Resolution.  Compare  with  Art.  2  of  the  1991  Resolution  adopted  by  the 
International Law Institute in Basel, which provides that parties “may agree on the application of 
the law of any State”.
79 Dicey & Morris mentioned that “in international arbitrations, where a government is a party to a 
contract, the parties may choose as the governing law the 'general principles of law' or even public  
international law” : Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, 13 th ed.) at 
p. 1223, § 32-079. One limitation to party autonomy seems to be that parties must choose a system 
which is definite and ascertainable. On this basis, a choice for equity or for an honourable code 
(which will not easily be accepted by a State) will meet more resistance.
80 Delaume has,  however,  warned  not  to  place  too  much  reliance  on  “isolated  arbitral  decisions  
rendered several decades ago in particular circumstances” (G. R. Delaume,  'The Proper Law of 
State Contracts and the Lex Mercatoria : a Reapparaisal' 3 ICSID Rev 1988, 79 at p. 86).
81 Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 62 ILR 140 
(1982);   British Petroleum (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic  53 ILR 297 
(1979);  Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., California Asiatic Oil co. v. Government of the Libyan  
Arab Republic, 17 ILM 1 (1978)).
82 In  the  Texaco arbitration,  the  arbitrator  held  that  the  clause  was  primarily  a  choice  of  public 
international  law.  Prof.  Dupuy  indeed  held  that  the  principles  of  international  should  “be  the  
standard for the application of Libyan law since it  is  only if  Libyan law is in conformity with  
international that it should be applied” and concluded that “the reference which is made mainly to  
the principles of international law and, secondarily, to the general principles of law must have as a 
consequence the application of international law to the legal relations between the parties” (Texaco 
(fn. 8), 17 ILM 1, 15, § 41 (1978)).
In the BP arbitration, the arbitrator appears to have considered that the clause was a choice for the  
general principles of law. In a famous dictum, judge Lagergren held that “The governing system of 
law is what that clause expressly provides, viz in the absence of principles common to the law of  
Libya and international law, the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may 
have been applied by international tribunals” (British Petroleum (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the  
Libyan Arab Republic 53 ILR 297, 329 (1979)).
In the Liamco arbitration, the arbitrator held that the governing law of the contract was the law of 
Libya with the exclusion of  those  rules  of  Libyan law which conflicted with the principles  of 
international  law :  Libyan American Oil  Company (Liamco) v. Government of the Libyan Arab  
Republic 62 ILR 140, 173-176 (1982).
83 Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 62 ILR 140, 
171-172 (1982).
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governing a contract concluded by a State is also generally accepted,84 although some 
resistance may still be found.85 The same applies to the validity as such of a combined 
choice, whereby the contract stipulate that the law of a State only applies insofar as it 
accords with public international law or the general principles of law.86 The language 
used in arbitration statutes 87 and rules adopted by the major arbitration institutions 88 
make allowance for this kind of choice.89
Beyond the validity, one should also inquire about the enforceability of a complex 
choice of law provision. If parties decide to submit their contract, exclusively or in 
combination  with  some  municipal  law,  to  public  international  law,  one  should 
determine what rules of international law are relevant for the agreement. It is likely 
that among all sources of international law, which are listed in Art. 38 of the Statute of 
the  ICJ,  the most  relevant  rules  are  those of  customary international  law and the 
'general principles of law recognised by civilised nations'.90 Treaty law appears to be 
less suited to find an answer to disputes arising out of an agreement.91 If one considers 
84 See e.g. the observations of Messrs Redfern and Hunter that “There is no reason in principle why 
[parties to a contract] should not select public international law as the law which is to govern their  
relationship” (N. Blackaby and  C. Partasides,  Redfern and Hunter  on International  Arbitration, 
(OUP, 2009), p. 207-208, §3.138). English courts have also accepted that an arbitration agreement  
may be subject to international law – see  Occidental Petroleum & Production Co v Republic of  
Ecuador ([2005] EWCA 1116, at para. 33.
85 See  e.g.  M. Sornarajah (fn.  16) at  pp. 412-413 (after having noted that  even if parties choose 
international law to govern their contract, the host State is entitled to request the application of its 
mandatory rules, Mr Sornarajah indicates that “It is very unlikely that party autonomy itself can 
support the idea that the application of the domestic law to a foreign investment transaction can be  
excluded altogether by some choice of nebulous system of law”).
86 In the Channel Tunnel dispute (which did not involve a State), the House of Lords accepted that the 
choice  made  by  parties  for  the  principles  common to  French  and  English  law  was  valid  and 
enforceable. According to the House of Lords, “The parties chose an indeterminate 'law' to govern 
their substantive rights; an elaborate process for ascertaining those rights; and a location for that  
purpose outside the territories of the participants. This conspicuously neutral, 'a-national' and extra-
judicial structure may well have been the first choice for the special needs of the Channel Tunnel 
venture. But whether it was right or wrong, it is the choice which the parties have made” (Channel  
Tunnel Group Ltd. v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1993] AC 334, 368.
87 See also s. 46 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which requires an arbitral tribunal to determine a  
dispute either in accordance with the law chosen by the parties or, if the parties agree, in accordance 
with considerations agreed by them or determined by the tribunal. The very general reference by 
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention to the “rules of law” which may be chosen by parties, also  
make it possible to contemplate a choice for something different than a domestic law (see e.g. C. H.  
Schreuer (fn. 51) at pp. 565-566).
88 See Art. 21(1) of the 2012 ICC Arbitration Rules, which provides that “The parties shall be free to 
agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute” (we 
underline). The explanatory comments which accompany the model choice of law clause prepared 
by ICSID indicate that parties are free to refer to national law, international law, a combination or  
national or international law or a law frozen in time or subject to certain specifications (1993 ICSID 
Model Clauses).
89 It may, however, be difficult to draw conclusions from court practice as courts are mostly required 
to intervene when an arbitral award has been issued. The refusal by a court to set aside the award 
may be the expression of a hands-off policy of the courts towards arbitral awards, much more than a 
positive  confirmation  that  a  choice  for  international  law  or  common  principles,  is  valid  and 
enforceable.
90 As noted by N. Blackaby and C. Partasides, (fn. 83) at p. 208, § 3.139.
91 As  noted  by  P.  Weil,  'Le  droit  international  en  quête  de  son  identité.  Cours  général  de  droit  
international public', Collected Courses of the Hague Academy, vol. 237, 9, 98 (1992). Compare 
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customary law and general principles, the determination of the relevant rules leaves 
some freedom to the dispute resolution body.92
Another difficulty arising to an (exclusive or mixed) choice for public international 
law, is that this set of rules many not be an obvious breeding ground to find a solution 
for a contractual dispute. As has been noted, “Public international law, being primarily 
concerned with the relationship between States, is not particularly well equipped to 
deal with detailed contractual issues – such as mistake,  misrepresentation,  time of 
performance, the effect of bankruptcy or liquidation, force majeure or the measure of 
damages, and so forth”.93 It has, however, been argued that the choice for international 
law could prove an effective protection even if the principles of international law are 
rudimentary, because what is sought is a protection against the most blatant violation 
of the contract, such as its total repudiation.94
Similar  difficulties  are  likely  to  appear  when  the  contract  is  subject  to  'general 
principles of law'.95 It may indeed be difficult - and very time consuming 96 - for the 
dispute resolution body to find 'common principles' recognized everywhere in order to 
form the  substantive  content  of  the  law applicable  to  the  contract.97 As  Reinisch 
indicates, “In the case of dispute, judges or arbitrators are not only asked to settle the 
specific contentious issues between the parties, but to conduct a thorough comparative 
analysis  of  law in order  to  ascertain the legal  principles commonly recognized in 
various legal systems.” And Reinisch rightly adds that “choice of law clauses of this 
kind require a considerable degree of trust and impose a high burden on judges and 
arbitrators”.98
with the observations of Jimenez de Arechaga, who appear to believe that if a contract is governed  
by international law, application should be made of the treaties. Jimenez takes argument out of the  
fact  that the application of treaties would not lead to satisfactory results in contractual disputes 
because “international law does not possess adequate rules governing contracts of this nature” (E. 
Jimenez de Arechaga, 'International Law in the Past Third of a Century', Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy, vol. 159 (1978-I), at p. 308).
92 According to Brownlie, when the contract includes a choice for local law and such principles and 
rules of public international law as may be relevant, the arbitrators “have a certain discretion in 
selecting the precise role of public international law”. (I. Brownlie (fn. 7) at p. 550).
93 N. Blackaby and C. Partasides (fn. 83) at p. 208-209, § 3.140. See also the comment by Jimenez de 
Arechaga, who noted that “We do not believe that there is an international law of contracts” (E. 
Jimenez de Arechaga, (fn 90), at p. 308).
94 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (fn. 22), at p. 42.
95 See for example,  the concession agreement concluded in 1980 between the government of Abu 
Dhabi  and Amerada Hess  Petroleum, which made reference to  “the principles of  law normally 
recognized by civilzed states in general including those which have been applied by International 
tribunals” (quoted by A. Diehl (fn. 63), at p. 263).
96 See  G. A.  Bermann,  (fn.  50),  at  pp.  196-201 :  Bermann attempts  to  find out  whether  there  is 
equivalence between the French and the American approach to unilateral revision of a contract by 
government and concludes that “the proximity of any two legal systems on refined questions like  
these  is  clearly  matter  for  careful  examination  and  judgment.  How  much  more  delicate  the 
enterprise, when it is put on the scale necessary in order to determine whether any one such set of  
rules embodies general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (at p. 200).
97 Compare with the opinion of Seidl-Hohenveldern,  who wrote that  “Comparative law is able to 
deduce form the domestic laws of the States members of the international community as many 
general principles as may be required to solve any disputes” (I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (fn. 21) at p. 
569 (1975)).
98 A. Reinisch, and  I. Marboe, 'Contracts between States and Foreign Private Law Persons' in Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (R. Wolfrum (ed.), OUP, 2012), § 28. Messrs. 
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Further, it is likely that the attempt to find an answer in general or common principles 
will only produce very general rules, which may not be the most suitable to solve 
contractual disputes. As Bermann wrote, “Neither the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
nor the clausula rebus sic stantibus … will decide the hard concrete case”.99 Wood has 
also expressed his concerns in the context of financial transactions, stating that “the 
objection  to  a  choice  of  international  law or  general  principles  accepted  amongst 
civilised  nations  is  that  the  content  of  these  systems  appears  rudimentary  and 
imprecise  and  therefore  incapable  of  conferring  predictability  upon  international 
financial transactions”.100
The value of 'general principles' as a standard to solve contractual dispute may have 
substantially increased over the last decades, notably following the adoption of the 
Unidroit Principles – and other attempts to give more body to the law of international 
contracts. These Principles may indeed make it easier for courts and tribunals to find 
an answer to a precise question arising in the framework of a contractual dispute.101
In practice,  it  is  therefore advisable to  make reference to  general  principles  or to 
international law in combination with a choice for a State law.102
Further, if parties to the contract refer to several systems, the combination of these 
systems may prove difficult to apply.103 This appears to have been recognized by the 
Dolzer  &  Schreuer  indicate  in  this  respect  that  “Choice  of  law  clauses  may  be  in  need  of  
interpretation in various ways. The meaning of clauses referring to general principles of law or to 
the usage of trade many not be self-evident in the light of the circumstances of each case” (R. 
Dolzer & Ch. Schreuer (fn. 12), at p. 74).
99 G. A. Bermann (fn. 50), 200.
100Ph. Wood Conflict of laws and international finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at p. 64, § 2-094. 
See also  N. Blackaby and  C. Partasides (fn.  83),  p. 209, § 3.140 : “The problem with general 
principles is they are just that. They deal with such topics as the principle of good faith in treaty  
relations, abuse of rights, the concept of State and individual responsibility. They are excellent as  
generalisations but lack sufficient detail”. Verhoeven already wrote that “La part d'arbitraire sur  
laquelle repose l'affirmation de 'principes généraux' … doit faire singulièrement douter tant de la  
practicabilité que de l'opportunité d'une référence au droit des gens qui se réduit à une référence à  
des  droits  internes,  par  le  biais  de  principes  qui,  comme tels,  ne  constituent  pas  un  système  
juridique autonome” (J. Verhoeven (fn. 36), at p. 141, § 12).
101On the application of these principles to disputes involving state contracts, see J. Crawford and A. 
Sinclair, 'The Unidroit Principles and their Application to State Contracts', ICC Bulletin – Special 
Supplement  Unidroit  Principles  59-79,  in  particular  at  pp.  58-60  (2002).  See  also  the  brief  
observations of K.-H. Böckstiegel, 'The application of the Unidroit Principles to Contracts involving 
States or Intergovernmental Organizations', ICC Bulletin – Special Supplement Unidroit Principles 
51-55.
102N. Blackaby and C. Partasides (fn. 83) p. 209, § 3.140. This is also acknowledged by Prof. Leben, 
who indicates that “il n'est pas souhaitable de se priver de la plénitude de règles offertes par un  
ordre  juridique  interne  …  pour  régler  tous  les  problèmes  entre  les  parties  contractantes”. 
According to  Leben,  “Il  est  clair  que,  quels  que  soient  les  progrès  du droit  international  des  
contrats  en  cours  de  formation,  celui-ci  n'a  pas  encore  toute  la  richesse  normative  que  l'on  
rencontre, d'ordinaire, dans les ordres juridiques internes” ((fn. 32) at p. 278-279, § 153). P. Weil 
has noted that 'le droit international des contrats en est encore à ses premiers balbutiements' (P. Weil 
(fn. 90), at p. 98).
103A different problem arises if an investment dispute is submitted to arbitration on the basis of an  
investment contract. The investor may indeed have a contract claim and a treaty claim. Although the 
difference between the two may not always be relevant in practice, both claims will need to be  
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International Law Institute Institute, which indicated that “[i]t is also desirable that in 
designating  [the  proper  law  of  contract]  the  parties  take  into  consideration  the 
difficulties which may result from the possible application or combination of a variety 
of legal systems or principles”.104 When the choice is made to subject the agreement to 
national law as well as to international law, the question may arise how these two 
relate to each other.105 This question was considered by the arbitral tribunal in the 
Agip case.  The  agreement  in  dispute  included  a  choice  for  the  law  of  Congo 
“supplemented by international law”. After reviewing whether the nationalization of 
the  assets  was  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  Congo  and  concluding  that  the 
nationalization could not be upheld under these laws, in particular under Congolese 
contract law, the Tribunal noted that “these observations concerning Congolese law do 
not dispense the Tribunal from examining the nationalization from the point of view 
of international law”.106 Turning to the meaning of the choice of law provision, the 
Tribunal  noted  that  AGIP  had  argued  that  the  term  “supplemented”  should  be 
interpreted as implying the subordination of Congolese law to international law. The 
Tribunal, however, indicated that “it is enough for the Tribunal to note that the use of 
the term 'supplemented' at least means that there can be recourse to the principles of 
international  law  either  to  fill  a  gap  in  Congolese  law  or  to  supplement  it  if 
necessary”.107 Although the precise impact of a choice of law provision will depend on 
its wording, it may be accepted that when parties make a reference to international 
law, the rules of international law should at least be given as much weight as those of 
the national law.108
ascertained based on their own legal regime (see e.g.  Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and  
Vivendi Universal v Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/97/3, decision on annulment (July 3, 2002) 41 
ILM 1135, 1154, para. 96).
104Art. 4 1979 Athens Resolution. Messrs. Dolzer and Schreuer note that “Any reference in a choice-
of-law clause to two different legal orders or principles will, in the case of collision or diversity  
among them, pose the question of a hierarchy or of the selection of the legal order for the individual 
issue concerned” (R. Dolzer & Ch. Schreuer (fn. 12), at p. 74).
105This question echoes the difficulty in applying Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention and its twin 
reference, when parties have not selected the applicable law, to “... the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute […] and such rules of international  law as may be applicable”.  As is well 
known, several views coexist on the relative weight to be given to municipal and international law 
on the basis of this provision. See the arguments of E. Gaillard and Y. Banifameti, 'The Meaning of 
'and' in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention : the Role of International 
Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process', 18 ICSID Rev. 375-411 (2003).
106AGIP v. Popular Republic of the Congo ICSID Case No. ARB/77/1, 21 ILM( 726, at p. 735, § 80 
(1982).
10721 ILM 726, at p. 735, § 83 (1982). The Tribunal then went on to consider whether the repudiation 
of the stabilization clauses was valid under international law.
108In the  Liamco award, the arbitral tribunal considered the effects of a choice of law clause which 
provided that the agreement was to be governed by “the principles of law of Libya common to the  
principles of international law”. The arbitrator held that this choice excluded “any part of Libyan 
law which is in conflict with the principles of international law” (Libyan American Oil Company v.  
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic relating to petroleum concessions 16, 17 and 20, 20 ILM 
1, 35 (1981); 62 ILR 140, 173 (1982)). The arbitrator dismissed the notion that there could be any  
conflict between Libyan law and international law, as Libyan law treated international law as “an  
imperative compendium forming part of the general positive law” (20 ILM 1, 37 (1981); 62 ILR 
140, 175 (1982)). See also the reasoning of the majority in Aminoil with respect to the applicable 
law and the 'blending' of various sets of rules (general principles of international law and the laws 
of  Kuwait)  :  American Independent  Oil  Company Inc  (Aminoil)  v  Government  of  the  State  of  
Kuwait [1982] 21 ILM 976, 1000-1001, §§ 6-10 (1982). See also the observations of the English 
Court of Appeal in the Svenska Petroleum case – the contract provided that “This Agreement shall 
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1.4 What law in the absence of a choice of law provision?
It may happen, although this will not be very common, that a contract concluded by a 
State, does not include a choice of law provision.109 What law governs, in such a case, 
the contractual issues arising in relation with the contract? It has been suggested that 
the contract shall be governed by the law of the State, as the law presenting the closest 
connection with the agreement.110 This was generally accepted for a long time.111
This may, however, not be true to a general extent. Under modern conflict of laws 
rules, it must be examined where the center of gravity of the contract lies.112 This is 
what the Institute has accepted in its  1979 Resolution. Article 1 of the Resolution 
provides that contracts between a State and a foreign party shall be subjected, in the 
absence of a choice by parties, “to the rules of law with which the contract has the 
closest link”.113 In determining where the center of gravity lies, account may be taken 
be governed  by  the  laws of  Lithuania  supplemented,  where  required,  by  rules  of  international  
business activities generally accepted in the petroleum industry if they do not contradict the laws of  
the Republic of Lithuania." The court held that “Article 35.2 gives primacy to the law of Lithuania  
and that  it  is  to the law of Lithuania that  one must turn first  in order to find the principles of  
construction  that  must  be  applied  in  ascertaining  the  meaning  and  effect  of  the  Agreement.  
However, we find it more difficult to accept the suggestion that the rules of international business 
activities  generally  accepted  in  the  petroleum industry  (whatever  they  may be)  can  be entirely 
ignored since they are either the same as the law of Lithuania or contradict it and must therefore be 
disregarded in either event : Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Lithuania et al., [2005] EWHC 
2435, at § 21.
109See  e.g. the  Aminoil case where the concession agreement which had been brought to an end by 
nationalization by Kuwait, did not include a choice of law :  American Independent Oil Company 
Inc (Aminoil) v Government of the State of Kuwait [1982] 21 ILM 976; (1984) 66 ILR 518.
110See  e.g. the PCIJ holding in the  Serbian Loans case (fn. 58), at p. 42 : the Court noted that the 
borrower  was  a  Sovereign  State  “which  cannot  be  presumed  to  have  made to  have  made  the 
substance of its debt and the validity of its obligations accepted by it in respect thereof, subject to 
any law other than its own”. See also F. Rigaux and M. Fallon, Droit international privé (Larcier, 
2005), at p. 863, § 14.120.
111See e.g. the statement by Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the Abu Dhabi arbitration : noting that the 
contract had been made in Abu Dhabi and was to be wholly performed in Abu Dhabi, the arbitrator 
held that “if any municipal system were applicable it would  prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi” 
(Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 18 ILR 144, 149 (1951)). The arbitrator went 
on to reject the possibility to apply the law of Abu Dhabi on the ground that it was very primitive  
and wholly unadapted to the long term agreements in dispute (at pp. 149-150). See also the holding 
in the Aramco award : after having reviewed a number of theories and arguments, the tribunal noted 
that the law of Saudi Arabia should be applied to the concession agreement 'cause this State is a 
Party to the Agreement, as grantor, and because it is generally admitted in private international law 
that a sovereign State is presumed, unless the contrary is proved to have subjected its undertakings 
to its own legal system” (Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) 27 ILR 117, 
167 (1963)). Likewise in the Wintershall arbitration, the arbitral tribunal noted that the Exploration 
and Production Sharing Agreement concluded between various companies and the government of 
Qatar did not include a choice of law clause. The tribunal then indicated that “in consideration of 
the close links” between the EPSA and Qatar, the law of Qatar would apply (Wintershall AG et al.  
v. Government of Qatar, award of Feb. 5, 1988 and May 31, 1988, 28 ILM 795, 802 (1989).
112Modern scholarship has since long expressed its doubt about the mechanical application of the law 
of the State party to the agreement - see e.g. J. Verhoeven (fn. 36), at pp. 136-137.
113This is further elaborated in Article 5 of the Resolution, which provides that in the absence of any 
choice by the parties, “the proper law of the contract shall be derived from indications of the closest  
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of the fact that one the parties to the contract is a State, although this is as such not 
conclusive.114 Under English conflict of laws principles, it has indeed been said that 
the fact that one of the parties to the contract was a State, was “an element of weight 
to be considered, but it is no more than that”.115 
It may be more useful to consider whether the State acted  jure imperii or only  jure  
gestionis –  when  a  government  concludes  a  contract  in  the  direct  exercise  of  its 
governmental authority,  there is  indeed much to say for the idea that  the contract 
should  be  governed  by  the  law  of  its  state.116 The  distinction  between  'private' 
contracts and 'official' contracts is, however, difficult to apply. When one considers 
the Rome Regulation, the same difficult distinction must be made as the Regulation 
only applies in 'civil and commercial matters'.117 Although the precise boundaries of 
these matters is not easy to describe, it may be accepted that when a State enters into a 
contract in its capacity as sovereign, the European rules should not come into play.118 
If on the other hand, these rules are deemed to apply, the fact that one of the parties is  
a state or state entity should be discounted when determining the applicable law.119
Another possible distinction which could be use when determining the law applicable 
to a contract, pertains to the place of performance. If the contract must be performed 
totally or in part in the State, there is good reason to accept that the law of the State  
governs. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has come to this conclusion on a number of 
occasions.120 However, if the contract must be performed outside the State –  e.g. a 
contract for supply of services or goods to an army of State A posted in State B – there 
is much less reason to apply the law of the State.121 So it is that in order to decide that 
connection of the contract”.
114Mann wrote in this respect that “the rule that in looking for the proper law of transactions with 
States very great, though by no means overriding, weight has to be given to the character of the  
State party, is universal, supported by common sense and applicable to legislative instruments with 
particular force” (F. A. Mann, (fn. 39) at p. 564).
115Rex v. International Trustee Company for the Protection of Bondholders [1937] AC 500, at 557 
(HL). This was a case of dollar bonds linked to the valued of gold, issued in New York by the 
British  government.  The  bonds  were  linked  to  the  value  of  gold.  After  the  American  Joint  
Resolutions abrogated gold clauses in 1933, the court in England applied the law of New York to 
hold that the gold clause was unenforceable. See for other precedents in the same direction the case 
law referred to by O. Lando, 'Contracts', Intl. Enc. Comp. L., Vol. III/Ch. 24 (Mohr, 1976), p. 92, § 
173.
116See e.g. O. Lando (fn. 113), p. 92, § 173.
117In  contrast  with  the  Rome II  Regulation,  the  Rome I  Regulation does  no  specifically  exclude 
obligations arising iure imperii - art. 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation provides that it does not apply 
“  to the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta  iure 
imperii)”.
118One may refer to the interpretation given to this phrase by the ECJ in the context of the Brussels I 
Regulation.  See  e.g.  H.  Gaudemet-Tallon 'Le  règlement  'Rome  I'  sur  la  loi  applicable  aux 
obligations contractuelles', Journal Droit européen, 237, 238 (2010).
119As Lando wrote, “Apart from cases where the state acts jure imperii, there seems to be little reason 
to treat a government differently from other enterprises” : O. Lando (fn. 113), p. 92, § 173.
120See  e.g.  Housing  and  Urban  Services  International,  Inc.  v.  The  Governement  of  the  Islamic  
Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 201-174-1 (22 Nov. 1985), 9 Iran-US CTR 313 (The Tribunal 
held that an architect's agreement and a joint venture agreement were governed by the law of Iran, 
as they had been concluded in Iran); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., 
Award No. 135-33-1 (13 July 1984), 6 Iran US C.T.R. 149 (finding that a contract was subject to the 
laws of Iran because both parties were Iranian and the contract concerned a parcel of land in Iran).
121This is what the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has done in a series of ruling : see e.g. Economy Forms 
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the contract concluded between the French government and an Israeli lawyer who was 
asked to intervene in proceedings pending before an Israeli court, were governed by 
Israeli law, the French Supreme Court noted that that contract had been concluded and 
performed  in  Israel  and  that  the  proceedings  concerned  assets  located  in  that 
country.122
Further, some tribunals have preferred to rest their decision not so much on the law of 
a particular State, but rather on general principles of contract law. This is particular 
the case for the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, whose practice appears to be established to 
the effect  that  disputes will  be solved in  the maximum extent  without  making an 
explicit reference to a particular national law.123 Commenting on this practice, Judge 
Mosk  noted  that  “...  under  Article  V  of  the  Claims  Settlement  Declaration,  the 
Tribunal has great flexibility in its choice of law. Accordingly, the Tribunal sometimes 
has rejected the application of municipal law and has applied general principles of 
law.”.124 Other  arbitral  tribunals  have  similarly  chosen  to  find  support  for  their 
Corp. v. The Governement of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al ., Award No. 55-165-1 (14 June 
1983), 3 Iran-US CTR 42 (The Tribunal held that it would decide the contract claim pursuant to 
“the proper law of the contract” and that this law would be determined using a center of gravity test,  
noting that this was “the test under general principles of conflicts of law”. In effect, the Tribunal  
found that the contract was governed by the law of Iowa, as the goods were to be manufactured in  
that  State  and  delivery  and  payment  also  had to  be  made in  the  US);  Harnischfeger  Corp.  v.  
Ministry of Roads and Transportation et al., Award No. 144-180-3 (13 July 1984), 7 Iran US C.T.R. 
90 (finding that a contract was subject to the UCC because it had been accepted in the United States  
and provided for the manufacture of items in the US).
122Widow Szczupak v. French Ministry of Finance (Court of Appeal of Paris, Feb. 19, 1968), Revue 
critique de droit international privé 257 (1969) – the Court held that “conclue sur le territoire de  
l'Etat d'Israël entre les représentants de l'Etat français sur ce territoire et un avocat d'un barreau  
israélien pour des prestations se rapportant à l'exercice de la profession d'avocat, et concernant  
des  biens  situés  en  Israël,  puis  exécutée  dans  ce  pays,  la  convention  … est  soumise  à  la  loi  
israélienne” (at p. 259).
123See e.g. Morrison-Knudsen Pacific Ltd. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, et al., Award No. 
143-35-3, (6 Aug. 1984), 7 Iran-US C.T.R. 54 : deciding a claim following a delay in performance 
of a contract, the Tribunal rested its decision on a “general principle of law” to the effect that “a  
party may recover for losses suffered as a consequence of contract breach irrespective of whether a 
right also exists to terminate the contract” (at p. 74). The Tribunal made reference to Treitel's study 
published in the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law to justify its decision, noting also 
that “nothing in Iranian law has been called to the Tribunal's attention that contradicts this general  
legal  principle”.  See  in  the  same vein,  Anaconda-Iran,  Inc.  v.  The  Government  of  the  Islamic  
Republic  of  Iran,  Award  No.  65—167-3  (10  Dec.   1986),  13  Iran-US  C.T.R.  199  (noting  the 
freedom it enjoyed under Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal found it 
unnecessary to decide whether the contract was governed by Iranian law or US law. It held that it 
“is  not  required  to  apply  any  particular  national  or  international  legal  system”);  Combustion 
Engineering, Inc. et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 506-308-2 (18 Feb. 1991), 
26 Iran-US C.T.R. 60 (after noting that it should look to “principles of commercial and international 
law”, the Tribunal referred to the “widely accepted” principle that one can prove the existence of a 
contract through evidence demonstrating partial performance. The Tribunal concluded that “Such a 
principle must be taken to constitute a general principle of law”);  Mobil Oil Iran Inc., et  al. v.  
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 311-74/76/81 (14 July 1987), 16 Iran-
US C.T.R. 3 – the Tribunal noted that parties had made a partial choice for the laws of Iran and held 
that it did “not consider it appropriate that such an Agreement be governed by the law of one Party”. 
Accordingly,  the Tribunal  decided that  the law applicable  to  the  contract  was “Iranian law for 
interpretative issues, and the general principles of commercial and international law for all other 
issues” - at p. 28).
124Harnischfeger Corp. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation et al., Award No. 144-180-3 (13 July 
WAUTELET – INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRACTS – APPLICABLE LAW 23/58
decision  in  the  principles  codified  by  Unidroit.  In  several  arbitral  proceedings 
conducted under the ICC rules,125 arbitral tribunals have indeed applied the Unidroit 
principles to contracts concluded between a State and a foreign company, which did 
not include any choice of law.126
Another solution could be to attempt to preserve the application of the law of the State 
but subject it to some limitation. This is what the ICSID Convention does. Art. 42(1) 
of the ICSID Convention indeed provides that in the absence of an agreement on the 
applicable law, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting State party to 
the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) “and such rules of international 
law as may be applicable”. A balance is established between the law of the State, 
whose honor is  safeguarded, and the need to  protect the contracting party against 
arbitrary action.127 The use of concurrent systems of law has in the past been adopted 
by arbitral tribunals in disputes between States and private investors.128
§ 2. The practice
Although the distinction between various categories of state contracts is somewhat 
artificial, it may be useful to review the different categories of contracts separately 
given the lack of uniform practice.
2.1 'Investment' agreements and other long term contractual relationships
The  practice  under  so-called  'investment'  agreements  is  not  uniform.129 What  law 
1984), 7 Iran US C.T.R. 90 – dissenting opinion of Judge Richard Mosk, at p. 140. Commenting on  
the practice of the Tribunal, Messrs. Brower and Brueschke noted that “the Tribunal invariably fails  
to  give  detailed  explanations  regarding  the  sources  of  the  law it  applies  except  where  public 
international  law  is  concerned.  Moreover,  despite  the  range  of  sources  available,  the  Tribunal 
generally has not engaged in complicated conflict of laws analyses when determining the applicable 
law in its decisions” (C. N. Brower and  J. D. Brueschke,  The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
(Nijhoff, 1998), at p. 639).
125See the awards discussed by  M. J. Bonell, 'The Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts and the Harmonization of International Sales Law 36 R.J.T.334, at pp. 344-346 (2002). 
According to  Bonell,   “...  it  is  particularly in the context  of so-called 'State  contracts'  that  the 
Unidroit  Principles  are  frequently  applied  even  in  the  absence  of  an  express  reference  by  the  
parties”  (at  p.  344).  See  more  recently,  M.  J.  Bonell,  'International  Investment  Contracts  and 
General Contract Law : a Place for the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts',  
17 Uniform Law Rev. 141-159 (2012).
126After noting that the contract was silent as to the applicable law, one arbitral tribunal noted that 
neither party was prepared to accept the other’s domestic law and decided to apply “those general 
principles and rules of law applicable to international contractual obligations   [ . . . ], including 
[  .  .  .  ]  the Unidroit  Principles,  as  far  as  they  can be  considered to  reflect  generally  accepted 
principles and rules ” (quoted by M. J. Bonell, 'The Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts and the Harmonization of International Sales Law 36 R.J.T.334, at pp. 345).
127The precise meaning of Art. 42(1) has given rise to much controversy. See the literature referred to 
in footnote 103 above.
128See e.g. the Aminoil case where the arbitral tribunal held that the law of Kuwait applied but that  
account should also be taken of public international law and general principles of law, which were  
part of the law of Kuwait : American Independent Oil Company Inc (Aminoil) v Government of the  
State of Kuwait 21 ILM 976, 1000-1001 (1982).
129For a recent review of the various possibilities, focusing on contracts concluded in the framework 
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governs the agreement depends indeed among other on the bargaining power of the 
parties.130 If one looks at agreements covering exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources, such as oil and gas, there appear to have been a gradual shift in favor of the 
law of the host State, with more recent contracts including an express provision in 
favor of this law.131 This is certainly the case for contracts concluded by so-called 
developed States, which have always insisted on the application of their laws.132 
This practice has been followed in other parts of the world, probably because it is felt 
that accepting a choice for another law than the State's own law puts the future of a 
contract  in  the  hands  of  another  country's  legislative  body,  something  which  is 
considered with more than reluctance. So it is that contracts concluded recently by the 
Libyan National Oil Company include a choice for Libyan law.133
of foreign investment projects, see  A. Diehl (fn. 63) at pp.  257-265 – Ms Diehl distinguishes six 
options used in practice,  ranging from the choice of the law of the host  state to the choice of 
international law.
130In a recent case,  a rather unusual choice was made for the “law of the place of the act”.  This  
provision was included in one of the agreement concluded in 2007 between the DRCongo and 
several Chinese companies. The provision read as follows : “La loi applicable est la loi du lieu de  
l'acte. Au cas où la loi applicable ne peut être déterminée selon le critère précédent, et afin de la  
déterminer,  les  parties  se  référeront  aux  critères  usuellement  utilisés  dans  le  commerce  
international pour régler les différends de même nature”. It  is  likely that  the absence of a real 
choice of law reflects the fact that both parties were in fact States – the Chinese companies were 
indeed reportedly all State owned companies acting with the autorization of the PRC.
131Some scholars have referred in this respect  to the “relocalization” of these agreements,  after  a 
period during which reference to international law and general principles was more frequent. See A. 
S. El Kosheri and  T. F. Riad, 'The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum Agreements : 
Changes in the Arbitration Process',  1  ICSID Rev.– Foreign Investment L. J., 257-279 (1986), in 
particular at p. 267-277 – which purported to discover a trend rejecting attempts to eliminate the 
applicability of the host country's legal system. See also A. B. Derman, A. Golding, M. Halake, W. 
M. Katz Jr. and P. A. Vermillion, 'Choice of Law Provisions When Drafting Arbitration Provisions 
for International Oil and Gas Agreements', 2 Intl. Oil Gas and Energy Dispute Management (2006).
132See e.g. the Model Petroleum Licence Agreement of Norway (quoted by Ch. Leben, (fn. 32), at p. 
266, note 93), which provides that the licence is subject to Norwegian legislation. The same applies  
for the model agreement used in Brazil, which includes a choice for Brazilian law – see D. Szyfman, 
'Brazilian Oil & Gas Regulatory Framework'  in International Oil and Gas Transactions in Latin 
America (R. Colmenter and D. Enriquez (eds.), Porrua, 2011, 215, 232 (discussing the concession  
agreements concluded by the Brazilian National Oil Agency). See also the choice of law clause in 
the 1982 Participation Agreement  concluded between New Zealand and Mobil  Oil  (which was 
considered in  Attorney General v. Mobil Oil NZ Ltd., (New Zealand High Court, July 1, 1987, 4 
ICSID Reports 123) – the choice was made in favor of the laws of New Zealand and the choice for  
Peruvian law included in the Concession agreement granted by Peru to a US company, which was 
considered by an ICSID arbitral tribunal in Aguaytia Energy LLC v. Republic of Peru (ICSID Award 
Case  No.  Arb/06/13)  –  article  4  of  the  Concession  agreement  read  as  follows  :  “Applicable 
Governing Law. The legal framework to which the agreement hereto is compulsorily subject to is 
the Electric Concessions Law – Law Decree No. 25844 and its Regulations approved by Supreme 
Decree No. 009-93-EM with the amendments incorporated by Supreme Decree No. 02-94-EM, and 
the rest of Peruvian laws in force in each instance”.
133According to Article 21 of the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement which is used by the 
National Oil Corporation of Libya : “ « This agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in  
accordance  with  the  laws  and  regulations  of  GSPLAJ  [Great  Socialist  People's  Libyan  Arab  
Jamahiriya],  including,  without  limitation,  the  Petroleum  Law ».  See  for  more  details,  P.  de  
Vareilles-Sommières and A. Fekini (fn. 32). In earlier contracts concluded by Libya, the choice of 
law provision was less protective of Libyan interests, as it provided that the concession agreement 
“shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of law of Libya common to 
the principles of international law ...”. In his award in the Texaco Overseas case, Prof. Dupuy noted 
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Similar provisions are included in contracts signed by other national oil companies.134 
Likewise,  a contract concluded between PGN, an Indonesian state owned company, 
with a tripartite Indonesian joint operation, for the design, procurement, installation, 
testing and pre-commissioning of an onshore gas transmission pipeline in Indonesia, 
was explicitly governed by Indonesian law.135 Finally, the Model Mining Agreement 
developed by the IBA also includes a choice for the law of the State concerned.136
In other fields than natural resources contract, the choice for the law of the State also 
appears to be the majority solution. Delaume reports that the “overwhelming majority 
of stipulations of applicable law in State contracts refer to some municipal law as the 
proper law of the contract” and adds that for construction and managements contract, 
turnkey contracts or licensing agreements regarding transfer of technology, the choice 
falls on the law of the State party.137
In some countries, there is no room for a choice of another law than the law of the 
State. Many jurisdictions indeed insist that contracts concluded by the government or 
governmental agencies be exclusively governed by local law.138 So it is that under the 
in respect of the reference to the 'principles of law of Libya' that “the parties thereby wanted to  
demonstrate that they intended the Arbitral Tribunal to base itself on the spirit of Libyan law as 
expressed in the fundamental principles of that law, rather than by its rules which may be contingent 
and  variable  since  these  rules  depended,  in  the  last  instance,  on  the  unilateral  will  –  even 
arbitrariness – of one of the contracting parties” (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 18, § 49 (1978). In another 
arbitration which followed the nationalization of Libyan oil operations, BP argued that the choice of  
law clause, which made reference to the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of  
international  law, should be construed to the effect  that  international  law alone was applicable.  
Jugde Lagergren rejected this interpretation, holding that under the choice made by parties, resort  
should also be had to the general principles of law - BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd v. Libya 
53 ILR 297, 327-328 (1979).
134See e.g. the oil contracts signed with Algeria, or rather its oil company Sonatrach. Article 58(3) of 
the Act No 05-07 of 28 April 2005 provides that Algerian law applies in case of disputes. This is 
read to exclude any possibility of a choice of law clause in exploration and production agreements 
signed between the national oil agency (ALNAFT), the national oil company (Sonatrach) and the 
foreign investor. See for more details, M. Trari-Tani, 'Arbitrage international et contrats publics en 
Algérie  –  l'exemple  des  contrats  de  recherche  et  d'exploitation  des  hydrocarbures',  in  Contrats 
publics et arbitrage international, (M. Audit (ed.), Bruylant, 2011), (171), 180-182; D.-E. Lakehal, 
(fn.  32)  at  p.  512  and  M.  Trari-Tani,  'The  new legal  framework  for  prospecting,  research  and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons in Algeria', Intl. Bus. L. J. 53-67 (2008) (according to Ms Trari-Tani,  
the 2005 Act must be considered to be 'internationally mandatory' – at pp. 65-66, § 54). Even before 
the adoption of the 2005 Act, the practice of Algerian state companies was to include a choice for 
Algerian law, see  G. Blanc, Le contrat international d'équipement industriel. L'exemple algérien, 
(Université des sciences sociales de Grenoble, 1980), pp. 185-188.
135This contract was first contemplated in ICC arbitration proceedings (ICC Case No 16122) and later 
in a ruling of the Singapore Court of Appeal : CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara  
(Persero) TBK  (2011)  SGCA 33.  The  Contract  concluded  in  2006  between  PGN  and  the 
Consortium was based on the 1999 FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering 
Construction.
136Section  35.0  of  the  Model  Mining  Development  Agreement  reads:  “This  Agreement  shall  be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State, including international treaties  
and bilateral investment treaties to which the State is a party (collectively, “Applicable Law”).”
137G.R. Delaume,  'The Proper Law of State Contracts and the  Lex Mercatoria :  A Reappraisal',  3 
ICSID Rev., 79, at p. 82 (1988).
138See e.g. for concession agreements, the various national reports published in International Project 
Finance and PPP's. A Legal Guide to Key Growth Markets (J. Delmon and V. Rigby Delmon (eds.),  
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laws of Dubai, a contract concluded by the government or a governmental agency 
may  not  include  a  choice  for  “any  laws  or  rules  other  than  the  laws,  rules,  and 
regulations prevailing in the Emirate of Dubai and any text to the contrary shall be 
considered as invalid and not binding.”139
When this is not imposed by the law, it may result from a well entrenched refusal by 
governmental agencies to consider the application of foreign law.140
Although it probably represents the majority solution,141 the choice for own law is by 
no means a universally accepted practice. In some instances, parties to the contract 
decide  that  the  contract  will  be  governed  by  another  law  than  that  of  the  State 
concerned.142 So it is that the contract concluded between a Swiss company and a 
Slovak state-owned network operator, which granted the Swiss company the right to 
transmit electricity on a transmission line which it partly financed, included a choice 
for Austrian law.143
Another option, which is frequently used in the oil industry, is to submit the contract 
to local law but to supplement this choice with a reference to another legal regime.144 
The  most  common  example  is  that  of  a  reference  to  international  law.145 In  an 
Kluwer, 2012), in particular the report for Brazil (at p. 46); for China (at pp. 44-45), Russia (at p. 
75), United Arab Emirates at p. 48) and Vietnam (at pp. 71-72).
139Art. 36 of the  Law No. 6 of 1997 On Contracts of Government Departments in Dubai Emirate 
provides that  “No contract  where Dubai Government or any of its departments is  a party shall 
contain a provision for arbitration outside Dubai Courts or to any laws or rules other than the laws,  
rules,  and regulations prevailing in the Emirate of  Dubai  and any text  to the contrary shall  be  
considered  as  invalid  and  not  binding.  As  an  exemption  where  public  interest  requires,  the 
Government  or  any  of  its  departments,  establishments  and  authorities  may  be  exempted  from 
conforming to said provision”. Article 37 of the same law goes on to provide that no contract may  
stipulate adherence to the FIDIC Conditions of Contract.
140This is apparently the case in Nigeria, with the local authorities refusing to accept a choice for 
another law : Report for Nigeria in International Project Finance and PPP's. A Legal Guide to Key  
Growth Markets (fn. 135), at p. 32-33.
141In the oil industry, the majority of agreements are governed by the law of the State – see Ch. Leben, 
(fn. 32) at p. 270, § 135.
142Schreuer reports that as far as investment contracts are concerned, the choice for the law of a third 
state is “rare” (C. H. Schreuer (fn. 51) at p. 561).
143The contract has given rise to litigation between Slovakia and the European Commission on the 
compatibility  of  Slovakia's  obligation under EU law to ensure  non-discriminatory  access  to  its 
energy  network  and  the  need  to  afford  investments  protection  under  a  BIT  concluded  with 
Switzerland. See ECJ, 15 Sept. 2011, European Commission v Slovak Republic, case C-264/09, not 
yet published in ECR.
144In some older agreements, the choice of law provision included a reference not to international law 
but rather to 'good faith' or other general principles. This was the case in the agreement concluded  
between the National Iranian Oil Company and a Canadian company, which was considered in the 
Sapphire arbitration : in addition to a reference to the laws of Iran, the choice of law provision also  
stipulated that parties undertook to carry out their obligations “in accordance with the principles of 
good faith and good will and to respect the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement” ( Sapphire 
International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, Award of March 15, 1963 (35 ILR 
136, 140 (1967)).
145Sometimes, the external reference system is found not in international law but rather in the general  
principles of of law common to several legal systems. In a contract concluded more than fifty years 
ago by the National Iranian Oil Company, the following provision was included : “In view of the  
diverse nationalities of the parties to this Agreement, it shall be governed by and interpreted and  
applied in accordance with the principles of law common to Iran and the several nations in which 
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agreement  signed in  the 1970's  between the  State  of  Congo and AGIP,  an Italian 
company, parties agreed that their contract would be governed by the laws of Congo 
“supplemented by international law”.146 In many contracts, the choice for local law is 
supplemented  not  directly  by  a  reference  to  'international  law',  but  rather  to  the 
'principles of international law'. This has been a favored method for a long time in the 
oil  industry.  Many  production  sharing  agreements  still  include  today  a  provision 
subjecting the contract to both local law and “the principles of international law and 
the decisions of international tribunals and international treaties to which [the State] is 
a party”.147 Another method which is sometimes used is to keep the reference to the 
law of the host State, but to stabilize it or otherwise attempt to prevent changes being 
made to this law.148
There are many variations to this type of choice of law provisions, depending first on 
which external regime is chosen and second on the relationship between local law and 
the external reference regime. As far as the external regime is concerned, practice 
learns that contract drafters make reference to 'international law', the 'principles of 
international  law',149 the  'rules  of  international  law'  or,  in  a  distant  past,  to  the 
'principles  of  law  recognised  by  civilised  nations  in  general”.  Sometimes,  an 
additional reference is included to the 'decisions of international tribunals'.150 In a few 
cases, the drafters make a more limited reference to a specific source of international 
law, such as the international treaties.151 Another possibility used by contract drafters 
the other parties to this Agreement are incorporated ...” - the contract provision was quoted by F. 
Mann,  'The  Proper  Law  of  Contracts  by  International  Persons',  B.Y.I.L.,  1959,  (34),  at  51, 
reproduced in Studies in International Law, at p. 233. This clause was considered and applied in the 
Sapphire arbitration :  Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd v. National Iranian Oil Co.  35 ILR 
136,, 170-176 (1967). Acording to El Kosheri, this type of provision is no more than a “historical  
souvenir' -  A. S. El Kosheri and  T. F. Riad, 'The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum 
Agreements : Changes in the Arbitration Process', 1 ICSID Rev.– Foreign Investment L. J., 257-269 
(1986).
146The agreement (dated 2 January 1974) was considered in AGIP v. Popular Republic of the Congo 
ICSID Award Nov. 30, 1979, Case No. ARB/77/1, 21 ILM 726 (1982), 1 ICSID Reports 313.
147As is for example done in art. 29(1) of the Model Production Sharing Contract of Turkmenistan 
(1997).
148See hereinafter (section 2) on the various stabilization mechanisms. A good example may be found 
in  a  1981  contract  concluded  by  Guinea,  which  provided  that  “The  term 'law'  in  the  present 
Agreement refers to Guinean law. However, Guinean law will be applicable only insofar as it is not 
incompatible with the terms of the present Agreement, and where it is not more restrictive than the 
law in force at the date of entry into force of the present Agreement” (this provision was considered 
in Atlantic Triton v. Guinea, ICSID Award, April 21, 1986, 3 ICSID Reports 23).
149Or 'generally accepted principles of international law'.
150As was done in the choice of law provision included in oil contracts concluded some fifty years ago 
by the Iranian National Oil Company – which provided that failing an answer in the laws of Iran,  
application should be made of the “...  principles of law recognised by civilised nations in general, 
including such of those principles as may have been applied by international tribunals”. See more 
recently  in  the  same vein  the  provision  included  in  an  agreement  concluded in  1990 between 
Texaco and Pakistan, which read as follows : “This Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in 
accordance with and shall be given effect under the laws of Pakistan to the extent that such laws and 
interpretations  are  consistent  with  generally  accepted  standards  of  International  Law including 
principles as may have been applied by international tribunals” (as quoted by A. Diehl (fn. 63), at p. 
265).
151See the  choice  of  law provision  included  in  a  concession agreement  concluded by  Kyrgystan, 
quoted by Ch. Leben (fn. 32), at p. 272-273.
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is to make reference to 'specific usages of the petroleum industry'.152
When such a combination is used, contract drafters have different options to deal with 
the  hierarchy  of  the  various  regimes  they  select.  Frequently,  the  reference  to 
international law aims to avoid the application of local idiosyncracies which could 
affect the law of the State party to the contract. This is obvious in the case of the 
concession  agreements  concluded  by  Libya  some  decades  ago.  As  will  be 
remembered, these agreements provided that the concession “shall be governed by 
and interpreted in  accordance with the principles of law of Libya common to the 
principles of international law ...”.153 
Often,  the stabilizing role  of international  law is  expressed even more openly,  by 
providing that to the extent that the law of the contracting State is not consisted with 
international  law,  the  latter  shall  prevail.154 In  other  contracts,  the  reference  to 
international law or general principles is only used as a fall back solution for situation 
in  which  no solution  may be  found in  the  law of  the  State  party.155 In  yet  other 
agreements, no indication is given as to the relationship between the law of the State 
party  and  international  law  to  which  reference  is  made.156 In  the  Agip case,  the 
wording used in the agreement was ambiguous, as the choice for the law of Congo 
was  said  to  be  “supplemented”  by  principles  of  international  law.  After  having 
examined the legality of the nationalization decree under Congolese law, the arbitral 
tribunal noted that it should also consider the impact of international law. Agip had 
argued  that  the  language  use  by  parties  meant  that  Congolese  law  should  be 
subordinated to international law. The tribunal noted in this respect that “Whatever the 
merits of this argument it suffices for the Tribunal to note that the use of the word 
'supplemented' signifies at the very least that recourse to principles of international 
law can be made either to fill a lacuna in Congolese law or to make any necessary 
addition to it”.157 In some cases, an attempt is made to mitigate the application of the 
law of the State party to the agreement by linking it to general principles of another 
municipal law.158
152See  e.g. the following choice of law clause :  “This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of 
Lithuania  supplemented,  where  required,  by  rules  of  international  business  activities  generally 
accepted in the petroleum industry if they do not contradict the laws of the Republic of Lithuania." 
(taken from a contract between a Swedish company and a Lithuanian state-owned company, with 
the government  of  Lithuania  also  co-signing the  agreement,  which  was  considered  in  Svenska  
Petroleum Exploration AB v. Lithuania et al., [2005] EWHC 2435).
153This provision was considered in the three arbitration proceedings already referred to.
154This  is  the  language  used  since  the  2002  revision  by  the  Model  Joint  Operating  Agreement 
developed by the AIPN (see article 18).
155In the Libyan concession agreements, the choice of law provision included the following language : 
“...and  in  the  absence  of  such common principles  then by and  in  accordance with the general 
principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been applied by international 
tribunals”. A contract recently concluded by China provided that it would be governed by the laws 
of the PRC and that “Failing the relevant provisions of the Law of PRC, principles of applicable 
laws widely used in petroleum resource countries acceptable to the parties  shall  be applicable” 
(reproduced by Ch. Leben (fn. 32) at pp. 273-274, § 143).
156See e.g. section 29.1 of the 2007 Model Production Agreement of Turkmenistan, which provides  
that “This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws 
of  Turkmenistan  and,  as  applicable,  the  principles  of  international  law  and  the  decisions  of  
international tribunals and international treaties to which Turkmenistan is a Party”.
157AGIP v. Popular Republic of the Congo ICSID Award Nov. 30, 1979, 1 ICSID Reports 313, 323.
158See  e.g. the following language found in a contract concluded between Algeria and the French 
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In very rare cases, parties may choose to submit their contract exclusively to public 
international law.159
2.2 Civil and commercial agreements
When one examines the practice of commercial agreements concluded by States, it 
becomes  apparent  that  what  law is  chosen by parties  depends on their  respective 
bargaining power and negotiation skills. When the negotiations are demand and not 
supply driven, it may be that a State or state entity insists on the exclusive application 
of its law.160 On the other hand, a large software company may obtain that the licence 
it grants to a State, is subject to the laws of its state of incorporation, which has served 
as the basis for the drafting of the licence.  In some cases, parties will  submit the 
contract to the law of a third State, presumably because this appears to be a neutral set 
of rules.161 Beyond the respective strength of both parties, other factors which may 
influence the choice of law are the existence of an adequate regulatory framework in 
the law of the State and the confidence of the parties, and in particular of the private 
contracting party, in the legal system of its partner.
It is difficult to gather precise information about other agreements concluded by a 
State. One could take the example of rental agreements concluded by a State with a 
foreign owner, e.g. in order to procure office space for an embassy or a consulate. It is 
far from excluded that such contracts are concluded without any express provision 
regarding the applicable law.162 If a choice is made, it could be that the law of the 
Republic regarding the setting up of a 'cooperative association for the purpose of joint exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons in Algeria' (reproduced in 4 ILM 809 (1965)) : 'The international  
arbitration tribunal shall make awards on the basis of the law applicable under the terms of the  
Sahara Petroleum Code and, if  necessary,  under the terms of  this Agreement.  If  necessary,  the 
Sahara  Petroleum Code  shall  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  French  administrative  law and,  in 
particular, due consideration shall be given to the French Council of State. If the above documents 
are silent or unclear on the point at issue, the tribunal may be guided by general principles of law' 
(art. 46(4)).
159There are only a few examples known of contracts including a direct and exclusive choice for  
international law – see  Ch. Leben (fn. 32) at p. 270, § 136. See already for this observation,  J.  
Verhoeven (fn. 36) at p. 141, § 12. Schreuer notes that a choice expressed solely for international  
law is “not advisable”, as the “contacts of the investment activity to various technical provisions of 
the host State's law …. would make such a formula impractical” (C. H. Schreuer (fn. 51) at pp. 563-
564).
160See e.g. the contract at the basis of the dispute settled by the Iran US Claims Tribunal in T.C.S.B.  
Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 114-140-2 (16 March 1984), 5 Iran-US C.T.R. 160 : 
the contract was subject to Iranian law. See also the contract concluded in 2007 between Belgium 
and a large pharmaceutical  company for  the procurement of  large scale influenza vaccination :  
section 16.13 of the agreement provided that “La présente Convention est régie par le droit belge,  
étant  entendu que  tout  Traité  en  est  expressément  exclu.  Les  Parties  excluent  expressément  la  
Convention des Nations Unies sur le Contrat de Vente International de Biens”.
161See e.g. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. The Government of Iran, et al., Award No. 145-35-3 (6 Aug. 
1984) 7 Iran US C.T.R. 181 – the contract was subject to Swiss law.
162In a decision issued in 1973, the French Court of Cassation had to rule on a dispute between Spain  
and a French Hotel (Georges V) which had rented some business space to the Spanish Kingdom for 
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place of the real estate is chosen. In addition, in many countries, such agreements are 
subject to important restrictions as to the applicable law.163 A state authority could also 
conclude contracts  for  supply and provision of  services  with a  foreign company. 
When  this  is  done  through  a  tender  mechanism,  questions  could  arise  as  to  the 
application of the public procurement rules of the State.164 The expectation is that the 
resulting contract will be expressly subject to the law of the State since it has the 
benefit of drafting the contract.
As  far  as  individual  labor  contracts,  and  most  importantly  those  concluded  by 
embassies and other representations of foreign States, is it quite difficult to determine 
what is the standard practice. Under French law, the ministry of foreign affairs has the 
possibility to subject employment contracts of staff recruited abroad, to local law.165 
This  possibility  must  be  used  “when  the  needs  of  the  mission  so  justify”.  This 
suggests that as a rule, staff members are bound by employment contracts governed 
by  French  law.166 It  appears,  however,  from  court  decisions  that  some  of  the 
employment contracts concluded by French authorities include a reference to foreign 
law.167 If there is a dispute between embassy staff and the authorities of the country of 
origin, it is not uncommon that the dispute is brought before the courts of the host 
country. It would be interesting to research the case law in this respect to determine 
whether  the  contracts  concluded by embassies  indeed do include  a  choice of  law 
provision.168 From the perspective of the host state, it would probably go too far to 
a  duration  of  18  years.  The  rental  agreement  did  not  include  a  choice  of  law but  included  a 
reference to some French statutes applicable to business leases (French Court of Cassation, January  
17 1973, published in 77 Revue générale de droit international public 907 (1973)).
163Under Russian law for example, any agreement relating to immovables (not limited to land) must  
be  governed  by  Russian  law.  See  artt.  1205  and  1206  Russian  Civil  Code.  It  is  probably  in 
recognition of the strength of the law of the place where the real  estate  is  located that  France 
adopted a specific  provision (in  its  Code on Assets  of  the State)  to  the effect  that  the French  
administration may decide not to apply the provisions of French law “when they are irreconcilable 
with the law of the State where the asset is located [...]” (art. L-1221(1) French 'Code général de la  
propriété des personnes publiques').
164See e.g. in France the decision of the Council of State in the Colas Djibouti case (July 4, 2008, case 
No.  316028) –  the  highest  French  administrative  court  held that  the  provisions  of  French  law 
regarding public procurement were not applicable as the call for tender had been placed in Djibouti 
by the French embassy and the contract was to be signed and performed outside France.
165According to Art. 34-V of the Act of 12 April 2000 (on the rights of citizens in their relations with 
public service), “Lorsque les nécessités du service le justifient, les services de l'Etat à l'étranger  
peuvent, dans le respect des conventions internationales du travail, faire appel à des personnels  
contractuels recrutés sur place, sur des contrats de travail soumis au droit local, pour exercer des  
fonctions concourant au fonctionnement desdits services”.
166See in general the explanations of M. Audit, 'Les contrats de travail conclus par l'Administration à 
l'étranger', Revue critique de droit international privé 39-69 (2002).
167See the case of Ministry of Interior v Gire, (Administrative Court of Paris Dec. 7, 2000, RFDE 505 
(2001) – in relation to the recruiting of a staff member by the French embassy in Senegal. The court  
found that the decision of the embassy included a reference to the Labor Code of Senegal.
168See e.g. in Germany the decision of the Bundesarbeitsgericht of Nov. 20, 1997 (IPRspr. 1997, No 
58 at p. 106) – in relation with an employee of the US embassy in Germany, the question arose  
whether  a  choice of  law could be  inferred  from the various provisions of  the Foreign  Service 
National Handbook. The court concluded that the Handbook did include a choice for German law 
and  that  even  if  such  a  choice  could  not  be  read  in  the  Handbook,  the  mandatory  protective  
provisions of German law applied. Consider also the decision of the Bundesarbeitsgericht of Feb. 
15,  2005 (IPRspr.  2005,  No 90,  p.  214)  (dispute  following the  termination of  an  employment  
contract by the US embassy in Germany, the court comes to the conclusion that the contract did not  
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require  that  staff  member  of  foreign  embassies  be  employed  under  a  contract 
governed by local law.169
2.3 Loan agreements and other financial arrangements
State  practice  in  loan  agreements  and  other  financial  contracts  is  more  easily 
ascertainable  than  for  other  categories  of  agreements.  The  information  available 
reveals that contrary to what applies in other fields, and most notably for investment 
contracts, States have much less reluctance to agree to a choice of a foreign law to 
govern the financial contract they enter into.170 In older loan agreements concluded by 
States, a choice was often expressed for the law of the lender's country.171 Older bond 
issues  often  did  not  include  an  express  choice  of  law  provision.172 In  other 
circumstances, the choice was made not for the lender's law but rather for the law of 
the market.173
include a choice of law). In Belgium, see Labour Appeal Court of Brussels, May 19, 2007, Journal 
des  Tribunaux  du  Travail  451  (2007)  (dispute  following  the  dismissal  of  an  employee  by  the 
embassy of Saudi Arabia, the court notes that the employment contract does not include a choice of 
law and comes to the conclusion that Belgian law applies).
169Consider, however, the practice in Belgium where identification cards are only issued to domestic  
staff employed by embassy personnel provided the relationship is documented in a written contract 
and the contract is in conformity with Belgian law. This falls short of requiring that the contract is 
expressly governed by Belgian law. See the circular  letters of  the Belgian Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs No 195 of March 19, 2003 and No. 1415 of June 7, 1999.
170As noted by Ph. Wood, 'Selected Aspects of International Loan Documentation and Rescheduling', 
in  Sovereign  Borrowers.  Guidelines  on  Legal  Negotiations  with  Commercial  Lenders  (Lars 
Kalderen and Qamar S. Siddiqi (eds.), Butterworths 1984, 123, at pp. 126-127. Wood notes that 
“most countries are willing to contract under an external system of law. They do not regard it as  
some sort of derogation of sovereignty”. Wood adds that in a few cases, the non-acceptance by a  
sovereign borrower of an external governing law has jeopardized the syndication of the loans. The 
situation  used  to  be  different,  however,  in  some  parts  of  the  world.  In  South  America,  many 
countries  indeed  resisted  the  notion  that  a  loan  agreement  they  concluded could be  subject  to 
foreign law. This resistance has been gradually overcome, starting with a loan agreement concluded 
in  1983  by  Columbia,  which  was  subject  to  English  law  (see  e.g.  V.  Carrillo-Batalla  Lucas, 
'Conflict of Laws in International Lending Transactions – Governing Law and Choice of Forum', in 
The External Debt (D. Carreau et al. (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 409, 423-430) and A. C. Cates 
and S. Isern-Feliu, 'Governing Law and Jurisdiction Clauses in Eurolean Agreements', Int'l. Fin. L. 
Rev., 28, at p. 31 (July 1983).
171D.  Sommers,  A.  Broches &  G.  R.  Delaume,  'Conflict  Avoidance  in  International  Loans  and 
Monetary Agreements', Law & Contemporary Problems 463-482, at p. 466, 467 472 (1956) and G. 
R. Delaume, 'ICSID and the Transnational Financial Community', 1 ICSID Rev. 237, 243 (1986) – 
according to  Delaume,  “consistent  with well  established contractual  practice,  the  law normally 
stipulated as governing the loan relationship is the law of the lender's country. Only on relatively  
rare occasions have the parties agreed to submit their relations to the law of a third country, such as 
that of an important financial center. So far is known, no attempt has bee, made to 'internationalize'  
the  loan  relationship.  Unlike  economic  development  agreements,  which  contain,  with  varying 
degree of precision, references to international law or to the general principles of law, the loan 
documents remain rooted in municipal law”. See also  G. van Hecke (fn.  13) at  p 68. Over the 
practice of State loans before the second world war,  see  J.F.M. Bosch,  De staatschulden in het 
internationaal recht (Martinus Nijhoff, 1929), at pp. 8-13).
172G. van Hecke (fn. 13) at p 68.
173At  one  point,  the  practice  developed to include  a  dual  choice  of  law :  the  contract  would  be  
primarily governed by English law or the laws of New York, but would also include the following 
proviso : “provided that in any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement brought by 
any Bank in the courts of the [State borrower], this Agreement shall be governed by and construed  
in accordance with the law of [the State borrower]”. This dual choice of law was an attempt to  
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Today,  most  loan  agreements  concluded  between  banks  and  States  are  expressly 
governed by the law of one of the major financial centers 174 – typically English law or 
the law of New York.175 A loan agreement concluded in 1974 between Egypt and a 
company incorporated in Hong Kong was expressly governed by English law.176 The 
large  medium-term floating  rate  syndicated  eurocurrency loans  which  were at  the 
source of many restructuring in the 1980's 177 also included a choice for either English 
or New York law.178 The ISDA Master Agreement includes a choice for English law or 
the laws of the State of New York. To take another example, some securities issued by 
Argentina in 1998 - so-called Floating Rate Accrual Notes - were issued based on 
documentation including a choice for the law of New York.179 As Reinisch has noted, 
this “reflects the important role of international financial markets for the financing 
and re-financing of large loans”.180 Taken together with the immunity waiver typically 
included in such contracts (infra), this confirms that such contracts are not different 
from  contracts  concluded  between  private  operators.181 When  a  loan  agreement 
includes a choice for another law than that of London or New York, the choice will in 
most cases be expressed for the law of one of the parties.182
alleviate the burden of proving New York law or English law if proceedings were brought before 
the courts of the State borrower (see the hesitation of  A. C. Gooch and  L. B. Klein,  'Annotated 
Sample Loan Agreement',  in  International  Borrowing.  Negotiating and Structuring International 
Debt Transactions (D. D. Bradlow (ed.), 2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff/ILI, 1986), 309 at 355-356).
174See in general A. C. Cates and S. Isern Felui, 'Governing Law and Jurisdiction Clauses in Euroloan 
Agreements', Intl. Financial Law Rev. 28 ff (1983). According to Heleniak, lenders will in any case 
insist  that  the credit  agreement be governed by the law of a jurisdiction other  than that  of the  
foreign state, in order to “reduce the risk of capricious change in that state's law to the detriment of  
lenders. And Heleniak to note that “The law finally chosen tends to depend much on the lawyers the 
banker brought with him to the negotiations. Frequently, a New York or English lawyer will tend to 
bring his own law with him” : D. W. Heleniak, 'Sovereign Risks', in Current Issues of International 
Financial Law (D. G. Pierce ed., Butterworths 1985) 85, at 87. Gruson adds that banks have resisted 
request by foreign sovereign borrowers that the law of their jurisdiction govern the loan agreement 
because “after the bank has disbursed the loan, it is in a weak position, because it has performed its  
part of the bargain and has rights only under the agreement” (M. Gruson, 'Controlling Choice of 
Law', in Sovereign Lending : Managing Legal Risks (M. Gruson & R. Reisner (eds.), Euromoney, 
1984) at 51).
175A. Reinisch & I. Marboe (fn. 96), § 27.
176This loan agreement, which was considered in the famous  SPP v. Egypt case, supplemented the 
parties' primary agreement. It provided that “This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
all respects in accordance with the laws of England” (SPP. v. Egypt (merits), ICISD Award, May 20, 
1992, 3 ICSID Reports 242 (the tribunal considered the loan agreement in particular at § 229 when 
discussing the interest rate to be applied to the computation of interests).
177S. Hal, International Finance : Law and Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 690-691, §19.066 ff.
178R. M. Auerback, 'Governing Law in International Finance Transactions', in International Banking 
Operations and Practices : Current Developments (J.J. Norton (ed.), Graham & Trotman/Martinus 
Nijhoff,  1994),  169,  173  –  Auerback  underlines  that  the  choice  of  law  reflects  “technical  
competence and, above all, drafting skills” which are very much necessary in the environment of  
Eurocurrency lending.
179This appears from NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, US Court of Appeals, 2nd Circ., Sept. 23, 2010.
180A. Reinisch & I. Marboe (fn. 96), § 27.
181Compare with Ch Leben (fn. 32) at p. 251 : according to Prof. Leben, if a loan agreement includes a 
choice of law clause, a stabilization clause and a arbitration clause, the contract might be regarded 
as an “international contract” not governed by the law of a State but rather by general principles of 
law or international principles.
182As was the case for the loan agreement at the center of the famous  Noga/Russia dispute, which 
included a choice for Swiss law. See for one of the numerous decisions in this long battle, Paris  
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When  one  considers  sovereign  bonds,  which  emerged  as  the  prime  source  of 
sovereign debt after the crisis of the 1980's,183 the practice is not unanimous. There is 
a  strong  attraction  exercised  by  English  law  and  the  law  of  New  York,  which 
dominate the sovereign bond market.  Some countries have,  however,  been able to 
issue bonds governed by their own law – it appears for example that the vast majority 
of debt issued by Greece is governed by Greek law.184
* * *
Section 2. Stabilization mechanisms
If  parties  choose to  subject  their  agreement  to the law of  the State  bound by the 
agreement, there is a risk that a modification of its legal regime by the State may 
negatively impact the contract. In the Sapphire arbitration, it was rightly noted in this 
respect that as the foreign company was bringing financial and technical assistance to 
Iran, involving considerable investment, it could expected to be protected against “any 
legislative change which might alter the character of the contract”. The tribunal noted, 
however, that “this would not be guaranteed to them by the outright application of 
Iranian law, which it is within the power of the Iranian State to change”.185
This explains why many agreements include a choice for another set of rules than the 
law of the State party to the agreement. Several possibilities exist, which have already 
been explored. It has, however, rapidly become clear that the choice of law provision 
has  a  limited  impact  as  stabilizing  factor.  Practice  has  therefore  developed  other 
means of stabilizing the relationship. These mechanisms will be explored, together 
with renegotiation clauses which have attracted much attention in practice recently 
(§1).
Stabilization  mechanisms may focus  on the  substance of  the  relationship between 
parties.  One  should,  however,  also  take  into  account  the  stabilizing  effect  of 
arrangements  made by parties  in  relation  to  dispute  (§2).  The last  section  of  this 
survey  will  therefore  cover  arrangements  made  by  parties  for  dispute  resolution, 
which may also help to curtail the State's sovereign powers.
§ 1. Contractual Restrictions on Sovereign Privileges
Court of Appeal August 10, 2000 (Journal droit international, 116 (2001)).
183As a result of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980's and the ensuing Brady plan, “bonds 
issued on the capital market replaced loans from commercial banks as the main form of private 
capital flows to emerging market economies” : see Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, 'Vultures or 
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring', 53 Emory L. J. (1047), 1072-
1073 (2004).
184According  to  Messrs.  Buchheit  and  Gulati,  “The  salient  feature  of  Greece's  bond debt  is  that 
approximately 90% of the total is governed by Greek law. Only about €25 billion of the bond debt 
was issued under the law of another jurisdiction, and most of that was under English law.” : L. C.  
Buchheit and M. Gulati (fn. 5) 46.
185Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company 35 ILR 136, 171 (1967).
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Among the many devices included in contracts entered into by States, this survey will 
focus on three important mechanisms which help to curtail the important prerogatives 
enjoyed by States. In the first place, an attempt will be made to present stabilization 
mechanisms. The uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of such device has led in 
practice to the advent of renegotiation clauses. Finally, another contractual device will 
be presented, which is at the intersection of substance and procedure, i.e. waiver of 
sovereign immunity.
Whatever  the name given by parties  to  their  arrangement,  it  is  obvious  that  such 
clauses  are  only  useful  in  long  term  contracts  of  some  magnitude.  Investment 
agreements  are  a  prime  field  where  such  clauses  have  been  developed.  On  the 
contrary, one shot commercial agreements and other employment contracts concluded 
by States, are not a prime breeding ground for such arrangements.186
1.1. Classic stabilization mechanisms
In long term contracts the use of so-called 'stabilization' clauses has become common, 
in  particular  in  contracts  concerning  the  exploration  and  exploitation  of  mineral 
resources such as oil and gas.187 This may be explained by the concern of private 
investors of ensuring that the long term project in which large investment is made, 
will be insulated from changes in the legal environment. Although such clauses are 
often  used,188 many  governments  remain  reluctant  to  accept  such  undertakings,189 
which have even been considered the remnant of a past colonial era.
186In financial agreements concluded by States, the choice for another law than the law of the State is 
considered to constitute sufficient “insulation” protecting the contract from legal changes in the 
borrower's country (see e.g. Ph. Wood (fn. 167) at pp. 124-125).
187See  in  general,  K.  Nka  Emeka,  'Anchoring  Stabilization  Clauses  in  International  Petroleum 
Contracts', 42(4)  Intl. Lawyer 1317-1338 (2008);  W. Peter, 'Les clauses de stabilisation dans les 
contrats  d'Etat',  Intl.  Bus.  L.  J.  875-891  (1997);  P.  D.  Cameron,  'Stability  of  Contract  in  the 
International Energy Industry', 27(3) J. Energy & Natural Resources law 305-332 (2009); N. David, 
'Les clauses de stabilité dans les contrats pétroliers. Questions d'un praticien', J.D.I. 79-107 (1986); 
J.-M. Loncle and D. Philibert-Pollez, 'Stabilization Clauses in Investment Contracts', Intl. Business 
L.J. 267-282 (2009) and B. Montembault, 'The Stabilisation of State Contracts Using the Example 
of Oil Contracts – a Return of the Gods of Olympia', Intl. Bus. L. J. 593-643 (2003).
188Waelde  and  Ndi  have  noted  that  while  during  much  of  the  1980's,  stabilization  clauses  were 
reported to have lost their importance, these contractual mechanisms attracted renewed attention 
starting in the 1990's with the opening of the former state controlled economies of Eastern Europe  
and  other  parts  of  the  world  :  T.  W.  Waelde and  G.  Ndi,  'Stabilizing  International  Investment 
Commitments : International Law Versus Contract Interpretation', 31 Texas J. Intl. L. 215, at p. 216-
217 (1996). In some countries, use of stabilization clauses is expressly provided by the legislation 
relating to natural resources agreements. Article 18(m) of the 1996 Petroleum Code of Ivory Coast  
recite for example that  «The petroleum  contract  in particular  must set […] the  legal  conditions 
concerning  the  applicable  law,  the  stability  of  conditions,  the  cases  of  force  majeure  and  the 
regulation of disagreements…».
189The recent contracts concluded by the Libyan Oil Company do not include any stabilization clause, 
as noted by P. de Vareilles-Sommières and A. Fekini (fn. 32) at § 18. Not surprisingly, stabilization 
clauses are absent of the contracts concluded by oil rich, developed nations such as Norway and the  
United Kingdom. In other countries, the absence of stabilization clause may be explained by the 
relative strength of the national oil company, the stable political climate and the limited geological  
risk (such as in Saudi Arabia).
WAUTELET – INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRACTS – APPLICABLE LAW 35/58
At its most basic form, a stabilization includes a choice for the law of one State – 
usually the state party to the contract - and and undertaking by parties that this law 
will be applied as it stands on the day the contract becomes effective.190 As the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal noted, a stabilization clause “in the usual meaning of the term … 
normally refers to contract language which freezes the provisions of a national system 
of law chosen as the law of the contract as of the date of the contract, in order to 
prevent  the  application  to  the  contract  of  any future  alteration  of  this  system”.191 
Experience has shown that stabilization clauses may be very general, and concern the 
whole  legal  regime,  or  be  tailored  and  focus  on  specific  aspects.  So  it  is  that 
stabilization  clauses  may cover  only  specific  matters,  such as  the tax  and custom 
regulations. Sometimes, parties aim at a very specific issue, such as the legal capacity 
of the host State.192 The drafting could also adopt various perspectives : in some cases, 
the clause will provide that laws adopted after the contract becomes effective, will not 
apply to the relationship between parties. In another drafting, parties could agree that 
if the State adopts a new law which conflicts with rules in force when the agreement 
was concluded, these rules will have priority. Sometimes, the freezing of the national 
law  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  a  reference  to  international  law,  both  elements 
reinforcing each other.193
Beyond the mere stabilization stricto sensu, which aims to make the contract immune 
against  what  has  been deemed to  be  the  'legislative  risk',  i.e.  the  modification  of 
national  laws  and regulations  with  a  direct  impact  on  the  contractual  framework, 
practice  has  also developed so-called 'intangible  clause'  ('clause d'intangibilité').194 
These contract provisions aim not so much to freeze the legal framework, but rather to 
prevent the State from exercising its public authority as a state. A State could indeed 
rely on its public authority to unilaterally modify the contract as such (e.g. increasing 
the royalties  to  be paid by the private  contract  party)  or,  even more radically,  by 
terminating the contract or depriving the contract party from the benefit of the project 
– by expropriation or nationalization. A contract provision stating e.g. that the contract 
190E.g.  the  following  provision,  found  in  a  'Master  Agreement'  concluded  between  Ghana  and  a 
company called Volta Aluminium Comp. Ltd. (agreement dated Feb. 8, 1962): “Except as otherwise 
provided herein, this Agreement and the Scheduled Documents shall be construed and have effect in 
accordance with the law of Ghana as it exists at the 22 nd day of January, one thousand nine hundred 
and sixty-two ...”.
191Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 310-56-3 (14 July 1987) 15 Iran-US C.T.R. 
189, 239, § 166. These provisions are called 'Versteinerungsklausel' by German scholars.
192In an agreement signed by Jamaica, the choice of law provision included a reference to the laws of 
Jamaica, with the following caveat : “... excluding also any law or rule which could throw doubt  
upon the authority or ability of the Government to enter into the Principal  Agreement and this  
Agreement” (this agreement was considered in Kaiser Bauxite v. Jamaica, ICSID Award of July 6, 
1975, 1 ICSID Reports 301).
193See  e.g.  the  following  provision  found  in  the  1969  Agreement  between  Jamaica  and  Kaiser 
Bauxite : “... In determining any dispute submitted to arbitration …, the Arbitration Tribunal shall  
apply  the  law of  Jamaica  and  such  rules  of  international  law as  may be  applicable  excluding  
however any enactments passed or brought into force in Jamaica subsequent to the date of this 
agreement which may modify or affect the rights of the parties under the Principal Agreement … “ 
(this agreement was considered in  Kaiser Bauxite v. Jamaica,  ICSID Award of July 6, 1975, 1 
ICSID Reports 301).
194The  distinction  has  been  pioneered  by  P.  Weil,  'Les  clauses  de  stabilisation  ou  d'intangibilité 
insérées  dans  les  accords  de  développement  économique',  in  La  communauté  internationale.  
Mélanges  offerts  à  Ch.  Rousseau (Pedone,  1974)  301-344.  Such  clauses  are  called 
'Unberührbarkeisklausel' by German scholars.
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“shall not be annulled,  amended or modified in any respect,  except by the mutual 
consent  in  writing  of  the  parties  thereto”  195 attempts  to  cover  this  type  of 
modification.196 More sophisticated contract  language has become common,  which 
tend to focus not so much on potential modification of the contract as such, but rather 
on the adverse effect any intervention by the State could have on the position of the 
private investor.197
The distinction between these two types of clauses is not always clear.198 Parties to the 
contract may include only a stabilization clause or go for a larger protection and touch 
upon both stabilization and intangibility. Some contract provisions appear to cover 
both aspects at once.199 As in other matters, contract drafting is not always free from 
ambiguity.200 It  may  be  more  useful  to  accept  that  such  clauses  exist  on  a  wide 
spectrum, from the narrow freezing clause to more elaborate versions which could be 
likened to force majeure clauses.201
195Language taken by Faruque from a Production Sharing Contract  between Indonesia and and a 
private company (A. Faruque, 'Validity and Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses. Legal Protection vs. 
Functional Value', 23(4) J. Int. Arb., 317-336 at p. 319 (2006)).
196See another example : “The Republic further guarantees that no action, ordinance or other measure 
whatever by it or by any State service, authority, Municipality, Community or other agency will be 
taken  and  applied  to  the  effect  of  jeopardizing,  restricting  or  aggravating in  any  way or  form 
contractor's  rights  and  obligations  under  this  Agreement”  (provision  taken  from  a  Togolese 
petroleum concession contract concluded in the 1970's).
197E.g. “The State guarantees to the Contractor, for the duration of the Contract, the stability of the 
financial and economic conditions insofar as these conditions result from the Contract and from the 
regulations in force on the Effective Date. The Obligations resulting from the Contract shall not be 
aggravated and the general  and overall  equilibrium of the Contract  shall  not  be affected in an  
important and lasting manner for the entire period of validity thereof” (taken from a production 
sharing agreement concluded by Gabon). Or the following language taken from the Mozambique 
PSC Model (2001) : «The Government shall not revoke or amend the Authorization granted to ENH 
to explore for and produce Petroleum from the contract Area without taking effective measures to 
ensure  that  such  revocation or  amendment  does not  affect  the  rights  granted  to  the Contractor 
hereunder» (Art. 30.7(d)) and «The Government  will not without the agreement of the contractor 
exercise its legislative authority to amend or modify the provisions of this Agreement and will not  
take  or  permit  any  of  its  political  subdivisions,  agencies  and  instrumentalies  to  take  any 
administrative or other action to prevent or hinder the contractor from enjoying the rights accorded 
to it hereunder» (Art. 30.7(e)).
198It has been suggested to distinguish between clauses with a very wide range, encompassing all 
possible change in the applicable law of the host state, and clauses with a more limited range, which  
only concern specific legislation, such as labour law, tax law or administrative law (A. Faruque (fn. 
192) at p. 318).
199See e.g. the following provision appearing in a contract concluded by Ghana : “The Government 
undertakes that no general or special legislation or administrative measure or act whatsoever of or 
emanating  from  Ghana  or  any  Ghanian  authority  shall  annul,  amend,  revoke  or  modify  the 
provisions or, or prevent or hinder the due and effective performance of the terms of the Scheduled 
Contracts or any of them [...]”.
200Some of the clauses are very ambiguous. Consider the following language taken from a contract  
which was considered in a dispute submitted to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal : “This Agreement  
shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of Iran. The rights and obligations of the Parties 
shall be governed by and according to the provisions of this Agreement. The termination before 
expiry date or any alteration of this Agreement shall be subject to the mutual agreement of the  
Parties” (the Tribunal  noted  that  this  provision was “remarkably  – and perhaps  intentionally – 
ambiguous” : Mobil Oil Iran Inc., et al. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award 
No. 311-74/76/81 (14 July 1987), 16 Iran-US C.T.R. 3, at p. 20).
201It has in fact been suggested to do away with stabilization clauses and attempt to cope with the 
problem of legislative change through a force majeure provision, which would allow to organize the 
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Whether narrow or large, stabilization mechanisms raise intriguing questions related 
both to their validity and enforceability.202
If one first turns to the validity of such clauses,203 questions arises, not all of which 
can be answered firmly. It is accepted that pure stabilization clauses are not effective 
under  the  Rome  I  Regulation.204 Under  the  Regulation,  if  the  law  of  the  State 
concerned is the governing law of the contract, then any subsequent change in the 
governing law will normally have to be given effect.205
The question,  however,  goes well  beyond the Rome I Regulation.  If  one looks at 
international scholarship and practice, there is no firm consensus yet on the question. 
A stronger position may be taken for 'pure' stabilization mechanisms than intangibility 
provisions. As to the first ones, there are indeed indications that this type of provision 
is  not,  as such,  invalid.  Article  3  of  the 1979 Resolution adopted by the Institute 
provides  that  the  parties  to  a  contract  may  “agree  that  domestic  law  provisions 
referred to in the contract shall be considered as being those in force at the time of 
conclusion of the contract”. There is, however, not a well developed practice of courts 
which has tried and tested such clauses.206
effects of the event on the contract : M. Fontaine and F. de Ly, Drafting International Contracts – An 
Analysis of  Contract  Clauses  (Transnational  Publishing, 2006) at  p.  412.  The effect  is  that  the 
regime in case of change is that contractually agreed between parties for force majeure events. The 
drafting should ensure that proper care is given to the definition of the even triggering the force  
majeure clause. One possible drafting reads as follows : “For purposes of this Clause … a material 
adverse governmental  action shall  occur if  (I) the Government or any Relevant Authority takes 
action of any nature whatsoever, including the introduction or application of any law, decree or  
regulation, whether prior to or after the Date of the Concession Contract, or fails to carry out its  
obligations as prescribed by law, the principal effect of which is directly or indirectly borne by the 
Concession Company or by the Concession Company and other toll road concessionaires and only 
incidentally by other Persons...”.
202Not  to  mention  the  possible  consequence  of  stabilization  clauses  in  the  debate  on  the 
'internationalization'  of  contracts  concluded by States.  The existence of  such  clause  has  indeed 
frequently  been  used  in  arbitral  practice  as  an  indication  of  the  fact  that  the  contract  was 
'internationalized' and thus removed from the strict framework of municipal law (see  e.g. in the 
Texaco award –  Texaco  (fn. 8), 17 ILM 17, § 45 (1978). According to Leben, when a contract 
includes a stabilization clause, “ce n'est pas le droit de l'Etat qui est applicable, mais un ensemble  
de règles concordant avec le droit de l'Etat à la date de la stabilisation, ensemble incorporé dans le  
contrat. Celui-ci est bien alors dans une situation d'extériorité par rapport à l'ordre juridique de  
l'Etat  contractant  et  c'est  donc  l'Etat,  personne  de  droit  international,  qui  contracte  avec  
l'investisseur. Il s'agit par conséquent, d'un contrat d'Etat au sens strict, contrat rattaché à l'ordre  
juridique international” ((fn. 32) at p. 266, § 129).
203From a classic private international law perspective, the validity of such contract provision must be 
ascertained on the basis of the lex causae – see Ch. Reithmann and D. Martiny, (fn. 69) at pp. 109, § 
110.
204A similar  position was adopted under the 1980 Rome Convention, see Dicey & Morris  on the 
Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, 13th ed.) at p. 1223, § 32-080.
205According to Dicey, Morris & Collins (Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006, 14th ed.) at p. 1568, § 32-082) and Ch. Reithmann and D. Martiny (ed.) (fn. 69) at 
pp. 110, § 111. In its Resolution adopted in 1991 (Basel Session), the International Law Institute  
indicated that a freezing clause included in a contract between private parties would only have as 
effect that “ the provisions of that law shall be applied as substantive provisions incorporated in the 
contract”.
206If the question is put to a national court, it is far from excluded that such court would come to the  
conclusion that  a  stabilization clause is  not  valid as  a  matter  of  domestic  law,  e.g.  because of 
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The  matter  is  more  difficult  for  intangibility  mechanisms.  It  has  sometimes  been 
suggested that such clauses are invalid under international law, because they would 
contravene  the  principle  of  permanent  sovereignty  over  natural  resources.207 The 
argument  is  not  convincing  :  even  assuming  that  the  principle  of  permanent 
sovereignty has assumed the character of a  jus cogens rule,208 this does not seem to 
impair the State's freedom to limit its own action by a contract it freely chooses to 
enter into.209 Likewise, the idea that stabilization mechanisms should not be enforced 
as they limit a State's legislative or sovereign power, falls short of convincing. Such 
mechanisms  are  indeed  only  limited  renunciations  by  States,  not  a  full  waiver. 
Further, it is difficult to see why a State could not voluntarily agree to limit, for a  
certain  duration,  the  impact  its  actions  could  have  on  a  private  contract.  As 
stabilization  mechanisms  are  not  imposed  by  outside  forces,  but  self-imposed, 
temporary limitations on the sovereignty of the host State, this reduces the weight of 
the sovereignty argument. A less radical version of the argument is that the restriction 
imposed by a stabilization clause does not deprive the State of the power to put an end 
or amend the agreement, but would only need to be taken into account when deciding 
whether to grant the investor some compensation.210 The radical questioning of the 
constitutional constraints on the possibility for the State to renounce the use of its sovereign power 
to legislate.  See the explanations of  T. W. Waelde and  G. Ndi (fn.  185),  at  p.  238-240 (1996). 
Sornarajah has argued that it “may not be possible, as a matter of constitutional theory, for a state to  
bind  itself  by  a  contract  made  with  a  private  party,  particularly  a  foreign  party,  to  fetter  its  
legislative power. It is trite law that a legislature is not bound by its own legislation and has the  
power to change it. That being so, it cannot be bound by a provision in a simple contract” ( M. 
Sornarajah (fn. 16) at pp. 407-408).
207See  most  notably  e.g.  M.  Sornarajah (fn.  24)  at  pp.  210-211  :  referring  to  the  principle  of 
permanent  sovereignty of  States  over natural  resources,  as  enshrined  in  the  various resolutions 
adopted by the General Assembly of the UN, Mr Sornarjah wrote that “... a state cannot validly 
agree not to change the terms of the agreement on the exploitation of natural resources or to submit  
disputes to a foreign arbitral tribunal”..
208See however, for the potential impact of other  ius cogens rules such as the prohibition of forced 
labor  or  certain  fundamental  principles  protecting  the  environment,  A.  Giardina,  'Clauses  de 
stabilisation et  clauses  d'arbitrage  :  vers  l'assouplissement  de  leur  effet  obligatoire?',  Revue de 
l'arbitrage 646, 652-655 (2003).
209It  is  on  this  basis  that  the  arbitral  tribunal  refused  to  consider  in  Aminoil that  the  various 
stabilization  clauses  included  in  the  Concessions  Deeds  were  invalid.  After  giving  proper 
consideration to the Kuwaiti Constitution and the principle of sovereignty over natural resources,  
the tribunal concluded that these elements did not prevent a State from granting stabilization by 
contract (American Independent Oil Company Inc (Aminoil) v Government of the State of Kuwait 
21 ILM 976, 2012, § 90 (1982)). Looking specifically at the UN Resolutions on natural resources, 
the Tribunal held that “Even if some of their provisions can be regarded as codifying rules that 
reflect international practice, it would not be possible from this to deduce the existence of a rule of  
international law prohibiting a State from undertaking not to proceed to a nationalisation during a  
limited period of time”. And the Tribunal added that “it may indeed well be eminently useful that 
'host' States should, if they so desire, be able to pledge themselves not to nationalise given foreign 
undertakings within a limited period” (21 ILM 976, 1022, § 90).
210 See  e.g.  E. Jimenez de Arechaga (fn.  90), at pp. 307-308 (according to Jimenez de Arechaga, 
stabilization clauses do not deprive the host State of the power to put an end to the contract, because  
this would run contrary to the fundamental concept and purpose of the permanent sovereignty of the 
State over its natural resources. Such clauses may however, be considered when deciding upon the  
compensation : a violation of such clause could “give rise to a special right of compensation; the 
amount of indemnity would have to be much higher than in normal cases since the existence of such 
a clause constitutes a most pertinent circumstance which must be taken into account in determining 
the appropriate compensation”).
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validity of stabilization and intangibility agreements which was typical of scholarship 
in  the 1980's,  has  today been replaced by narrower criticism voiced against  these 
mechanisms by civil society, mainly based on fundamental rights.211
Arbitral practice seems in any case to be overwhelmingly in favor of the validity of 
stabilization  mechanisms.212 Although  some  tribunals  may  have  been  reluctant  to 
enforce such mechanisms to their full extent, there has been no significant instance 
where such agreement has been found invalid.213 In the Texaco Award, the arbitrator 
noted that “There is no doubt that in the exercise of its sovereignty, a State has the 
power to make international commitments […]” 214 and later added that “There is no 
value to dwell at any great length on the existence and value of the principle under 
which a State may within the framework of its sovereignty, undertake international 
commitments with respect to a private party. This rule results from the discretionary 
competence of the State in this area”.215 In  Agip, the tribunal likewise showed great 
deference towards several stabilization clauses protecting the Italian investor against 
changes brought to the Congolese legislation which would alter the company set up 
locally  by  the  investor.216 In  Aminoil,  the  Tribunal,  which  was  not  particularly 
sympathetic  to  stabilization  clause  and adopted  a  very narrow construction of  the 
provision at  hand, nevertheless noted that  “No doubt contractual limitation on the 
State's  right  to  nationalize  are  juridically  possible”.217 More  recently,  an  ICSID 
tribunal had to deal with the claim by an investor who argued that Peru had breached 
an undertaking granting it stability throughout the first ten years of a major investment 
in exploitation of natural resources.218 The case turned on the question whether the 
stabilization  undertaking  granted  the  investor  a  substantive  right  of  non-
211See  e.g.  'Stabilization  Clauses  and  Human  Rights'  (a  report  by  the  International  Finance 
Corporation and the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human 
Rights -  May 2009) – in which the question is raised whether stabilization clauses  may create 
obstacles to applying new social and environmental legislation to investment projects in the host 
state.
212Schreuer notes that despite some debate, “the overwhelming weight of opinion is that these clauses 
are binding and must be upheld by arbitral tribunals” (C. H. Schreuer (fn. 51) at p. 591-592).
213It has been said, however, that arbitral practice does not offer a sufficient basis to support any firm 
conclusion as most arbitral awards concern older disputes which do not reflect current practice – see 
M. Sornarajah (fn. 24) at pp. 200-206 and M. Sornarajah (fn. 16) at pp. 417-429.
214Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 22, § 64 (1978)
215Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 23, § 66 (1978). In Aramco, the arbitral tribunal found that “By reasons of 
its very sovereignty within its territorial domain, the State possesses the legal powers to grant rights  
[by] which it forbids itself to withdraw before the end of the concession, with the reservation of the 
Clauses of the Concession Agreement relating to its revocation. Nothing can prevent a State, in the 
exercise of its sovereignty, from binding itself irrevocably by the provisions of a concession and 
from granting to the concessionnaire irretractable rights” (Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil  
Company (Aramco) 27 ILR 117, 168 (1963)).
216Agip v. Congo, ICSID Award, 1 ICSID Reports 321-322, § 86-88. See also Letco v. Liberia, ICSID 
Award,  March 31,  1986,  2  ICSID Reports  346,  368 (“This  clause,  commonly referred  to  as  a  
'Stabilization Clause', is commonly found in long-term development contracts and … is meant to  
avoid the arbitrary actions of the contracting government. This clause must be respected, especially 
in this type of agreement. Otherwise, the contracting government may easily avoid its contractual 
obligations by legislation”.
217American Indep. Oil Company (Aminoil ) v. State of Kuwait 21(5) ILM 976 at p. 1023, § 95 (1982). 
The tribunal added, however, that the clause at hand did not cover the case of nationalization.
218Aguaytia Energy LLC v. Republic of Peru (ICSID Award Case No. Arb/06/13).
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discrimination.219 It is noteworthy that at no point during the proceedings the validity 
of  the  stabilization  undertaking was  called  in  question.220 The  Tribunal  noted  that 
“stability undertakings, such as those entered into by [Peru] in the Agreement ... are of 
undoubted importance for investors. There is no need here to dwell on the importance 
for investors, obviously including the Claimant, of the stability guarantees given in 
the field of taxes, foreign currency, free remittance of profits and capital and exchange 
rates”.221
It is one thing to treat stabilization clauses as valid. Quite another thing is to inquire 
about  the  enforceability of  stabilization  mechanisms.222 Various  elements  must  be 
taken into account, which, when taken together, appear to limit the enforceability of 
such mechanisms. In the first place, account should be taken of the identity of the 
parties  bound  by  the  mechanism.  Whereas  stabilization  clauses  included  in  older 
agreements were undertaken by States, more recent contractual practice has moved 
towards  stabilization  commitments  negotiated  and  undertaken  by  state  companies 
rather than by states,223 as most states have created a national oil company or agency 
entrusted  with  the  exploitation  of  oil  resources.224 When  one  looks  at  a  classic 
stabilization  mechanism,  this  has  consequence  on  the  design  of  the  clause.  If  the 
agreement is concluded not by the State, but by a state entity, or by a private company, 
it does not help very much to provide that the State will not modify the relevant legal 
219The investor claimed that Peru had offered a significantly more advantageous investment model to 
other investors even though the contract had guaranteed it that its investment would be treated at 
least as well as any other investor operating in the same economic sector.
220The stabilization undertaking was quite elaborate. It was granted to the investor on the basis of 
specific  legislation  authorizing  Peruvian  authorities  to  grant  stabilization  guarantees  to  private 
investor – i.e.  the 'Legislative Decree 662 Approving the Juridical  Stability System for Foreign 
Investment'. The effect of this regime is that specific legal regimes are frozen for a specific period 
of time. According to the law, the stabilized laws will remain applicable beyond their actual term of 
effectiveness, regardless of whether such laws are subsequently modified or repealed, or whether 
any amendments are more or less favorable to the affected investors. Among the guarantees offered 
to the investor, there was an undertaking in relation to the applicable tax regime, which was drafted 
as follows : “Pursuant to the Agreement and throughout its effectiveness, the STATE undertakes to 
guarantee juridical stability for AGUAYTIA in connection with the investment ... under the terms 
set forth below: 1. Stability of the tax system applicable to the Income Tax (VAT) as provided for in 
item a), article 10, of Legislative Decree 662, effective as of the date of execution hereof....”.
221ICSID Award  Case  No.  Arb/06/13,  pp.  53-54,  §  95.  The  Tribunal  also  added  that  “Also,  the 
“stability of the right to non-discrimination” itself is of obvious importance for a foreign investor. It 
freezes the laws, rules and regulations applicable to it, as they were in existence at the time the 
Agreement was concluded. This means that  no new law may be passed which would state that 
certain rules  regarding non-discrimination would no longer apply to the Claimant.  It  especially 
guaranteed  the  constitutional  right  to  equality  before  the  law”.  See  for  a  comment,  L.  Cotula, 
'Pushing  the  Boundaries  vs.  Striking  a  Balance  :  the  Scope and  Interpretation  of  Stabilization  
Clauses in the Light of the Duke v. Peru Award', 11(1) J. World Investment and Trade 27-43 (2010).  
See also the short reference to stabilization clauses in the CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina  
Republic award (ICSID Case No/ ARN/01/8, 2005), para. 151 and 302-303.
222See in general P. D. Cameron, International energy investment law : the pursuit of stability (OUP, 
2010), at pp. 59-101.
223In the meantime, practice had also changed as to the nature of the agreement and the old concession 
agreements were replaced by Exploration and Production Agreements and also Production Sharing 
Agreements.
224For an overview of the situation in Latin America, see  L. E. Cuervo, 'Latin American Petroleum 
Contracts in the Era of Globalization', in International Oil and Gas Transactions in Latin America 
(R. Colmenter and D. Enriquez (eds.), Porrua, 2011, 3-32.
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framework, even if the state company is fully controlled by the State.225 In order to 
cope with this, stabilization clauses have been refined. Instead of preventing the State 
from modifying its  laws,  current  contract  practice  seeks  to  provide a  solution  for 
allocating between parties the financial consequences of the legal and political risk.226 
This  is  consonant with the move towards renegotiation provisions (see hereinafter 
section 1.2 on renegotiation provisions).
Further, the drafting of the clause may create some difficulty. This may be illustrated 
by reference to the clause which was discussed in the Amoco case. Section 30(2) of 
the contract concluded between an American company and the Iranian national oil 
company provided that “The provision of any current laws and regulations which may 
be wholly or partly inconsistent with this Agreement shall, to the extent of any such 
inconsistency, be of no effect in respect of the provisions of this Agreement”. In what 
has  been  said  to  be  a  “microscopic  linguistic  test”,227 the  Tribunal  held  that  this 
provision only applied “to the provisions of any current laws and regulations”, and did 
not protect against future alterations of the legal framework.228 In addition, if a State 
commits  to  freeze  the  law  chosen  by  parties,  it  may  be  wondered  whether  this 
commitment applies generally or is limited to those legal rules directly relevant for the 
contract. The law chosen by parties to govern their agreement, is indeed only relevant 
for those issues which may be deemed to be contractual.229 Such issues as the tax 
regime, the labor provisions or the regulations of land use, are wholly unimpaired by 
the law chosen, since these questions do not fall within the purview of the parties' 
choice.  It  may therefore  be  that  the  stabilizing  effect  of  a  freezing  clause,  if  not 
properly drafted, is rather limited.
If one sets aside difficulties linked to the drafting, there are some more fundamental 
questions  arising in connection with the enforceability of stabilization agreements. 
The key question is indeed whether a State which has accepted such a stabilization 
mechanism, is bound not to change its laws. It appears to be accepted that effect of 
such clauses is not to tie up the State so as to prevent it from modifying its legislation.  
Rather, the stabilization clause, which aims to limit the legislative competence of the 
State or to limit the possibility for the state to exercise its public authority, thereby 
impacting the contractual  framework,  cannot  prevent  the State  from exercising its 
public authority. The net effect of such clauses is indeed not so much to prevent a 
State from acting, but to make sure that any subsequent legislation adopted by the 
225See, again, the Amoco award, in which the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the language of the 
contract did not impose an obligation on the Republic of Iran, as it was not a party to the agreement  
- Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran et al., Award No. 310-56-3 (14 July 1987) 15 Iran-US 
C.T.R. 189, at pp. 240-241, §§ 171-173. See recently the argument in that sense by D.-E. Lakehal 
(fn. 32) at p. 511.
226A clause could provide that if there is an increase in the tax obligations of the foreign company, 
lump sum damages will be afforded to the company. An alternative is to provide that the company 
will benefit from a tax exemption.
227A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, 'Some Reflections on Stabilisation Techniques in International Petroleum, 
Gas and Mineral Agreements', [2005] Intl. Energy L. & Taxation Rev. 96, at p. 98.
228Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 310-56-3 (14 July 1987) 15 Iran-US C.T.R. 
189, 239 at para. 166. In light of this ruling Maniruzzaman advises to cover in a stabilization clause  
“both  present  and  future  changes  in  law  against  which  the  guarantee  is  intended”  (A.  F.  M.  
Maniruzzaman, 'Drafting Stabilisation Clauses in International Energy Contracts : Some Pitfalls for 
the Unwary', Oil, Gas & Energy Law Int., 2007, vol. 5-2).
229See e.g. the list in Art. 12 of the Rome I Regulation.
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State, will not be applicable to the contract. From the perspective of the sanctity of 
contract, there is a difference between the two positions.
This  is  what  Tribunal  stated  in  the  Agip arbitration.  According  to  the  tribunal, 
“stabilisation  clauses,  which  were  freely  entered  into  by  the  Government,  do  not 
affect the principle of its sovereign legislative and regulatory powers since it retains 
both  with  respect  to  those,  whether  nationals  or  foreigners,  with  whom  the 
Government has note entered into such undertakings […]”.230 Rather,  the Tribunal 
noted that such “changes in the legislative and regulatory arrangements stipulated in 
the agreement  simply cannot  be invoked against  the other  contracting party”.231 It 
would  therefore  be  deceitful  to  imagine  that  a  State  could  be  prevented  from 
modifying  its  laws  or  administrative  regulations  because  it  has  agreed  to  a 
stabilization clause.232 As Verhoeven indicated, “quel que soit le système juridique,  
légal ou conventionnel applicable, l'autorité brutale de l'Etat 'souverain' est un fait  
qu'il  est  vain  de  prétendre  circonscrire  légalement,  dans  l'état  présent  de  
structuration du milieu international”.233 
This may explain why most stabilization clauses in fact do not prevent the State from 
modifying its laws. The clauses included in contacts rather aim to ensure that future 
modifications will not impact the content of the relationship between the State and the 
company. In other words, the State does not waive its sovereign right to legislate. It 
only guarantees that future changes to the legislation will not apply to the contract at 
hand and will not be enforceable vis-à-vis the contracting party. In practice, the clause 
has the effect of incorporating the law chosen in the contract as an “immutable code 
of law”.234 The law chosen will therefore not change, whatever amendments are made 
by the State to its law after the contract has been concluded. The problem is, however, 
that a State may – although this is a radical move – introduce a law which avoids such 
230AGIP v. Popular Republic of the Congo ICSID Case No. ARB/77/1, 21 ILM 726 (1982), at p. 735-
736, § 86.
231AGIP v. Popular Republic of the Congo ICSID Case No. ARB/77/1, 21 ILM 726, at p. 735-736, § 
86 (1982). In this case, the Government of Congo had accepted in an agreement signed with the  
Italian company AGIP, not to apply certain laws and decrees which would reduce or alter the status 
as a limited liability company under private law of a company initially owned by AGIP, who had 
been forced to sell  50 % of its  shares  to  the government.  Another  provision of  the agreement  
concluded  between AGIP and  the  government  provided  that  if  changes  were  made in  the  law 
concerning companies,  “appropriate measures will  be taken to ensure that  such changes do not  
affect  the  structure  and composition of  the organs  of  the Company”.  In  1975,  the government  
adopted a decree nationalizing the company and ordering the transfer of all shares to a state owned 
company. See also the holding of  Prof.  Dupuy in the  Texaco case :  Prof.  Dupuy held that  the 
stabilization clause underwritten by Libya “does not affect in principle the legislative and regulatory 
sovereignty of Libya. Libya reserves all its prerogatives to issue laws and regulations in the field of 
petroleum activities in respect of national or foreign persons with which it has not undertaken such 
a commitment” (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 24, § 71 (1978)). The only impact of the clause according 
to Dupuy, was that it “only makes such acts invalid as far as the contracting parties are concerned –  
with respect to whom this commitment has been undertaken – during the period of applicability of  
the Deeds of Concession” (idem).
232According to Jimenez de Arechaga, stabilization clauses do not achieve the purpose of stabilization 
which is pursued “because international law does not forbid a nationalization, nor the resulting  
cancellation of the contract, provided appropriate compensation is paid” (E. Jimenez de Arechaga 
(fn. 90), at pp. 308).
233J. Verhoeven (fn. 36), at p. 139, § 11.
234N. Blackaby and C. Partasides (fn. 93) at p. 201, § 3.116.
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freezing clause.235
What about intangibility clauses? Do they prevent the State from nationalizing the 
operations? The views differ notably on this issue. In the  Texaco case, Prof. Dupuy 
held that the nationalization by Libya was a breach of the intangibility clause and 
hence  constituted  an  illegal  act  under  international  law.236 However,  in  another 
arbitration which arose out of the same nationalization by the Libyan government, the 
arbitrator did not regard the intangibility clause as an obstacle to the nationalization 
by the government.237 Likewise, in the Aminoil arbitration, the tribunal held that the 
intangibility clause did not prevent the nationalization by Kuwait.238 After holding that 
such clauses limiting the State's right to nationalize are in principle valid, the Tribunal 
added that “... what that would involve would be a particularly serious undertaking 
which would have to be expressly stipulated for [… ] and it is to be expected that it  
should  only  cover  a  relatively  limited  period”.239 This  seems  to  indicate  that  the 
fettering  of  the  legislative  sovereignty  of  a  State  could  in  other  words  only  be 
tolerated  if  it  was  limited  to  a  reasonable  period  of  time.  If  there  is  still  some 
uncertainty as to the precise effects of an intangibility agreement under international 
235Presumably, this law would be internationally mandatory. See in general T.C. Hartley, 'Mandatory 
Rules in International Contracts :  the Common Law Approach',  Collected courses of the Hague 
Academy, vol. 266, 337 ff. (1997).
236Clause 16 of the Deed of Concession provided that “The Government of Libya will take all steps 
necessary  to  ensure  that  the  company  enjoys  all  the  rights  conferred  by  this  concession.  The  
contractual  rights  expressly  created  by  this  concession  shall  not  be  altered  except  by  mutual 
consent”. After examining the status under international law of the right of States to nationalize  
(Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 21-22, §§ 58-61 (1978)). Prof. Dupuy reviewed the impact on this right of 
the commitment made by Libya in an 'internationalized' contract which had been 'stabilized' and 
concluded that “in respect of the international law of contracts, a nationalization cannot prevail over  
an internationalized contract containing stabilization clauses, entered into between a State and a  
foreign private company” (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 25, § 73 (1978)). The award has been criticized 
on numerous grounds, among which the decision to grant the restitutio in integrum (on this issue, 
see J. Verhoeven (fn. 36) pp. 226-228, §§ 19-22).
237Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 62 ILR 140, 
182-196 (1982).  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  his  arbitral  award,  the  arbitrator  did not  consider  the 
stabilization  clause  when  reviewing  the  “legal  qualifications  and  implications  of  Liamco's 
nationalizations” (62 ILR 140, 193-196; 20 ILM 1, 58-61 (1981). It is not clear whether Liamco had 
based its case on the stabilization clause. In BP Exploration Co (Libya) v Libyan Arab Republic, the 
sole  arbitrator  did  not  elaborate  on  the  stabilization  clause,  holding  that  the  actions  of  Libya 
constituted “a fundamental breach of the BP Concession as they amount to a total repudiation of the 
agreement and the obligations of the Respondent thereunder” (53 ILR 297, 329 (1979).
238The  clause  read  as  follows  :  “The  Shaikh  shall  not  by  general  or  special  legislation  or  by 
administrative measures or by any other act whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in 
Article 11. No alteration shall  be made in terms of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or the 
Company except in the event of the Shaikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in 
the interests of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or additions to this Agreement”.
239American Indep. Oil Company (Aminoil ) v. State of Kuwait 21(5) ILM 976 at p. 1023, § 95 (1982). 
The tribunal went on to find that the stabilization clause agreed by parties, did not cover the case of  
nationalization since that situation had not been expressly mentioned in the clause. According to the 
tribunal, such a stipulation could not be presumed to be included in the contract. This holding has  
been severely criticized, not the least by Sir Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion. According to Sir  
Fitzmaurice, the stabilization clause rendered the expropriate unlawful (separate opinion, 21(5) ILM 
976 pp. 1049-1052, paras. 19-30). Mann has written in respect of the majority's decision that “We 
have long known, of course, that there is nothing for which lawyers cannot find words, but there 
can be few instances of a more blatant distortion of plain language” ('The Aminoil Arbitration',  
reproduced in Further Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press 1990), at p. 258).
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arbitration practice, it seems that arbitral tribunals will exercise some restraint when 
considering these arrangements.
Stabilization clause may be more efficient when coupled with arbitration agreement, 
which attempts to ensure that disputes will not be submitted to the courts of the State 
concerned. Certainly, if the contract provides that disputes must be submitted to these 
courts, “there is little likelihood that the stabilisation clause will have any effect”.240 
But even if a choice is made arbitration, questions remain about the practical effect of 
stabilization agreements. At most, it seems that the effect of such clauses will not be 
to  prevent  the  sovereign  state  from  interfering  with  the  contract,  but  rather  to 
“mitigate  the  sovereign/political  risks”.241 Likewise,  the  strength  of  a  stabilization 
clause may be reinforced if it is linked to a choice for international law or the general 
principles of international law, rather than to some municipal law.242 However, this 
begs  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  foundation  in  international  law  granting 
specific protection to stabilization clauses.243
To sum up, stabilization clauses, whatever their drafting, seem to have a rather limited 
effect.244 As has been said, “it cannot be contended in the light of recent arbitral case 
law and the majority of juristic views that there is any totally effective way to prevent 
the host state from interfering with stabilisation clauses for a very long time, no matter 
how carefully such clauses are drafted and crafted”.245 There are nonetheless two main 
effects of the clause. One effect of such clauses is their promotional virtue : a State 
committing to stabilization or intangible clauses, creates an encouragement for foreign 
investment. It may well be that at the end of the day, such clauses afford the investor 
little effective protection. It remains that a State stands to gain by agreeing to such 
clauses,  which  appear  to  limit  its  sovereign  power.  As  has  been  underlined,  “the 
presence of a stabilisation clause in a petroleum contract can act as a psychological 
boost to give confidence to investors at the initial stage of the investment”.246 This 
could  also  explain  why  some  States  have  included  similar  language  in  their 
investment laws.247
Further,  the  main effect  of  such stabilization  clause  may well  be  not  so much to 
protect the foreign company against any intervention by the State, but to ensure that if 
such change occurs, proper compensation will be granted. This view was also adopted 
240A. F. M. Maniruzzaman (fn. 224) at p. 100. This is in particular so if the contract is governed by the 
law of the host State.
241A. F. M. Maniruzzaman (fn. 224) at p. 100.
242On the link between the stabilization clause and the choice of law, see Faruque, at pp. 332-334.
243A view which is challenged, see e.g. M. Sornarajah (fn. 16), at pp. 409-410.
244For  a  recent  overview,  see  A.  Crockett,  'Stabilisation  Clauses  and  Sustainable  Development  : 
Drafting for the Future',  in Evolution in investment treaty law and arbitration (C. Brown et  al. 
(eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011), 516-538. Alvik has also concluded that “practice relating 
to  stabilisation  clauses  exhibits  a  tendency  more  or  less  evidently  responding  to  the  concerns 
underlying  the  principle  of  permanent  sovereignty,  conceived  as  a  minimum  requirement  of 
inalienability” : I. Alvik (fn. 17), 258.
245A. F. M. Maniruzzaman (fn. 224) at p. 100. One commentator went further and referred to the 'myth' 
of  stabilization  clauses  :  S.  H.  Chatterjee,  'The  Stabilisation  Clause  Myth  in  Investment 
Agreements', Journ. Int. Arb. 97-112 (1988).
246A. Faruque (fn. 192) at p. 323.
247See  e.g.  Article  17(2)  of  the  Federal  Law of  Russia  concerning  production  sharing  agreement 
(Federal Law 225-FZ, as amended).
WAUTELET – INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRACTS – APPLICABLE LAW 45/58
by  the  arbitral  tribunal  in  Aminoil :  after  having  refused  to  consider  that  the 
stabilization  clause  included  in  the  agreements  prohibited  arbitration,  the  tribunal 
noted that “these provisions are far from having lost all their value and efficacy on 
that  account  since,  by  impliedly  requiring  that  nationalization  shall  not  have  any 
confiscatory character, they re-inforce the necessity of for a proper indemnification as 
a condition of it”.248 The question then arises whether additional compensation will be 
granted in case of nationalization because there has been a breach of a stabilization 
clause. It has been contented that the presence of a stabilization clause could give rise 
to a “special right” 249 to compensation or even form the basis of granting additional 
compensation to the investor.250 Arbitral practice appears, however, to be uncertain as 
to this effect of stabilization agreements. While in the  Texaco case, the stabilization 
agreement may have been one of the reasons which encouraged the arbitrator to grant 
the restitutio in integrum,251 the presence of a stabilization mechanism did not prove 
decisive in other cases.252
1.2 Renegotiation and adaptation clauses
In  light  of  the  limited  impact  of  intangible  and stabilization  clauses,  practice  has 
shifted from a pure prohibition imposed on the government from enacting subsequent 
legislation  or  modifying  the  agreement,  to  a  more  subtle  drafting  :  the  contract 
attempts to mitigate the adverse impact of the State's action on the economic balance 
of the contract. This is apparent in the following contract provision:
“If  after  the  effective  date,  existing  laws  and  regulations  are  amended  or 
annulled or new laws and regulations are introduced in Vietnam […] in any case 
adversely affecting the economic rights or benefits expected by the contractor 
from this contract […] the parties shall meet and consult promptly with each 
other and make such changes to this contract as are necessary both to maintain 
248American Indep. Oil Company (Aminoil ) v. State of Kuwait 21(5) ILM 976 at p. 1023, § 96 (1982).
249E. Jimenez de Arechaga (fn. 90) at p. 307.
250 E.g.  O.  Schachter,  'International  Law  in  Theory  and  Practice.  General  Course  in  Public 
International Law', 178 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy, 9, at p. 314 (1982) - “If the State 
is  found  to  have  violated  the  contract  by  legislative  changes  contravening  the  stabilization 
provisions, the foreign firm would probably be entitled to higher indemnity because of that clause”.  
Jimenez wrote that  the existence of a stabilization clause would lead to granting an amount of  
indemnity “much higher than in normal cases since the existence of such a clause constitutes a most 
pertinent  circumstance  which  must  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  the  appropriate 
compensation” : E. Jimenez de Arechaga (n. 90) at p. 307.
251The  award  does  not  appear  to  contain  any  reference  to  the  stabilization  clause  in  the  section 
discussing the opportunity to grant the restitutio in integrum (Texaco (fn. 8), 17 ILM 36-37, §§ 110-
112 (1978).
252In Liamco v Libya, the tribunal does not appear to have considered the existence of a stabilization 
mechanisms as one of the factor leading to the award of “equitable compensation” (see 62 ILR 145, 
200-216). In  Aminoil, the tribunal considered that the existence of a stabilization mechanism was  
one of the factors justifying the taking into account of the legitimate expectations of the investors  
(21 ILM 976, 1037, at § 159 (1982) – the tribunal held that “whereas the contract of concession did 
not prohibit nationalisation, the stabilization clauses inserted in it […] were nevertheless not devoid 
of all consequences, for they prohibited any measure that would have had a confiscatory character. 
These  clauses  created  for  the  concessionaire  a  legitimate  expectation  that  must  be  taken  into  
account.  In  this  context,  they  dissipate  all  doubts  as  to  the  strength  of  the  respect  due  to  the  
contractual equilibrium”.
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the Contractor's rights, benefits and interests hereunder and to ensure that any 
revenues, incomes or profits […] derive or to be derived under this contract […] 
shall not in any way be diminished as a result of such changes”.253 
These clauses – also called 'economic equilibrium clauses – do not attempt to limit in 
any way the possibility for the State to modify its laws or otherwise interfere in long 
term  contracts.  Rather,  the  purpose  of  these  clauses  is  to  ensure  that  whatever 
modification is made by the State will not deprive the private party of the original 
economic balance which the contract was based on.254 The 'economic stabilization 
clause' or renegotiation clause aim at the future and not the past : they seek to remedy 
a change which has occurred by focusing on modification of the contract to take into 
account the change, rather than to prevent the change from occurring.
As with other stabilization clauses, there is considerable variety of renegotiation or 
adaptation clauses used in practice.255 Some of the older clauses only aimed at a single 
element and did not provide much details on the process of renegotiation.256 Modern 
adaptation clauses are much more sophisticated. They generally include more details 
on issues such as the triggering event – when should negotiations took place -, the 
content of the obligation to negotiate 257 and, most importantly, the consequences of a 
failure by parties to reach an agreement.258 One possible answer to the latter issue is to 
refer parties to the dispute resolution method selected in the agreement,  and most 
commonly arbitration, when they fail to reach an agreement on the renegotiation.259 
One key  aspect  of  the  drafting  process  is  to  specify  whether  the  clause  aims  to 
guarantee that the private investor is entitled to a restoration of the original contractual 
equilibrium or if the investor should accommodate a change which takes into account 
the public interests pursued by the state party.
In fact, even without such clause, it is not uncommon that long term agreements are 
renegotiated even though the contract does not include specific clauses providing for 
renegotiation  or  adaptation.260 In  this  context,  the  question  will  arise  whether  one 
253Vietnam Model Production Sharing Contract 2004, art. 17.1.
254In this sense, a renegotiation clause will in general not be included next to a stabilization clause. 
However, the two provisions could coexist, provided adequate care is taken in the drafting thereof.
255See  the  overview  provided  by  Z.A.  Al  Qurashi,  'Renegotiation  of  International  Petroleum 
Agreements' 22(4) J. International Arbitration 261-300 (2005).
256The  renegotiation  clause  included  in  the  agreement  between  Kuwait  and  Aminoil  is  a  good 
example.  It  only aimed to allow Kuwait  to request  an increase in the benefits it  received from 
Aminoil,  following changes  made  to  other  concession  agreements  which  granted  Kuwait  such 
increased benefits. Several rounds of negotiations took place between Kuwait and Aminoil on the  
basis of this provision, which led to several substantial modifications of the contract provisions – 
see the detailed account in American Indep. Oil Company (Aminoil ) v. State of Kuwait 21(5) ILM 
976, 991-998 (1982).
257As well as the obligations of the parties regarding further performance of the contract during the 
negotiations.
258On all these issues, see in general the observations (not limited to state contracts) of  P. Accaoui  
Lorfing, La renégociation des contrats internationaux (Bruylant, 2011).
259This is a different position than when the arbitrator is seized of a dispute concerning the proper 
application of the renegotiation mechanism – e.g. when one of the parties argues that the conditions 
set in the contract to trigger the obligation to renegotiate are met and the other party challenges this  
assertion.
260See e.g. the case of the  Paiton I power plant where renegotiation took place with the Indonesian 
authorities in the wake of the crisis which led to the end of the Suharto regime – as reported by S. 
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party could find in domestic or international law some support for the claim that the 
contract must be renegotiated. In most cases, the issue of adaptation will arise when 
the contract is still being performed. In some cases, the adaptation could even take 
place after  the contract  has  been terminated.  In both cases,  one of  the key issues 
arising  in  this  respect  is  the  role  the  arbitral  tribunal  could  possibly  play  in  the 
renegotiation process.261
1.3 Waiver of immunity
Stabilization  clauses  are  not  the  only  mechanism which  may  be  used  to  provide 
additional comfort to the private partner teaming up with a State. There is another 
very important instrument which is widely used in practice to reach the same goal : a 
contract provision whereby the State agrees to waive the sovereign immunity.262
Such waivers  are  very  frequent  in  international  loan  agreements  and bond issues, 
where they have become standard fixture.263 As explained by Wood, the practice in 
financial agreements where a State or state entity is party, is that the documentation 
includes  an  elaborate  waiver  of  immunity,  which  covers  both  the  immunity  from 
jurisdiction  and  immunity  from  enforcement.264 Strictly  speaking,  a  waiver  of 
immunity may not be necessary in financial  transactions,  as States may not enjoy 
sovereign immunity in respect of these transactions.265 The practice is, however, well 
established.266 The  ISDA master  agreement  includes  a  full  waiver  of  sovereign 
Kröll,  'The  Renegotiation  and  Adaptation  of  Investment  Contracts',  in  Arbitrating  Foreign 
Investment Disputes (N. Horn (ed.), Kluwer, 2004), 425-470, at pp. 427-428.
261And  more  specifically  whether  the  arbitrator  is  entitled  to  'rewrite'  the  contract.  See  e.g.  P. 
Bernardini, 'The Renegotiation of the Investment Contract', 13(2) ICSID Rev. 411, 420-425 (1998).
262In general,  G. R. Delaume, 'Contractual Waivers of Immunity : Some Practical Considerations', 5 
ICSID Rev. 322 (1990).
263See e.g. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica S.A., 676 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1982) (the 
court found that Banco Nacional, which was an instrumentality of the government of Costa Rica,  
had waived “any right or immunity from legal proceedings including suit judgment and execution 
on grounds of sovereignty which it or its property may now or hereafter enjoy”);  EM Ltd. v. The  
Republic of Argentina, 382 F.2d 291 (2004) (the Second Circuit held that Argentina had waived its 
sovereign immunity in the documentation of the bond issue in dispute).  This practice has been 
confirmed notably by J. A. Guria-Trevino, in 'Negotiations with Transnational Banks : A Sovereign 
Borrower's  Perspective”,  reproduced  in  International  Borrowing.  Negotiating  and  Structuring 
International Debt Transactions (D. D. Bradlow (ed.), 2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff/ILI, 1986), 389 at 
395.
264Ph. Wood (fn. 98) at p. 573, § 24-038.
265In the United Kingdom, section  3(3)(b) of the 1978 State Immunities Act provides that « (b) any 
loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of  
any such transaction or of any other financial obligation » constitue a « commercial transaction » 
for which a State does not enjoy immunity. In the United States, the FSIA provides an exception to  
the sovereign immunity for 'commercial activity' undertaken by the foreign State (section 1605 (a)  
(2)). In order to conclude that the issuance of debt instruments by a State was analogous to a private 
commercial transaction, the Supreme Court decided in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover (504 U.S. 
607) that “...when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a 
private player within it, the foreign sovereign's actions are “commercial” within the meaning of the 
FSIA...”. Justice Scalia explained that “there is … nothing distinctive about the state's assumption 
of debt (other than perhaps its purpose) that would cause it always to be classified as jure imperii...” 
(504 U.S. at 617).
266In order to accommodate the diversity of opinions on the extent of sovereign immunity, the waiver 
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immunity.267 This may reflect the perception by lenders that the lack of uniformity of 
immunity rules and the significant variations which may affect such rules warrant an 
express contractual protection.268 Some States will, however, not accept a waiver for 
attachment prior to judgment or in aid of execution.269
In other contexts, the State is less likely to accept a waiver of immunity. This is the 
case  for  concession  contracts.270 In  yet  other  contracts,  the  existence  of  a  waiver 
depends  on  the  bargaining  power  of  the  parties.  When  a  waiver  of  immunity  is 
included, it may be drafted indirectly, with language indicating that the object and the 
purpose of the contract constitute 'commercial and private acts'.271 This comports with 
the practice in many jurisdiction to exclude any claim for immunity by a sovereign 
when the dispute concerns commercial or other private transactions.
The validity  of  a  waiver  of  immunity  is  not  challenged.  It  is  recognized both by 
national legislation 272 and by international instruments.273 The discussion focuses not 
so much on validity  as  such,  but  rather  on the existence,  scope and effect  of  the 
waiver.274 The determination of such scope and effect may lead to difficulties, as the 
boundaries of sovereign immunity and the restrictions that may limit a State's ability 
to waive immunity vary from State to State.  To take the example of central  bank 
assets, if the position is prima facie identical in New York and England, whose laws 
is very often stated to be “to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law”.
267Section 13(d) of the 2002 Master Agreement provides that “Each party irrevocably waives, to the 
extent permitted by applicable law, with respect to itself and its revenues and assets (irrespective of  
their use or intended use) all immunity on the grounds of sovereignty or other similar grounds from 
(i)  suit,  (ii)  jurisdiction  of  any  court,  (iii)  relief  by  way  of  injunction  or  order  for  specific  
performance or recovery of property, (iv) attachment of its assets (whether before or after judgment) 
and (v) execution or enforcement of any judgment to which it or its revenues might otherwise be  
entitled in any Proceedings in the courts of any jurisdiction and irrevocably agrees, to the extent  
permitted by applicable law, that it will not claim any such immunity in an Proceedings”.
268This is the explanation given by G. R. Delaume, 'Sovereign immunity and public debt', Festschrift  
in Honor of Sir J. Gold, WERNER F. EBKE and J. J. NORTON (eds.), Recht & Wirtschaft 1990, 21, at p. 
31.
269This  was  for  example  the  position  in  Mexico  :  J.  A.  Guria-Trevino,  in  'Negotiations  with 
Transnational Banks : A Sovereign Borrower's Perspective”, reproduced in International Borrowing. 
Negotiating and Structuring International Debt Transactions (D. D. Bradlow (ed.), 2nd ed., Martinus 
Nijhoff/ILI, 1986), 389 at 395.
270Ph. Wood, Project Finance, Securitisations, Subordinated Debt (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at p. 21.
271See e.g. the waiver included in the contract which was considered by the English courts in Sabah 
Shipyard Pakistan) Ltd. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2002] EWCA Civ 1643 – section 2.6 of the 
contract concluded by a Pakistani company (wholly owned by a Malaysian company) and various 
companies owned by Pakistan, for which Pakistan had acted as a Guarantor provided that “The 
Guarantor  hereby  irrevocably  and  unconditionally  agrees  that  the  execution,  delivery,  and 
performance by it of this Guarantee constitute private and commercial acts.”
272There is no discussion in most jurisdictions on the validity of a waiver of immunity by a sovereign  
state. See section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, which provides an exception to sovereign immunity when 
“the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.” For other references 
to waiver in the FSIA, see sections 1610(a)-(c), § 1610(d) and § 1611(b)(1).
273See e.g. Art. 2 and 3 (immunity of jurisdiction) and Art. 23 (immunity of enforcement) of the 1972 
European Convention on State Immunity (Basel) and Art. 7 (waiver of immunity from jurisdiction) 
and  Artt.  18  and  19  (immunity  from  enforcement)  UN  2004  Convention  on  Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property.
274Another discussion relates to the question which entity within a State has competence to agree to a  
waiver of immunity. See in this respect section 2(7) of the English State Immunity Act of 1978.
WAUTELET – INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRACTS – APPLICABLE LAW 49/58
grant  such assets  a  wide immunity,275 there is  a  clear  difference  between the  two 
jurisdictions in that it  is  not clear under the laws of New York to which extent a 
foreign central bank may agree to a waiver of immunity, whereas the question has 
been answered positively in England.276 A difference may also exist as to what type of 
state property may be attached. This explains why contract practice has adopted very 
sophisticated drafting,277 including not only a basic waiver of immunity of jurisdiction 
and of enforcement, but also excluding some assets from any measure or earmarking 
them for loan service purposes.278
When the contract includes a waiver, the question arises how to construe it.279 Some 
courts  have  taken  quite  a  relaxed  attitude  towards  such  waiver,  construing  them 
without undue restraint.280 Other courts have adopted a more conservative approach.281
Practice has shown that discussion on the exact effects of a waiver is not rare. In one 
275In the US, section 1611(b)(1) FSIA. In the UK, section 14(4) SIA.
276On  this  issue,  consider  E.  T.  Patrikis,  'Immunity  of  Central  Bank  Assets  under  US  Law',  in 
Sovereign Lending, Managing Legal Risk (M. Gruson & R. Reisner (eds.), Euromoney, 1984), 89-
101, at p. 97-99.
277In most cases, the provision will also include a waiver of immunity from prejudgment proceedings, 
relief  and  attachment  (such  as  Mareva injunctions  and  other  prejudgment  injunctions  or 
attachments) and also a provision appointing an agent for service of process. 
278In some cases, the waiver will explicitly exclude some assets – see e.g. the waiver by Argentina in 
some bond issues in the early 2000 : the waiver expressly mentioned that it did not apply to central  
bank  reserves,  public  domain  assets  and  assets  needed  for  the  enforcement  of  the  budget  (as  
apparent from the quotation by the French Supreme Court, 28 Sept. 2011,  NML Capital Ltd. v.  
Republic of Argentina). See in the same dispute NML Capital Limited v. Republic of Argentina, 
[2011] UKSC 31 (Supreme Court, judgment of 6 July 2011). In loan agreements, a variation of 
waiver under the form of a warranty such as : « The borrower is subject to civil and commercial law 
with respect to its obligations under this Agreement. The execution, delivery and performance of  
this Agreement by the borrower constitute private and commercial acts, rather than governmental or 
public acts. The Borrower and its property do not enjoy any right of immunity from suit, set-off or  
attachment  or  execution  on  judgment  in  respect  of  the  obligations  of  the  borrower  under  this  
Agreement. The waiver contained in this Agreement by the borrower of any such right of immunity 
is irrevocably binding on the borrower” (Language offered by Ph. Wood (fn. 98) at p. 574, § 24-
040).
279This question is often caused by the laconic drafting of the waiver. As Meessen wrote, “To do so is  
not an easy task. As lawyers  well  know, the time of  negotiating an investment  contract  with a 
sovereign state is not the time to discuss the most humiliating aspects of a worst case scenario. It is  
like discussing the terms of the divorce on the day of the wedding. In a word, waivers, if explicitly 
made at all, tend to be less than specific” (K. Meesen, 'State Immunity in the Arbitral Process', in 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (N. Horn (ed.), Kluwer, 2004), 387-397, at p. 392.
280So it is that a court in the United States held that to be “explicit” as required by the FSIA, a waiver 
of sovereign immunity inserted by Argentina in the documentation of German bonds it had issued,  
need not contain a reference to the United States or a specific jurisdiction in the US, as Argentina 
had argued. A waiver of immunity in “any court” was sufficient according to the Court :  Capital  
Ventures Intl. v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2009). See also Libra Bank 
Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982) – where the court held that the 
State which had accepted a waiver drafted in the most comprehensive way, also had waive its 
immunity  from  pre-judgment  attachment.  See  also  Sabah  Shipyard  Pakistan)  Ltd.  v  Islamic  
Republic of Pakistan [2002] EWCA Civ 1643 – the court held that the waiver included in a contract  
signed by Pakistan also applied to proceedings brought by a company which sought an injunction 
restraining  Pakistan  from bringing proceedings in  Pakistan,  while  the  agreement  called for  the 
courts of England to have jurisdiction.
281See the discussion by F. Knoepfler, 'L'immunté d'exécution contre les Etats', Revue de l'arbitrage 
1017, 1028-1038 (2003).
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the  numerous  proceedings  brought  by  creditors  following  Argentina's  default,  a 
discussion arose in relation to the effects of the waiver by Argentina of its sovereign 
immunity in bond documentation. The question arose whether this waiver also applied 
to assets held by the Argentinian social security system in New York as part of a fund 
to meet pension obligations.282
There might also be a discussion on the question whether the waiver only pertains to 
the immunity from adjudication or also concerns the immunity from execution.  In 
most  jurisdictions,  waiver  of  immunity from execution  requires  a  separate  waiver 
from immunity from adjudication.283 Questions may also arise  when the waiver  is 
included in one agreement linked to several other agreements which do not include a 
waiver.284
When the contract does not include a specific waiver by the State, this does not mean 
that the State will be able to rely on its sovereign immunity. Other contract provisions 
or the behavior of the State could be interpreted to mean that the State has indeed 
waived its  immunity.  This is the case for example when the State has agreed that 
disputes  would  be  settled  by  arbitration.  A difficult  issue  concerns  the  question 
whether entry into an arbitration agreement by a State may be interpreted as consent 
to a waiver.285 In some jurisdictions, the presence of an arbitration clause will be taken 
to mean that the State has at least waived its immunity from jurisdiction.286 French and 
282In first  instance, a district  court  first  allowed the creditor to attach the assets,  holding that  the 
waiver by Argentina of its sovereign immunity in bond documentation also applied in this case  
(Aurelius Capital Partners. LP v. The Republic of Argentina, 07-CIV-2715 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
The Second Circuit reversed and vacated the attachment, holding that the funds were immune under  
the FSIA, without resolving the parties' dispute about whether the Social Security Administration 
was a separate agency or instrumentality of Argentina (see Aurelius Capital Partner, LP v. Republic  
of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 1691 (2010)). In general on the 
question whether a waiver should be given by the State itself or by the agency, H. Fox, The Law of 
State Immunity (OUP, 2002), at p. 265.
283H. Fox,  The Law of State Immunity (OUP, 2002), at p. 265. The position is, however, different 
under Swiss law.
284See e.g.  Proyecfin de Venezuela S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 
1985) : an initial  loan contract  concluded by Proyecfin with a  consortium of banks included a 
waiver of immunity. The borrower then concluded another contract with BIV, a state owned bank 
supervising the use of the money, which provided that the provisions of the loan agreement were 
incorporated  by  reference  into  the  contract.  The  Court  held  that  the  waiver  applied  to  this 
supervisory contract by incorporation.
285See  e.g.  Art.  17  of  the  2004  UN Convention,  which  provides  that  “If  a  State  enters  into  an 
agreement in writing with a foreign natural or juridical person to submit to arbitration differences  
relating to a commercial transaction, that State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a 
court  of  another  State which  is  otherwise  competent  in  a  proceeding  which  relates  to:  (a)  the 
validity, interpretation or application of the arbitration agreement; (b) the arbitration procedure; or 
(c) the confirmation or the setting aside of the award, unless the arbitration agreement otherwise 
provides.”
286This is the case in France, where courts have accepted that the presence of an arbitration agreement 
means that the State could no longer rely on its immunity of jurisdiction before the court seized of a 
request to support the arbitration process, nor before the court dealing with a request to enforce an 
arbitral award – see e.g. CFI Paris, 10 January 1996, Revue de l'arbitrage 427 (2002). The position 
is similar in England, see Svenska Petroleum Explorations AB v. Lithuania et al., [2006] 1 All ER 
731, §§ 111-123 – decided on the basis of  Section 9(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 which 
provides  "Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or may arise, to 
arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom 
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American court have gone one step further and held that if a State has committed to 
arbitration under institutional rules such as the ICC Arbitration Rules, this should be 
held as constituting an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity, as the rules impose 
obligations on the party to honor an arbitral award.287 In other jurisdictions, courts 
have not been prepared to accept such an implicit waiver.288
* * *
§ 2 Contractual Arrangements on Dispute Resolution
What contractual arrangements are made for dispute resolution by parties concluding 
a contract when one of the parties is a State or a State agency? Practice is far from 
uniform. Depending on the nature and the importance of the agreement, three main 
options may be distinguished which will be discussed in turn. Another option will not 
be  discussed,  i.e.  the  choice  not  to  include  in  the  contract  any specific  provision 
regarding dispute resolution.289
2.1 Choice for courts of the contracting State
When a contract is concluded with a State, parties may choose to refer future disputes 
to  the  courts  of  the  contracting  State.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  generalize,  it  is 
believed that many 'one shot' contracts concluded by States include a choice for the 
State's  courts.290 In  some  countries,  this  may  even  be  mandatory  under  local 
administrative regulations. In supply or off-take contracts, the practice is also oriented 
which relate to the arbitration.".
287In France, see Sté Creighton Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance of Quatar et al.,  Court of Cassation, July 6, 
2000, Revue de l'arbitrage 114 (2001) (and the follow up case by the Paris Court of Appeal of Dec. 
12,  2001,  Revue  de  l'arbitrage  147  (2003),  deciding  on  remand  after  the  Supreme  Court  had 
quashed an earlier decision), where the Supreme Court held that “ … l'acceptation du caractère 
obligatoire de la sentence qui résulte  de celle  de la convention d'arbitrage opérant,  au vu du  
principe de bonne foi et sauf clause contraire, une renonciation à l'immunité d'exécution”). In the 
United States, see  Walker International Holdings Ltd. v. République du Congo, 395 F.3 229 (5th 
Cir.). For the position under English law, see H. FOX, The Law of State Immunity, (OUP, 2002) at p. 
267, with reference to the attempts by Liamco to enforce arbitral awards obtained following the 
cancellation of oil concessions by Libya.
288For a discussion of English and German case law, see S. EL SAWAH, Les immunités des Etats et des  
organisations internationales. Immunités et procès équitable (Larcier, 2012) at pp. 196-198, § 480 
ff. The question was recently touched upon in a case decided in Hong Kong, where a distressed debt 
fund sought to enforce an ICC award against assets of an African State, arguing that the acceptance 
by the State  of  an  ICC arbitration clause,  meant  that  the State  had waived  its  immunity from 
enforcement. See FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo et al., [2009] 1 
HKLRD 410 (Court of First Instance) and [2010] 2 HKLRD 66 (Court of Appeal). See in general,  
A. Sinclair and D. Stranger-Jones, 'Execution of Judgments or Awards against the Assets of States 
Entities', Disp. Res. Intl., 105 ff. (2010).
289Although this is difficult to demonstrate, it is likely that smaller contracts, concluded on a one off  
basis, often lack a proper dispute resolution provision.
290See e.g. the contract the basis of the dispute settled by the Iran US Claims Tribunal in T.C.S.B. Inc.  
v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 114-140-2 (16 March 1984), 5 Iran-US C.T.R. 160 : the 
contract included a clause vesting exclusive jurisdiction in Iranian courts.
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towards choice for the courts of the State.
In large, investment contracts, the choice for the courts of the host State is definitively 
not the favored option for the investor. Sometimes, this option cannot, however, be 
avoided. It is indeed not uncommon to see that the authorities of a State will insist on 
the submission of disputes to their courts.291 
2.2 Choice for courts of a third State
It may not be natural for a State to accept to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
another State.  This is nevertheless what happens at  least in those fields where the 
State must cede before the request of its contracting partner.
Financial transactions concluded by States offer a good example of this practice. As is 
well known, most of these transactions will include a choice for the courts of a major 
financial center, such as New York or London.292 The ISDA Master Agreement for 
example provides that disputes will be submitted to English or New York courts. Even 
before the practice became institutionalized through ISDA, it was already common for 
international loans to include a choice for the courts of a neutral country. When the 
courts of England or of another common law country were selected, this could be 
done by having the sovereign borrower appoint an agent in that country.293 As with 
other types of international loans, choice of court clauses to be found in sovereign 
borrowing are often non-exclusive, leaving the lender with the choice of where to 
bring proceedings.294
Outside the field of financial agreements, a choice for the courts of another State is  
sometimes made by parties to a State contract, although it is difficult to determine 
with precision how frequent the practice is. One may refer to the choice for English 
courts which was included in a contract for the design, construction and maintenance 
of  electric  generation  facilities  concluded  between  a  company  incorporated  in 
Pakistan, but wholly owned by a Malaysian parent, and various companies owned by 
Pakistan.295
2.3 Arbitration agreement
Arbitration is probably the dispute resolution method chosen in the largest number of 
291See e.g. the oil contracts signed by the Algerian national oil company D.-E. Lakehal (fn. 32) at p. 
513.
292According to Gooch and Klein, the courts of New York or English courts “are most frequently 
chose, because those jurisdictions have an institutional interest in continuing to be perceived as 
providing a fair forum to borrowers and lenders”. These authors add that these courts “are the home 
jurisdictions  of  major  borrowers  as  well  as  lenders,  which  works  to  ensure  an  even-handed 
legislative and judicial approach to problems”. As final justification, these authors note that “the 
relevant substantive law in these jurisdictions is well developed, and the courts have a good record 
for fair treatment of litigants” : A. C. Gooch and L. B. Klein (fn. 170) at p. 357.
293As reported by Ph. Wood (fn. 167) at pp. 127-128.
294As reported by  Ph. Wood (fn. 167) at pp. 139-140. Some States resist this type of non-exclusive 
agreements, see e.g. for Mexico, J. A. Guria-Trevino (fn. 266) at p. 395.
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international contracts concluded by States. This dispute resolution method coincides 
with the interest of both the State and the private party, who each would like to resist 
submitting disputes to the courts of the other. Arbitration has also received the most 
attention in relation to State contracts, in part due to a few large cases where disputes 
were indeed submitted to arbitration.
Many  contracts  signed  by states  or  state  entities  include  a  choice  for  arbitration. 
Arbitration is for example often chosen as dispute resolution method in government 
concessions and construction contracts.296 In the oil industry, arbitration also appeared 
to  be  the  favored  dispute  resolution  method.297 So  it  is  that  a  contract  concluded 
between  State  of  Israel  and  the  Iran  Oil  Company  which  was  considered  by  the 
French  Supreme  Court  in  2005  included  a  choice  for  arbitration.298 International 
financial institutions also frequently opt for arbitration in the contracts concluded with 
States and state entities.299 The standard clause in the General Conditions for Loans of 
the IBRD provides for example that “any controversy between the parties to the Loan 
Agreement or to the parties to the Guarantee Agreement […] shall be submitted to 
arbitration by an Arbitral Tribunal [...]”.300 In transactions with commercial banks and 
other non-institutional lenders, arbitration is, on the contrary, not favored as dispute 
resolution  method.301 This  is,  however,  not  due  to  specific  features  of  sovereign 
borrowing  but  rather  to  the  strong  reluctance  of  the  financial  sector  towards 
arbitration.
Often, the choice for arbitration is accompanied by an obligation for parties to attempt 
first to find a settlement.302
295See Sabah Shipyard Pakistan) Ltd. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2002] EWCA Civ 1643 - the 
proceeding arose following the introduction by Pakistan of proceedings before a court in Pakistan,  
in violation of the choice of court clause; the court in England was asked to issue antisuit injunction  
restraining Pakistan from doing so.
296See  e.g. art. 23 of the the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement which is used by the  
Libyan National Oil Corporation, which includes a choice for ICC arbitration. See also Ph. Wood 
(fn. 267) at p. 15, § 2-010.
297Cuervo has reported that the vast majority of oil and gas contracts concluded in South American 
include an arbitration agreement : L. E. Cuervo (fn. 221) at pp. 12-13.
298See eg State of Israel v National Iran Oil Company (French Supreme Cour, Fev. 01, 2005, case No. 
01-13;742/02-15.237) – in that case, the Supreme Court considered a contract concluded in 1968 
between the State of Israel and the Iranian National Oil Company relating to oil transactions. The 
agreement included an arbitration clause which provided that if the two arbitators designated by the 
parties could not agree on the resolution of the dispute or on the choice of a third arbitator, the  
President of the ICC would be asked to proceed with the appointment of the chair.
299See  the  overview  of  the  practice  of  the  main  financial  institutions  in  G.  Domenico  Spota, 
'Arbitration  and  the  Contracts  of  International  Institutions',  in  Contrats  publics  et  arbitrage  
international (M. Audit (ed.), Bruylant, 2011), (99), 103-108 – Spota explains, however, that the 
EIB has chosen another path, preferring to submit disputes either to the courts of a Member State or  
directly to the ECJ, and this although the statute of the EIB provides that the Bank may “provide for 
arbitration in any contract” (art. 27 EIB Statute).
300Section 8.04, General Conditions dated July 1, 2005, as amended through February 12, 2008. See 
the comments by  J. Head, 'Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World 
Bank and Other Multilateral Development Banks', 90 Am. J. Intl. L. 214 ff. (1996).
301As reported by Ph. Wood, (fn. 167), at pp. 127-128.
302See  section  16.13  of  the  contract  concluded  in  2007  between  Contract  Belgium  and  a  large 
pharmaceutical company, which provided that “Les parties s'efforceront de résoudre toute difficulté  
ou  tout  différend  pouvant  survenir  entre  elles  par  un  dialogue  mené  de  bonne  foi  dans  la  
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In  recent  years,  the  impact  of  arbitration  on  dispute  between  States  and  private 
companies  has  been  greatly  encouraged  by  the  multiplication  of  BIT.  As  is  well 
known, this has given rise to what is now commonly referred to as arbitration without 
privity.303 Arbitration proceedings may indeed be initiated by a company or individual 
against a State even if parties are not bound by a contract including an arbitration 
agreement. The foundation for the arbitration is to be found in a generic offer made in 
bilateral investment treaties - and also in regional and multilateral treaties - to refer 
disputes to arbitration. ICSID is one of the favorite arbitration forum in this respect. 
The  consequences  of  this  development  are  well-known,  as  is  the  impact  of  the 
distinction between so-called 'contract claims' and 'treaty claims'.304
When one  looks  at  the  practice,  there  does  not  seem to  be  a  favored  method  of 
arbitration.  A good number of contracts  concluded by States,  include a choice for 
traditional  arbitration  institutions,  such  as  the  ICC,305 which  may  rely  on  a  long 
experience in administering arbitration involving states.306 Ad hoc arbitration is also a 
favorite of States when concluding contracts.307  Before the ICSID was created, most 
of the important arbitral proceedings involving state contracts were handled through 
ad hoc arbitration.308 Sometimes, the State will insist that the seat of the arbitration is 
located on its territory.309
Today it is no longer challenged that when a State or State entity accepts to submit to 
arbitration, such a choice is valid, save for possible limitations imposed by national 
laws.310 This is in sharp contrast with the attitude take some decades ago, when it was 
perspective d'une solution amiable.” (followed by an ICC arbitration clause).
303Following the  phrase  coined  by  J.  Paulsson,  'Arbitration Without  Privity'  ICSID Rev 232-257 
(1995).
304See in general,  B. M. Cremades and  D. J.A. Cairns, 'Contract and Treaty Claims and Choice of 
Forum in Foreign Investment Disputes', in Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (N. Horn (ed.),  
Kluwer, 2004), 325-351.
305This is e.g. the case for concession contracts concluded by the Brazilian National Oil Agency – see 
the comments of D. Szyfman (fn. 129) at p. 232 (indicating that the agreements include a choice for 
ICC arbitration, with Rio de Janeiro as place of arbitration).
306See S. Greenberg, 'ICC Arbitration & Public Contracts: The ICC Court’s experience of arbitrations 
involving states and state entities', in Contrats publics et arbitrage international,(Bruylant, 2011 M. 
AUDIT (ed.) 3-23. See  e.g. ICC case No. 7710 (1995), published in Journal de droit international 
1004 (1993).
307And  international  organizations.  See  section  16  of  the  United  Nations  General  Conditions  for 
Contracts for Purchase of Goods, which provide that failing amicable settlements, disputes shall be 
referred by either Party to arbitration in accordance with the Uncitral Arbitration Rules. The UN 
General Conditions for Contract includes a similar provision.
308See e.g. the various arbitration proceedings which considered the fate of the Libyan oil concessions, 
to which reference has already been made.
309For the practice under concession contracts in project finance, see Ph. Wood (fn. 267) at p. 21.
310The presence of an arbitration agreement in a contract concluded by a State is no longer taken as a 
sign that parties to the contract have implicitly accepted the application of international law to their 
contract or that the contract is 'internationalized'. See, however, the observations of P. de Vareilles-
Sommières and  A.  Fekini,  (fn.  32)  pp.  3-30  –  according  to  these  authors,  the  choice  in  the 
Exploration and Exploitation contracts signed by the Libyan Oil Company demonstrates that parties 
have  intended  to  submit  their  agreement  to  the  'lex  mercatoria'  (at  §§  28-29).  De  Vareille-
Sommières recognizes, however, that the lex mercatoria may only complement the agreement and 
not contradict the law chosen by parties (at §§ 31 ff.).
WAUTELET – INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CONTRACTS – APPLICABLE LAW 55/58
suggested  that  a  State  could  validly  decide  to  ignore  and  escape  an  arbitration 
agreement which it had signed.311
There remains, however, some resistance to arbitration.312 This is in particular the case 
for contracts concluded with so-called 'developing states', which are sometimes still 
wary  of  international  arbitration,  which  is  seen  as  a  circumvention  of  the  state 
authority.  Although  the  resistance  has  slowly  disappeared  and  ebbed  away,313 it 
remains quite strong in some countries where recourse to arbitration is not allowed for 
government contracts.314
When  arbitration  is  allowed,  the  resistance  may  translate  in  guerrilla  tactics. 
Experience has shown that this resistance may lead States to try to wrestle out of 
arbitration which they may have accepted,  once a dispute arises.315 This translates 
among other tactics by reliance on the plea of sovereign immunity as a technique to 
avoid the duty to  submit  to  arbitration.316 Some State  have also refused to  appear 
before the arbitral tribunal, expressing their dissatisfaction with the arbitral process 
through their non-appearance.317 It is sometimes also argued that in contrast with the 
position adopted for commercial contracts, an arbitration agreement does not survive 
the termination of the contract when the contract is unilaterally terminated by a state 
through the adoption of legislation.318
Many questions  may  arise  when  a  State  is  involved  in  arbitration  proceedings.319 
Questions arising in this context are for example whether a claimant which has signed 
311See for an account of the attempts by States to avoid arbitration agreements and the arguments  
made to that effect, P. Lalive, 'L'influence des clauses arbitrales', Revue belge de droit international 
at pp. 572-573 (1975). On the position today, see the various contributions published in Contrats  
publics et arbitage international (M. Audit (ed.), Bruylant, 2011, 234 p.).
312As is  well  known,  until  the 1970's  many States  in  South America  and Africa fiercely  resisted 
arbitration and insisted on local jurisdiction for investment disputes.
313Algeria is a good example : while the 1986 Act prohibited arbitration in the field of oil contracts,  
the Act of 2005 allows arbitration to settle disputes which could arise between the national  oil 
agency (ALNAFT) and a private company. The involvement of a national oil company (Sonatrach) 
has,  however,  given rise to some difficulties (see  M. Trari-Tani,  'The new legal  framework for 
prospecting, research and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Algeria', Intl. Bus. L. J. (53-67), at p. 65 
(2008).
314This  is  apparently the case  in  Dubai  (see  Art.  36  of  the  Law No.  6 of  1997 on  Contracts  of 
Government  Departments  in  Dubai  Emirate  which  provides  that  “No  contract  where  Dubai 
Government or any of its departments is a party shall contain a provision for arbitration outside  
Dubai Courts...) and in Russia (where the statute governing concession agreements does not provide 
for the possibility to refer concession disputes to  international arbitration – domestic arbitration is, 
however, allowed – see the Report for Russia in  International Project Finance and PPP's. A Legal 
Guide to Key Growth Markets (fn. 135) at pp. 89-90 and 95. In general on arbitration of contracts 
concluded by States in arab countries, see the explanations of N. Najjar, L'arbitrage dans les pays 
arabes face aux exigences du commerce international (LGDJ, 2004), pp. 182-191.
315See e.g. A. and R. Mezghani, 'Souveraineté de l'Etat et participation à l'arbitrage', Rev. arb., 1985, 
518 ff.
316See e.g. Elf Aquitaine Iran v. NIOC, arbitral award, Revue de l'arbitrage 401 (1984).
317As was  e.g. the case for the famous three arbitrations which followed the nationalization of the 
Libyan oil operations.
318See M. Sornarajah (fn. 16) at pp. 414 (who accepts that the position may be different in case of an 
arbitration agreement referring disputes to ICSID).
319See  in  general  State  Entitites  in  International  Arbitration  (E.  Gaillard  (ed.),  IAI  Series  on 
International Arbitration No 4, Juris Publishing, 2008).
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a contract with a state company, may also direct its arbitration request towards the 
State. This question has been extensively discussed following the  Westland 320 and 
Pyramides cases.321 It appears that the ICC looks with some stringency at the question 
whether a state which has not signed an arbitration agreement, may nonetheless be 
included in arbitration proceedings.322
Another  question  arising  in  relation  to  arbitration  of  state  contracts  is  that  of  the 
possibility  to  settle  disputes  arising  in  relation  with  several  distinct  contracts 
concluded  by  a  State,  before  a  single  arbitral  tribunal.  This  question  is  of  great 
importance when a State concludes several contracts with different parties with a view 
to a major project, such as the construction of a motorway or of a power plant. It is 
likely that in this situation, the parties concerned enter into various contracts- such as 
a construction agreement, a joint venture agreement, etc. If a dispute arises, the State 
would  like  to  file  a  single  arbitration  request  for  all  questions  arising  under  the 
different  contracts.  Whether  or  not  this  may  be  consolidated  in  a  single  set  of 
proceedings,  is  a  question  which  also  arises  when  no  State  or  public  entity  is 
concerned. It is far from certain that this question must be addressed using different 
standards because one of the parties is a State or a state controlled entity.323
* * *
Concluding observations
The issue of the law applicable to public contracts represents only one perspective on 
the process of internationalization of such contracts. In many ways, this perspective is 
biased  as  it  starts  from  the  assumption  that  the  contract  presents  a  cross-border 
dimension, thereby leaving aside the more subtle ways in which public contracts, be 
they domestic or not, could be influenced by international processes.
The overview of theoretical foundations and of current practices in relation to the 
legal framework applicable to international public contracts could,  however,  prove 
useful in general for public contracts. First, the survey shows that the delimitation of 
cross-border and domestic agreements is a difficult one to draw, and in many respects 
320See  e.g.  P.  Lalive 'Arbitration  with  foreign  states  or  state-controlled  entities  :  some  practical 
questions' in Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Julian Lew (ed.), Nijhoff 1987), 
289-296; Ph. Leboulanger, 'Groupes d'Etat(s) et arbitrage' Revue de l'arbitrage 415 ff. (1989).
321In which the question arose whether the claimant could file its request not only against the party 
with which it had contracted (the public company Egoth), but also against Egypt – which was only 
party to another contract and argued that it had not signed the arbitration agreement and should 
therefore be left outside the arbitration proceedings. See Paris, 12 July 1984 Revue de l'arbitrage 75 
(1986)  (setting  aside  the  award  issued  on  11  March  1983  (ILM  776  (1983)),  by  which  the 
arbitrators  had  accepted  that  Egypt  was  bound by  the  arbitration  agreement)  and  Cassation,  6 
January 1987 Revue de l'arbitrage 469 (1987).
322According to E. Silva-Romero 'ICC Arbitration and State Contracts', ICC Bulletin – Special Issue, 
34-60, at pp. 47-48 (2002) – who notes that the ICC « will undertake a more rigorous prima facie 
analysis of whether or not an arbitration agreement might exist with respect to « the public law 
entity » (at p. 48).
323Silva-Romero has, however, argued that the ICC could adopt a “stricter practice when faced with a 
group of state contracts...” (E. Silva-Romero (fn 318), at p. 50).
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an artificial one. While some contracts may from the start be characterized by a strong 
international  import,  the  international  nature  of  other  contracts  could  be  revealed 
through other, more discrete means. It is therefore important not to overemphasize the 
distinction between the two categories.
Second,  the  survey  reveals  the  tension  between  the  ever  more  sophisticated 
contractual techniques, which aim to bring legal certainty and enhance the position of 
the private party, and the public objectives pursued by the authorities involved. This 
tension,  which  has  in  particular  been  apparent  in  the  discussion  of  stabilization 
techniques,  is  not  a new one,  nor is  it  likely to go away soon. It  is  one of those 
perennial difficulties contract drafters should learn to cope with.
Finally,  the overview has learned that beyond the common features uniting public 
contracts, there is plenty of room for diversity. When attempting to carve out new 
solutions, one should therefore be careful not lose sight of the differences which may 
stand in the way of a unified solution.
* * *
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